It is generally believed that natural languages have lots of contextually sensitive expressions. In addition to familiar examples like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘today’, ‘he’, ‘that’ and so on that everyone takes to be contextually sensitive, examples of expressions that many would take to be contextually sensitive include tense, modals, gradable adjectives, relational terms (‘local’, ‘enemy’), possessives (‘Annie’s book’) and quantifiers (via quantifier domains). With the exception of contextually sensitive expressions discussed by Kaplan [1977], there has not been a lot of discussion as to the mechanism whereby contextually sensitive expressions get their values in context, aside from vague references to speakers’ intentions. My main task here will be to propose a candidate for being this mechanism and defend the claim that it is such. Because, as I suggested, these issues have been most extensively discussed in the case of demonstratives, I’ll focus on these expressions by way of contrasting the mechanism I will propose with others in the literature. However, as I’ll discuss further below, the reader should bear in mind that I am inclined to think that the mechanism I’ll discuss applies in the case of (almost—see below) all contextually sensitive expressions.

At least since the work of David Kaplan [1977], many philosophers and linguists distinguish two kinds of contextually sensitive singular terms.¹ On the one hand, there are pure indexicals: expressions that take on different values in different contexts and whose conventional meanings by themselves suffice to secure values in contexts. One could argue over particular cases, but ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ are often

¹ In calling these expressions singular terms, I do not mean to commit myself to the claim that they are all referring expressions. They are all NP’s that in some sense are used to talk about objects. In this sense, definite descriptions are singular terms, even if a Russelian quantificational account of them is correct.
taken to be expressions of this sort. These are the expressions to which the mechanism I shall propose as to how contextually sensitive expressions get their values in context does not apply. I bring them up to set them aside. On the other hand, there are **demonstratives**: expressions that need to be supplemented in some way in order that they secure values in contexts. Second and third person pronouns, and simple and complex demonstratives—both singular and plural—are generally taken to fall into this category.²

Again, at least since the work of Kaplan [1977] there has been a lively debate about what determines what a given use of a demonstrative takes as a value in a context.³ As I’ve indicated, I want to formulate and defend a view about what mechanism secures the value of a given use of a demonstrative in context. I’ll then consider a series of arguments given by Kent Bach that would undermine my account, and respond to them.

Kaplan [1977] held that demonstratives require an associated demonstration. The requirement was enforced by what Kaplan called “the linguistic rules”, and a demonstrative without an associated demonstration was held by Kaplan to be “incomplete”:

Some of the indexicals require, in order to determine their referents, an associated demonstration: typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing. These indexicals are the true demonstratives, and ‘that’ is their paradigm. The demonstrative (an expression) refers to that which the demonstration demonstrates. I call that which is demonstrated the ‘demonstratum.’

A demonstrative without an associated demonstration is incomplete. The linguistic rules which govern the use of the true demonstratives ‘that’, ‘he’, etc., are not sufficient to determine their referent in all contexts of use.

²I’ll use ‘demonstratives’, as I just have in the previous sentence, to mean second and third person pronouns, as well as simple (‘that’/’those’) and complex demonstratives (‘that dog’/’those dogs’) both singular and plural. (Of course second and third person pronoun have non-demonstrative uses as well.) I’ll use ‘simple demonstrative’ for ‘this’/’that’/’these’/’those’; and ‘complex demonstrative’ for ‘this dog’, etc.

³I’ll continue to talk about the value of a demonstrative in context instead of talking about what it refers to because I take simple and complex demonstratives to be quantificational. See King [2001]. My talk of an object being the value of a use of a simple or complex demonstrative should not be construed as committing me to the claim that the demonstrative refers to the object.
Something else—an associated demonstration—must be provided. The linguistic rules assume that such a demonstration accompanies each (demonstrative) use of a demonstrative. An incomplete demonstrative is not vacuous like an improper definite description. A demonstrative can be vacuous in various cases. For example, when its associated demonstration has no demonstratum (a hallucination)—or the wrong kind of demonstratum (pointing to a flower and saying 'he' in the belief that one is pointing to a man disguised as a flower)—or too many demonstrata (pointing to two intertwined vines and saying 'that vine'). But it is clear that one can distinguish a demonstrative with a vacuous demonstration: no referent; from a demonstrative with no associated demonstration: incomplete.4

Presumably when Kaplan talks of the “linguistic rules assuming” that a demonstration accompanies each use of a demonstrative, he means that it is part of the lexical semantics of demonstratives that they require supplementation by a demonstration. A complete demonstrative in context refers to the thing that the demonstration demonstrates. Thus, for Kaplan [1977], it is the demonstration that determines a value for a demonstrative in context. For Kaplan, this value is a semantic value of the complete demonstrative in context. Call this the demonstration account.5

As Kaplan himself recognized, the demonstration account has various problems. The first problem is that it simply isn’t clear what a demonstration is for Kaplan. In footnote 9, a footnote to the passage quoted above, Kaplan [1977] writes

However, a demonstration may also be opportune and require no special action on the speaker's part, as when someone shouts “Stop that man” while only one man is rushing toward the door. My notion of a demonstration is a theoretical concept. I do not, in the present work, undertake a detailed ‘operational’ analysis of this notion, although there are scattered remarks relevant to the issue.6

It is hard to know how to think of the demonstration in such a case. Other cases are even

4 Kaplan [1977] p. 490-91
5 I actually don’t want the demonstration account to entail that demonstratives refer. It holds only that the supplementation required by demonstratives, by means of which they acquire values in context, is a demonstration.
6 p. 490
more difficult to fit into Kaplan’s mold. As we sit in a bar you used to frequent with your ex-girlfriend who dumped you recently, I can note a wistful look on your face, and say to you ‘She probably misses you now.’ referring to your ex-girlfriend. Again here it is hard to know how to think of the demonstration. So for the advocate of the demonstration account, there are many, many cases in which it just isn’t clear what the demonstration is. Hence, on such an account it just isn’t clear what secures the value of a demonstrative in context. Further, I am skeptical about the possibility of formulating a notion of demonstration that is general enough to capture all the cases discussed so far, while excluding cases in which even the demonstration theorist will want to say that there was no demonstration.

