Two Sorts of Claims About “Logical Form”*

The notion of logical form broadly construed has been central to the enterprise of analytic philosophy. Indeed, much of what we call analytic philosophy can be understood as something like the attempt to “characterize the logical forms” of various classes of sentences. Thus metaethical investigations into the nature of moral goodness can be thought of as attempts to “characterize the logical form” of sentences such as ‘x is morally good’; epistemological investigations into the nature of knowledge can be thought of as attempts to “characterize the logical forms” of sentences such as ‘A knows that P’, and so on.

However, at least when viewed from a certain perspective, there are two quite different sorts of philosophical claims that one might intend in attempting to “characterize the logical form” of a given class of sentences. Unfortunately, these two sorts of claims have not always been carefully distinguished. And they should be carefully distinguished, not only for the sake of conceptual clarity, but because a given philosophical claim will have different implications depending on which of the two sorts of claims it is taken to be. Hence, when taken one way a given philosophical claim will be subject to objections that it is not subject to when taken the other way; and when taken one way a given philosophical claim will be able to do work in a larger philosophical theory that it could not do when taken the other way.

Though I have focused thus far on claims about logical form, similar remarks apply to claims to the effect that one is providing a philosophical “analysis” or “account” of e.g. knowledge or moral goodness. Here too, such claims can be interpreted in two importantly different ways.
In order to make these points clear, I shall begin by sketching a perspective from within which we can clearly distinguish these two sorts of claims about logical form. This perspective amounts to some minimal and quite plausible assumptions about propositions and their constituents. Once we have characterized the two different sorts of claims that one might intend when one makes a claim about “logical form”, by way of illustration, we will consider Russell’s [1905] theory of descriptions and note that the theory can be taken in two different ways, corresponding to the two different sorts of claims. Next, again by way of illustration, we shall consider a recent debate between Michael Smith and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord concerning Smith’s [1994] account of the concept of having a reason. We shall see that clarifying which of our two sorts of claims is being made at a crucial point would facilitate resolution of the debate.

I wish to stress the point just mentioned: the discussions of Russell’s theory of descriptions and the debate between