A second difficulty, noted by Kaplan [1978], is that in many cases a demonstration will be vague in the sense that there is no one thing clearly being demonstrated. An example would be a wave of the hand in the general direction of a dog, a bike and a child as I utter ‘Careful, that is a mean dog.’ Here it does not seem as though it was the demonstration alone that secured a value for the demonstrative, contrary to what the demonstration account claims.

A final difficulty, again pointed out by Kaplan [1978], is that even if focus my pointing with laser-like precision on my friend Glenn and say ‘He is an architect.’, I am pointing not only at Glenn, but at his shirt, his jacket, perhaps a button, etc. So here again, my demonstration—the pointing—does not seem as though it alone secures a value for the demonstrative in context.

Kaplan famously changed his mind about what secures a value for a demonstrative in a context. In Kaplan [1989], he claimed that ‘at least in the case of
perceptual demonstratives’ what he called the “directing intention” (he also calls it the “perceptual intention”7) of the speaker fixes the value of the demonstrative. Presumably, by ‘perceptual demonstratives’, Kaplan means those that are used to talk about something the speaker is perceiving. The idea, then, is that when a speaker is perceiving an object and forms the intention to talk about it by means of using a demonstrative, the value of the demonstrative the speaker produces in such a case is the object the speaker intends to talk about. Call this the intention account.

Reimer [1991, 1992] argues against the intention account by claiming that in all cases in which the demonstrated object diverges from the object towards which the speaker has a directing intention, it is the demonstrated object that is the value of the demonstrative relative to the context contrary to what the intention account predicts. She offers the following case:

Suppose, for instance, that I suddenly realize that I have left my keys on the desk in my (shared) office. I return to my office, where I find the desk occupied by my officemate. I then spot my keys, sitting there on the desk, alongside my officemate’s keys. I then make a grab for my keys, saying just as I mistakenly grab my officemate’s keys, “These are mine.” Now in such a case, Kaplan would presumably want to say that I had a “directing intention” with regard to my keys. For it was my set of keys that I focused on, and it was my set of keys that “directed” my grabbing. I intended to grab my keys, not my officemate’s. Thus, on Kaplan’s view, the demonstratum of “these,” as that expression occurred in my utterance, was my set of keys. And yet the keys that I’ve demonstrated by way of grabbing are my officemate’s keys. And so surely in such a case my officemate would speak truly were he to say to me, “No, you’re wrong. Those are not your keys; they’re mine.” The appropriateness (not to mention truth) of such a reply would suggest that my officemate’s keys—and not my own—were the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in my utterance. For if my keys were that demonstratum, then my officemate’s allegation that what I had uttered was untrue, would have been false—which surely it is not. If Kaplan’s view were correct, then my officemate’s reply would indicate that he simply hadn’t understood what I had in fact said (which was actually true), and his failure to understand

7 Kaplan [1989] p. 583
what I had said, would be due, on Kaplan’s view, to the fact that I demonstrated an object which was not the actual (i.e., intended) demonstratum. (Contrast the appropriateness of my officemate’s reply with the inappropriateness of my rejoinder, uttered while handing him back his keys, “Yes, these keys are yours, but I never said they were mine.” If Kaplan’s view were correct, my rejoinder ought to be both appropriate and true.)

The case seems to me underdescribed in a crucial respect. Are we to suppose that Reimer is continuously perceiving her keys and intending to talk about them from the time she first spots them until the time she has grabbed the officemate’s keys and finished her utterance? How could that be? How in that case are we to explain her picking up the wrong keys? It seems that at some point prior to actually grabbing the officemate’s keys she had to have shifted both her perceptual focus and her intention from her keys to her officemate’s. But then the case doesn’t constitute a counterexample to Kaplan’s intention account, since arguably Reimer at the crucial moment had shifted her intention to the officemate’s keys.

Further, Reimer is wrong in claiming that in all cases in which the demonstrated object and the intended object diverge, it is the demonstrated object that is the value of the demonstrative. Suppose an adult male swim coach is standing alone by the side of a pool. Various things are around him, a lifeguard tower among them. We are both looking in the general direction of the coach and, focusing on him, I form the intention to talk about the swim coach. I point in his general direction but am clearly pointing at the lifeguard tower to his right as I say ‘That is the swim coach.’ It seems obvious that in

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8 Reimer [1991] p. 190-191
9 Or she lost perceptual contact with the keys altogether. But then it isn’t clear that she had a perceptual intention and so it isn’t clear that Kaplan’s intention account is meant to apply to the case. For Kaplan only commits to the intention account when the directing intention is towards a currently perceived object.
10 Or at least it isn’t clear that the case constitutes a counterexample to Kaplan’s intention account.
such a case the swim coach gets secured as the value of my demonstrative, despite the fact that the demonstrated object diverges from the intended object; and in this case, it seems that the swim coach is secured as the value precisely because you have good reason to think I intended to talk about the man and not the tower I was in fact pointing at. So, contrary to what Reimer [1991, 1992] claims, I do not think cases of this sort cut against the intention account.

However, the intention account does have various difficulties. A problem with evaluating the account is that nothing has been said about how the values of non-perceptual demonstratives are secured in context.\(^{12}\) Consider Kaplan’s famous case of pointing behind himself at a spot on the wall long occupied by a picture of Carnap without turning to look at it and saying ‘That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.’, where unbeknownst to Kaplan the Carnap picture was replaced by a picture of Spiro Agnew. Since Kaplan is not perceiving the object he intends to talk about by means of the demonstrative, it just isn’t clear what the intention account predicts here. If we extend the account saying that a demonstrative secures as a value in a context whatever the speaker intends to talk about by means of the demonstrative, then it appears that the value of the demonstrative in this case is Carnap’s picture.\(^{13}\) The case is a strange one and it isn’t clear to me at least what the right thing to say about it is. But saying that in this case Carnap’s picture is the value of the demonstrative, so that Kaplan spoke truly, seems like a wrong thing to say.\(^{14}\) So in such

\(^{12}\) This is noted by Reimer [1991].

\(^{13}\) Of course there is a sense in which Kaplan intends to talk about the picture behind him. But as Reimer [1992] notes, this intention is derivative in the sense that Kaplan only has this intention because of his intention to talk about Carnap’s picture and his belief that Carnap’s picture is behind him. This is discussed further below.

\(^{14}\) At least this is so if we assume that Kaplan’s audience knows nothing about Carnap’s picture having occupied the spot now occupied by the Agnew picture.
cases, the intention theory either yields an incorrect prediction or no prediction.\footnote{Reimer [1991, 1992] makes essentially this point. We’ll see below that the intention account actually has another option here. See note 22.}

Further, and more importantly, the intention account seems very strained in cases in which a speaker has the relevant intention but mounts either a poor demonstration or no demonstration. For example, suppose I am sitting on Venice beach on a crowded holiday looking south. Hundreds if not thousands of people are in sight. I fix my attention on a women in the distance and, intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely to the south, say ‘She is athletic.’ You, of course, have no idea who I am talking about. It seems quite implausible in such a case to say that I succeeded in securing the woman in question as the value of my demonstrative simply because I was perceiving her, and intending to talk about her. Or consider Reimer’s [1991] example of two people in a park filled with dogs, one of which the speaker recognizes as her dog Fido. Focusing on Fido and intending to talk about him, she says ‘That dog is Fido.’ without producing any sort of demonstration (no pointing, nodding, glancing etc.) due to a sudden and momentary paralysis. Again, it does not seem as though the speaker succeeds in securing Fido as the value of her demonstrative in such a case. But she should have if the intention account were correct.

The difficulties noted with the intention and demonstration accounts have inclined some to combine them. Kaplan [1978] suggested such a view. Motivated in part by the second and third difficulties with the demonstration account discussed above, Kaplan suggests allowing the intended demonstratum to play a role in securing the value of a demonstrative in context “within limits”. Kaplan doesn’t make clear exactly what those limits are, but he does make clear that he wants to allow speaker intentions to play a role
in securing the value of a demonstrative in context in cases in which the demonstration mounted is too vague to do the job itself (e.g. I wave my hand in the general direction of the intended object, where there are other objects in the vicinity). He also wants to invoke intentions to make it the case that when I say ‘That is a nice dog.’ pointing at Fido, his coat and a flea on his coat, it is Fido who gets to be the value of my demonstrative in virtue of my intention to talk about him and not his coat or the flea. And finally, he does not want to allow that in the Carnap/Agnew picture case discussed above he succeeds in securing the picture of Carnap as the value of his demonstrative despite intending to refer to the picture of Carnap, writing ‘There are, of course, limits to what can be accomplished by intentions (even the best of them).’

Call the view that allows demonstrations together with intentions (limitedly) to secure the value of a demonstrative in context the hybrid account.

Reimer [1992] complains that the hybrid account will have the result that in the Agnew/Carnap picture case the speaker does not secure the picture of Agnew as the value of his demonstrative. This is because the demonstration alone doesn’t serve to single out the picture (as opposed to part of the frame etc.); and bringing in the speaker’s intended object won’t help because the intended object is the picture of Carnap. I think Reimer is correct in claiming the the hybrid view has the consequence that the picture of Agnew is not secured as the value of the demonstrative in this case. But I don’t view this as a serious objection to the view. As I suggested above, I do think that it is clear that in the Agnew/Carnap picture case the speaker does not succeed in securing the picture of Carnap as the value of the demonstrative (assuming the audience knows nothing about

16 Kaplan [1978] p. 396
the Carnap picture). However, I do not think that it is clear in this case that Kaplan will have succeeded in securing the picture of Agnew as the value of his demonstrative and so said something (presumably false) about the picture of Agnew. Of course Kaplan’s audience, particularly if they are unaware of the switch, may well take Kaplan to have said something about the picture of Agnew. But it really isn’t clear that he has. For one thing, if we alter the case by supposing that the picture of Carnap was removed and replaced with, for example, a wall clock or a sconce, the intuition that Kaplan has said something false about the wall clock or the sconce in uttering ‘That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.’ is quite weak. Indeed, I think it is tempting to say in this case that no value was secured for the demonstrative in the context. But it is hard to see why this case is any different from the original in terms of the facts that are relevant to determining whether any object was secured as the value for the demonstrative. After all, the only difference in the cases is that we have a clock or a sconce in one and a picture of Agnew in the other. Similarly, it is hard to see how the Agnew/Carnap picture case is different in relevant respects from a case in which I am perceiving Shane, form the intention to say something about him, and just as I turn my head and say ‘That is one of the greatest skiers of the last twenty years.’, Shane falls through a trap door so that my demonstration picks out some other thing. Again here, it is tempting to say that nothing was secured as the value of my demonstrative rather than saying that whatever happens to be in the way of my pointing was.

As a result of these considerations, I don’t think that the fact that on the hybrid view the picture of Agnew is not secured as the value of the demonstrative in the Agnew/Carnap picture case can be used as an argument against it.
However, I do think that there are difficulties with the hybrid account. First, like any account that invokes demonstrations as an important part of the story as to how demonstratives secure values in contexts, the hybrid account needs to address cases of the sort mentioned earlier where it just isn’t clear what the demonstration is. That is, the account needs a theory of demonstrations; and as I suggested above, there is reason to be skeptical that a workable theory is forthcoming. Second, like the intention account, the hybrid account seems to predict that speakers secure values for uses of demonstratives in certain cases in which it seems implausible that they do. As we saw in discussing the intention account, these are cases in which speakers have the relevant intentions and either mount a poor demonstration or no demonstration. Recall the example in which I am sitting on Venice beach on a crowded holiday looking south, with swarms of people in sight. I fix my attention on a women in the distance and, intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely to the south, say ‘She is athletic.’ It seems quite implausible in such a case to say that I succeeded in securing the woman in question as the value of my demonstrative simply because I was perceiving her, intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely in her direction. Or recall the Reimer’s [1991] example of two people in a park filled with dogs, one of whom the speaker recognizes as her dog Fido. Focusing on Fido and intending to talk about him, she says ‘That dog is Fido.’ without producing any sort of demonstration (no pointing, nodding, glancing etc.) due to a sudden and momentary paralysis. Again, it does not seem as though the speaker succeeds in securing Fido as the value of her demonstrative in such a case.\(^{17}\)

I’ve now argued that three common views about how values of demonstratives are

\(^{17}\) Of course a hybrid account on which demonstratives require demonstrations wouldn’t have problems with this last case. In fact, I believe that Kaplan [1978] intended the hybrid account to be understood in this way.
secured in context are flawed. Thinking of how and why will suggest an alternative
view that I’d like to explore. The view that the demonstration alone secures values for
demonstratives was seen to be inadequate partly because a speaker’s demonstration may
be “unclear” in various ways, and so not secure a unique value (e.g. a vague gesture in
the direction of a number of things); and even if it is perfectly precise, it typically picks
out more than one thing (a dog, its coat, a flea, etc.). So something more or different is
required. Speaker intentions, with or without demonstrations, won’t do the job either
because this sort of view predicts that speakers secure values for demonstratives in cases
in which they intuitively do not.

Thinking about these latter cases suggests that the theories we have looked at err
in not requiring the speaker to do enough to secure a value for her demonstrative. In the
cases where the intention and hybrid accounts incorrectly predict that speakers secure
values for demonstratives, what drives the intuition that they really have not is that their
hearers don’t seem to have any way of knowing what the relevant values are. Intuitively,
the speaker failed to discharge her responsibility to be understandable. This suggests that
we should make it a requirement on securing a value for a demonstrative in context that
the speaker has discharged this responsibility and has made her hearer able to determine
what that value is. However, we don’t want to require that the hearers in fact figure out
what the relevant value is. That would be too strong. If my hearer is inattentive,
incompetent or simply ignoring me, that should not by itself prevent me from securing a
value for my demonstrative. So I suggest we say that the value of a use of a
demonstrative in a context is that object o that meets the following two conditions: 1) the

\footnote{All the views I’ve considered have it that something about the speaker secures the values. I haven’t
considered views, such as Gauker [2008], on which other features of the context secure values of
demonstratives. That’s a job for another day.}
speaker intends o to be the value; and 2) a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer would take o to be the object that the speaker intends to be the value. We can abbreviate this by saying that an object o is the value of an occurrence of a demonstrative in context just in case the speaker intends o to be the value and the speaker successfully reveals her intention.\(^{19}\) I’ll call this account of how demonstratives acquire values the **coordination account**.

Note that on this view, demonstratives do not require an accompanying demonstration. A demonstration *may* be used as a means of insuring that condition 2 is met. But it need not be. There are many other ways of meeting condition 2. If we both witness a loud explosion and I say ‘That was earshattering.’ intending to talk about the noise, condition 2 is bound to be satisfied in the absence of a demonstration. And so on the coordination account, the noise is the value of my demonstrative. This kind of case highlights an advantage of the present view over views on which demonstratives must be associated with demonstrations. As we saw, such views must give an account of what the demonstration is in cases in which it is not at all clear what the demonstration is or even whether there was one, including the case just mentioned as well as those discussed earlier. By contrast, the coordination account can simply deny that there are demonstrations in such cases. As long as conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied by one object in such cases, a value will be secured despite the lack of a demonstration.

The coordination account avoids the other problems with the demonstration account. Vague demonstrations or demonstrations that by themselves don’t determine a unique object are no problem for the coordination account since it doesn’t claim that

\(^{19}\) Note that a speaker can successfully reveal her intention even though her hearer failed to figure out what she intended. The hearer could be inattentive, incompetent, etc.
demonstrations alone secure values for demonstratives. Again, on the coordination account all demonstrations ever do when they accompany demonstratives is to help with the satisfaction of condition 2 above. But other things may help too.

The Carnap/Agnew picture case will be discussed below, but the coordination account avoids the other problems with the intention account. Recall that cases in which speakers have the relevant intentions but mount poor or no demonstrations caused trouble for this account since it predicts that speakers secure values for their demonstratives, whereas intuitively they do not. In cases of this sort, some of which were described above, on the coordination account the demonstratives will not have values since condition 2 above will not be satisfied. Finally, the coordination account avoids the problems of the hybrid account, since the problems with that account were problems had by the demonstration and intention accounts; and we have seen that the coordination account avoids the problems with those views.

The coordination account requires elaboration in a number of ways. Recall that the coordination account claims that the value of a given use of a demonstrative is that object that meets the following two conditions: 1) the speaker intends it to be the value; and 2) a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer would take it to be the the object that the speaker intends to be the value. We should understand condition 2 in such a way that the idealized hearer knows the common ground of the conversation in Stalnaker’s sense at the time the sentence containing the demonstrative was produced. This will allow us to handle cases such as the following. Suppose we are in a graduate seminar. It is common ground that a participant, Glenn, is skiing at Mammoth today and so couldn’t attend the seminar. It is also common ground that he always sits in a now empty chair to my right.
Intending to say something about Glenn, I point at the empty chair and say “I bet he is having fun right now.’ Since I intend Glenn to be the value of my demonstrative and a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of our conversation would take him to be the the object that I intend to be the value, he is the value of my use of the demonstrative. This seems to be the intuitively correct result.

The Agnew/Carnap picture case brings out another respect in which the coordination account requires further elaboration. There are actually two versions of the case that don’t seem to have been distinguished in the literature. If we suppose that Kaplan’s audience did not know that a picture of Carnap had been hanging where the picture of Agnew is now hanging, the coordination account would seem to predict that the demonstrative has no value. For Kaplan intends the picture of Carnap to be the value of his demonstrative (though see below), whereas a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of our conversation would take him to intend the picture of Agnew to be the value. So nothing satisfies the two conditions required for something to be the value of a demonstrative.

However, suppose the audience did know that a picture of Carnap had long occupied the spot now occupied by the picture of Agnew. Indeed, suppose it is part of the common ground of the conversation that the picture of Carnap had occupied that spot. In such a case Kaplan will intend that the picture of Carnap be the value of his demonstrative and a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of conversation would take Kaplan to intend Carnap to be the value. So it may appear that our two conditions are satisfied and that the coordination account predicts that in such a case, the picture of Carnap is secured as the value of the demonstrative. In this
case, the audience certainly will take Kaplan to convey the claim that the picture of Carnap is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. So if the coordination theory did predict that the picture of Carnap is secured as the value of the demonstrative in this case, I don’t think it would be such a bad result. However, I actually don’t think that the coordination theory should be construed in such a way that it makes this prediction. This is due to the fact that in this case Kaplan has another intention in addition to the intention to have the picture of Carnap be the value of his demonstrative: the intention that the object behind him be the value of his demonstrative. Of course this latter intention is in some sense derivitive on his other intention. That is, he has the latter intention because he intends to have the picture of Carnap be the value of his demonstrative and he believes that the object behind him is the picture of Carnap. Let’s call the intention to have the picture of Carnap be the value of Kaplan’s demonstrative the first intention and the intention to have the object behind him be the value of the demonstrative the second intention. Of course Kaplan thinks that the intentions have the same thing as their objects: the picture of Carnap. But they don’t. By the lights of any theory that gives speaker intentions a large role in securing the value of a demonstrative, having the first and second intentions determine different objects in the way that they do in the present case amounts to the case being one in which a significant mechanism for securing values of demonstratives has gone badly astray. When the first and second intentions don’t pull together in having the same thing as their objects, it seems very natural to think that one can’t say unequivocally what Kaplan intended to be

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the value of his demonstrative.\textsuperscript{21} This in turn suggests that in such a case, there is no one object that he intends to be the value of his demonstrative. But then the first condition that an object must satisfy to be the value of a demonstrative on the coordination account is not met by any object. Hence, the coordination account ought to predict that Kaplan’s demonstrative has no value. For myself, I find the claim that in both versions of the Agnew/Carnap picture case, Kaplan has not secured a value for his demonstrative plausible, as I indicated above in discussing cases like it except that a clock or a sconce had replaced the picture of Carnap.

As a further point in favor of this position, let me note that in both versions of the case, it will seem odd for someone to say that Kaplan had said that a picture of Carnap was a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century or that a picture of Agnew was if he or she is apprised of all the details of the case. In the first version of the case, to simply report that Kaplan said that a picture of Agnew was a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century without saying anything further seems highly infelicitous (I take it that in this case no one would be tempted to say that he said that a picture of Carnap is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century). In the second version of the case the same is true; and it would also be strange to say that Kaplan said that a picture of Carnap was a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, without saying something further. This, even though in this case he will have conveyed the claim that a picture of Carnap is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century to his audience. These facts are easily explained if Kaplan secured no value for his demonstrative in either version of

\textsuperscript{21} Of course in some uses of demonstratives there will not be these two intentions. In some uses, e.g. I will simply be perceiving something and intending that it be the value of my demonstrative as I utter ‘that’. So here there can be no question of the two intentions determining different objects.
the case, as the coordination account claims.\textsuperscript{22}

Let’s consider a final respect in which we \textit{might} want to elaborate the coordination account.\textsuperscript{23} I am a bit more tentative about this elaboration, but the issues are sufficiently interesting as to merit at least brief discussion. The leading idea behind condition 2 of the coordination account’s view of what is required for a speaker to secure an object \(o\) as the value of a demonstrative in context is that the speaker needs to meet a certain standard in making her intention that \(o\) be the value recognizable to her hearers. The standard imposed by condition 2 is that a reasonable, attentive, competent speaker who knows the common ground of the conversation would know what the speaker intended to be the value of her demonstrative. This makes the standard the speaker needs to meet to secure a value for her demonstrative the same in every context. However, it may be that this standard actually varies depending in part on what sort of audience the speaker is addressing.\textsuperscript{24} Suppose, for example, one is talking to young children or adults with visual and auditory disabilities. It seems at least somewhat plausible that the speaker would have to do \textit{more} than condition 2 requires by way of making her intentions manifest in order to secure a value for her demonstrative than if she were speaking to reasonable, competent, attentive adults lacking disabilities. Or suppose I am talking to hyper intelligent adults who are significantly superior to normal adults in using world knowledge in practical reasoning. It seems intuitively plausible that I might have to do \textit{less} than condition 2 requires to secure a value for my demonstrative. Finally, suppose I

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\textsuperscript{22} It is open to the intention account to take the same position as the coordination account on the two versions of the Agnew/Carnap picture case, thus eliminating one of its difficulties. See note 15. The other difficulties stand.
\textsuperscript{23} Thanks to Claire Horisk and Andrew Moon for discussion here.
\textsuperscript{24} The standard may vary as a function of factors as well, but the nature of the audience seems the most plausible of the factors that have occurred to me.
\end{flushleft}
am talking out loud to myself. Again, it may seem plausible that I have to do much less than condition 2 requires to secure a value for my demonstrative. 25 Such cases suggest amending condition 2 in such a way that what standard the speaker has to meet varies with the speaker’s audience. But really, it is more plausible that the standard should vary with either what is in the common ground about the audience (e.g. they are children) or what the speaker knows about the audience. If it isn’t common ground that the speaker is talking to children or the speaker doesn’t know he is talking to children (they are cleverly disguised as adults), the speaker can’t be held responsible for not taking this information into account. In such a cases, the speaker might succeed in securing a value for her demonstrative and fail dramatically to communicate.

Condition 2, amended to have the desired affect, runs roughly as follows: 2) a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation at the moment the speaker makes her utterance and who has the properties that the common ground says members of the audience have (alternatively: who has the properties the speaker knows the members of the audience to have) would take o to be the object that the speaker intends to be the value. 26 However, as I have suggested, I am

25 Thanks to Andrew Moon for this case. Moon imagined waking up after a long night at a bar, and, thinking of a particular person one had been talking to, saying to oneself ‘That guy was an idiot.’ Here intuitively it can seem that you have successfully secured a value for your demonstrative despite the fact that a reasonable, attentive, competent hearer who knew the common ground of the conversation would not recognize who you intended (since there were lots of people at the bar who we interacted with, even someone who knows all about the evening will not recognize who you intend). On the other hand, one might think that in such a case all that matters is that a speaker knows who her own speaker reference is (and in any remotely normal case, she will). Given the purposes of the utterance, one might think that we simply don’t need the demonstrative to have a semantic value here. Anyone who thought this wouldn’t be moved by this case to alter condition 2. However, the various cases one can come up with, including those mentioned in the text, make it at least somewhat plausible that we should alter condition 2 in the way proposed below.

26 I stating condition 2 in this way, I haven’t chosen between whether we should take what the speaker knows about the audience or what is in the common ground about the audience to count. Also, in either case, we are likely to bring in irrelevant properties of the audience (e.g. we are at a pep rally and everyone is wearing red shirts). But I don’t see that this does any harm.
more tantative about this elaboration than the previous two. Because of this and for ease of exposition in what follows, I’ll suppress the elaboration just discussed and will revert to the simpler formulation of condition 2 on which it talks simply of a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground.

I think of the fact that a speaker intends an object to be the value of an occurrence of a demonstrative and the fact that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend that a certain object be its value to be objective features of a context of utterance. Call the former the speaker fact and the latter the hearer fact. A context is appropriate for a sentence containing demonstratives if each occurrence of a demonstrative in it is associated with a speaker fact and a hearer fact and these facts “involve” the same object (i.e. the intended object in the speaker fact is the object that would be taken to be intended in the hearer fact). For a given occurrence of a demonstrative in an appropriate context, call this latter object the coordinated object. Then I view the meaning of a demonstrative as a function that maps an appropriate context to the coordinated object.\textsuperscript{27} I take the latter to be the semantic value of the occurrence of the demonstrative in the context. Finally, I take the lexical meanings of demonstratives to require that a use of a demonstrative be supplemented by a speaker’s intention that is recognizable by an ideal hearer in just the way that the demonstration account held that the lexical meanings of demonstratives require that a use be supplemented by a demonstration. Though demonstratives share this feature of their lexical meanings, different demonstratives have other, different features of their lexical meanings (e.g. ‘he’ has as part of its lexical meaning that its value in a

\textsuperscript{27} Or at any rate, this is so for demonstratives that refer. Recall that I don’t take simple or complex demonstratives to be referring expressions, so the story is a bit different for them.
To this point, my defense of the coordination account has amounted to claiming that it gets the intuitively correct results in a variety of cases. That is, it predicts that speakers secure values for their demonstratives in cases in which that verdict seems intuitively correct; and it predicts that speakers fail to secure values for their demonstratives in cases in which that verdict seems intuitively correct. But I think the coordination account has a number of other considerations in its favor. First, there is a theoretical reason for favoring the coordination account. If we are constructing a semantic theory for a language with demonstratives and we want to define the notion of a use of a demonstrative having \( o \) as its semantic value in context \( c \), it seems reasonable to require in that definition that the speaker did what was required for successful communication with a demonstrative. After all the purpose in using a demonstrative is to communicate something about its value. It seems plausible to say that a speaker succeeded in securing a value for her demonstrative in context just in case she did what is required for its serving its purpose. And that in turn is a matter of doing enough to allow her audience to recognize what she intends to be the value, since this is what is required in order that the speaker communicate something about the value by means of her demonstrative. But this is just what the coordination account requires for a speaker to secure a value for her demonstrative in context. In this way, the coordination account’s notion of securing a value for a demonstrative in context can be seen as characterizing what must happen on the speaker’s side in order for communication to succeed. That seems to me to be a theoretical virtue. At any rate, it at least shows the point of the coordination account’s notion of securing a value for a demonstrative in context.
I mentioned above that one advantage of the coordination account over accounts that require demonstratives to be accompanied by demonstrations is that accounts of the latter sort must give some account of what the demonstration is in cases in which speakers seem to successfully secure values for their demonstratives despite not appearing to mount demonstrations in any obvious sense. The coordination account can simply deny that there are any demonstrations in such cases. A related advantage of the coordination account, as the example involving Glenn above showed, is that there is no puzzle at all about cases of so-called deferred reference: cases in which one in some sense indicates one thing while securing some distinct thing as the value of the demonstrative. On the coordination account, an object o is secured as the value of a use of a demonstrative iff the speaker intends o to be the value and the speaker successfully reveals her intention. What cases of so-called deferred reference show is that one can successfully reveal one’s intention to have o be the value of a use of a demonstrative by indicating some object other than o. This is hardly surprising given that speakers can even successfully reveal such an intention by indicating nothing at all, as we have seen.

As I indicated at the outset, another pleasing feature of the coordination account is that it can be applied much more widely than just to demonstratives. There are many, many cases of contextually sensitive expressions for which it is plausible that speaker intentions play some role in supplying them with values in context. Examples include those mentioned at the outset: tense, relational terms (‘enemy’, ‘local’), gradable adjectives, quantifiers (domain restriction), modals, possessives (‘John’s book’), and so on. The coordination account can be applied to all such cases. In all such cases, it seems plausible that the value the expression takes in a context is the one that the speaker
intends and that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend. Of course in the case of different sorts of contextually sensitive expressions, it may be that different features of the context of utterance will make a thing be such that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of our conversation would take the speaker to intend it to be the value of the use of the expression. But this seems true even of a given contextually sensitive expression. Consider a context $c_1$ in which there is a loud explosion, immediately after which I say ‘That was loud.’. Now consider a context $c_2$ in which I point at a painting sitting alone in a corner and say ‘That is nice.’. It seems that the features of the $c_1$ that make the explosion the value of ‘that’ in $c_1$ are quite different from the features of $c_2$ that make the painting the value of ‘that’ in $c_2$.

If the same mechanism is at work in all cases in which contextually sensitive expressions secure values in context (excepting pure indexicals), the only remaining question is why we do often employ demonstrations when using demonstratives but not in these other cases. I actually think that one can use gestures to help reveal one’s intentions in some other cases. E.g. a bunch of dishwashers are each given a stack of dishes to wash, and, finishing mine before the others are done, I gesture at my finished stack and say to my boss ‘All the dishes are done.’ Still, the fact that we don’t use gestures much in these other cases, if in fact the coordination account applies across the board as I am claiming, requires explanation. I suspect the explanation is very simple. It is extremely efficient and easy to reveal your intentions to talk about people and other objects in your environment by demonstrating them. This is much harder to do with

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28 Of course, some will hope for a theory of salience according to which both objects were something like maximally salient in their contexts. I am open minded, but very skeptical.
quantifier domains, standards for gradable adjectives, modal bases and ordering sources, and relations between people and books.

Let’s turn to worries with the coordination account. In a series of papers, Kent Bach has defended some views that conflict with the coordination account as I understand it. Bach has argued that intentions, or at least certain sorts of intentions, cannot contribute to determining what is said. But the way I understand the coordination account, in using a sentence with demonstratives appropriately, a speaker’s intentions do contribute to determining what is said by contributing to determining the value of the demonstrative relative to a context. Bach has also argued that intentions, or at least certain sorts of intentions, cannot be part of context, understood in the “narrow”, “semantic” sense. Context in this sense includes only a small number of “objective” features, including a speaker, an addressee, a time and a location. The coordination account as I understand it claims that speaker intentions can be part of the context that determines semantic values and what is said. Hence defending the coordination account requires addressing Bach’s arguments here.

Bach holds that what is said by a sentence in a context—its semantic content in that context—is determined by the semantic values in the context of the lexical items in the sentence (overt and covert) and their mode of syntactic combination. Here he follows Grice in having a very syntactically constrained notion of what is said. He differs from Grice in thinking that you can say something without meaning it. So if I utter ‘Kent is a fine friend.’ ironically after he betrays me, I say Kent is a fine friend but I

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29 Bach [2001] p. 29
mean the negation of this. On Bach’s view, saying one thing and meaning another, as occurs here, is nonliterality.®

Further, for Bach what is said need not be a proposition.® If I utter ‘Cindy is ready,’ what I say is not a proposition and not truth evaluable. However, what I mean is: e.g. I may mean that Cindy is ready for dinner.®

Bach holds that what a speaker means in speaking is given by her communicative intention. A speaker’s communicative intention is her intention that the hearer recognize that she means a specific proposition in saying what she says by means of recognizing this very intention and that the hearer is intended to recognize it.® The content of this intention is what the speaker is trying to communicate.® For Bach, to understand an utterance is to recognize the speaker’s communicative intention.® A speaker’s communicative intention is fulfilled by being recognized.®

When a speaker uses demonstratives, Bach thinks that her communicative intention includes as parts referential intentions associated with the occurrences of demonstratives.® These intentions are in some sense intentions to refer to things and get associated with occurrences of demonstratives.® But since Bach doesn’t think communicative intentions, or their parts, can determine what is said—the semantic value of a sentence in a context—the objects of these referential intentions cannot be constituents of what is said nor semantic values of demonstratives.

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33 Bach [2001] p. 17
37 Bach [2001] p. 31
38 Bach [2007] p. 3
40 Bach [2001] p. 33
41 Bach [2003] p. 26
With only this much of Bach’s view on the table, we can already state an argument of his that would undermine the coordination account’s claim that speaker intentions play a role in determining what is said. Because saying something doesn’t require meaning it, one can say something and have virtually any communicative intention or even none at all. This means that in different contexts one can use a given sentence S to say the same thing and have wildly different communicative intentions in the different contexts, or even none at all in some of them. But then communicative intentions cannot play a role in constitutively determining what is said. From this Bach infers that the speaker’s referential intentions, which are parts of his communicative intention, can play no role in determining what is said.

Let’s grant Bach’s argument here that a speaker’s communicative intention can play no role in constitutively determining what is said. In fact, Bach’s argument seems to me sound (though I might take issue with Bach’s views about the role of communicative intentions in understanding utterances, etc.). For the sake of argument, I’ll also grant Bach’s view that communicative intentions have referential intentions as parts, though I am somewhat skeptical of this claim. Finally, let’s identify Bach’s referential intentions involved with uses of demonstratives with speakers’ intentions that, according to the coordination account, play a role in determining the semantic values of demonstratives in contexts. In effect, Bach is arguing here that since what is said by uttering a given sentence S may be constant across a bunch of contexts, while the communicative

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42 Of course if you actually want to communicate something, it would be crazy to say certain things while having certain communicative intentions (or none at all), as Bach is well aware.
44 Bach [2001] pp. 32-33
45 Bach does allow that a speaker’s semantic or linguistic intentions can play a role in determining what is said. These are intentions concerning the resolution of vagueness and ‘the fixing of any indexical reference.’ (Bach [2001] p. 28, Bach [2007] p. 8 note 11)
intention backing the use of the sentence can vary indefinitely, the communicative
tention cannot play a role in determining what is said. And that seems exactly right.
But can you infer from this that the *referential intentions* that are parts of the
communicative intention play no role in determining what is said. No.

The coordination account claims that these referential intentions play a role in
determining what is said and that the values of demonstratives in contexts are
constituents of what is said.\(^{46}\) So take a sentence containing a demonstrative, say ‘He is
smart.’ and imagine it being used in different contexts to say the same thing *according to
the coordination account’s notion of saying the same thing*. Say that what is being said
in each context is that Kent is smart. Then it follows on the coordination account that the
speaker’s *referential intentions* remain constant across these contexts, even if her larger
communicative intentions are allowed to vary indefinitely. She must in each context
intend Kent to be the value of ‘He’. That means that in cases of this sort, we can’t have
what is said as understood by the coordination account staying constant across contexts
while referential intentions vary wildly. But then the considerations Bach raises here that
show that *communicative* intentions do not contribute to what is said cannot be used to
show that *referential* intentions do not contribute to what is said nor that the values of
demonstratives in contexts are not *semantic* values.

Next, Bach gives an argument, which he calls the *role of context argument*, for
the claim that context cannot play a part in determining what a speaker says, except for

\(^{46}\) The values of demonstratives in contexts are (sometimes) objects, and even though I don’t think simple
and complex demonstratives refer to these values/objects, there is a sense in which they are constituents of
what is said on my view.
fixing semantic values of pure indexicals.\textsuperscript{47} For obvious reasons, we’ll focus here on what a speaker says in uttering a sentence containing demonstratives. As we have seen, for Bach there is a narrow, semantic notion of context that includes the speaker, the hearer, the time and location. Pure indexicals have semantic values relative to these narrow, semantic contexts according to Bach. However, for Bach demonstratives do not, since their meanings aren’t rules that can be applied to these narrow contexts to yield semantic values. Bach also has a notion of the wide or broad context, comprising something like the mutually salient information at a given point in a conversation.\textsuperscript{48} However, Bach holds that context in this sense doesn’t play a role in constitutively determining the semantic value of anything. Context in this sense is used by hearers to figure out speakers’ communicative intentions, including referential intentions associated with occurrences of demonstratives (recall that Bach thinks that such referential intentions are parts of speakers’ communicative intentions). So the reason context can’t determine what is said beyond fixing the semantic values of pure indexicals is that narrow context can only do the latter. And broad context never plays any role in constitutively fixing semantic values of anything, but plays only an epistemic role in being used by hearers to figure out what speakers mean. So neither broad nor narrow context can constitutively determine any element of what is said that goes beyond the semantic values of pure indexicals. This means, of course, that the values of demonstratives in context are not semantic values and not constituents of what is said for Bach, contrary to what the coordination account claims.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Bach also argues that context can’t play a role in determining what a speaker means. But since this claim does not conflict with the coordination view, I won’t be discussing it.


\textsuperscript{49} Bach [2001] p. 32
Let’s call whatever context plays a role in constitutively determining semantic values the semantically relevant context. For Bach, this will be the “narrow” context consisting only of speaker, hearer, time and location. The response to Bach’s argument here is that the coordination account claims that the semantically relevant context is “bigger”—contains more features—than Bach claims it does. First, the coordination account claims that a speaker’s referential intentions are part of the semantically relevant context. Second, the fact that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend that a certain thing be the value of a given occurrence of a demonstrative must be a feature of the semantically relevant context as well on the coordination account. This latter fact will be highly complex but will include elements of what Bach calls broad context. This highlights the fact that the advocate of the coordination account differs from Bach in thinking that elements of what he calls broad context play a constitutive role in determining what is said.

Bach also argues that a speaker’s communicative intention cannot be part of the context. However, it seems to me that if the argument works, it would work for any speaker intentions, including those that the coordination account claims are part of context and play a role in securing values for demonstratives in context. Here is the crucial part of the argument:

However, if context is to play the explanatory role claimed of it, it must be the same for the speaker as it is for his audience and obviously the role of speaker intention is not the same for both.\textsuperscript{50}

The explanatory role of context that Bach mentions here is its role in explaining why the utterance of a sentence in a context has the content it has. So it is the semantically

\textsuperscript{50}Bach [2001] p. 30
relevant context that is in question here. Bach claims that the elements of the semantically relevant context must “be the same” for speaker and hearers. Bach is not fully explicit about what he means by “be the same”, but I think he must mean that speaker and hearers have to be epistemically related to the features of the semantically relevant context in the same way. Obviously, the speaker bears a very different epistemic relation to his intentions than the hearer does. So Bach concludes that speaker intentions cannot be part of the semantically relevant context.

The problem with this argument is that there is no reason to believe that speakers and hearers must bear the same epistemic relation to the elements of the semantically relevant context. Indeed, Bach himself must deny this. For Bach, the semantically relevant context--narrow context--includes the speaker, the hearer, the time and the place. Clearly, the speaker bears a different epistemic relation to himself than the hearer bears to him. The same, of course, is true of the hearer. Further, the speaker and hearer may bear different epistemic relations to the time and place of the context. Think of my being in a room that you have never been in and I call out to you ‘It’s dark in here.’ Clearly my epistemic relation to the location of the context of utterance is different from yours. So Bach’s argument here fails because the premise that speaker and hearer must bear the same epistemic relations to features of the semantically relevant context is false.

Finally, Bach in various places argues that what I am calling demonstratives don’t “refer as a function of context”. However, these arguments simply assume that the references of demonstratives are not constitutively determined by elements of what he calls broad context and that semantically relevant contexts do not include speakers’

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intentions. The first claim begs the question against the coordination account. And we have considered Bach’s arguments for the second claim. So there is no point in looking at these arguments of Bach’s.

Having surveyed various of Bach’s arguments that would undermine the coordination account, I conclude that the coordination account has effective responses to them.

References


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52 As we’ve seen, for Bach the semantically relevant context (his narrow context) includes only the speaker, hearer, time and place of the conversation.

53 Thanks to Eliot Michaelson, whose ideas caused me to stumble upon the coordination account; to Annie King for helpful comments and suggestions; to the audiences at the Mental Phenomena conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September, 2011, and the Kline Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics and Epistemology at the University of Missouri in October 2011 for helpful discussion.

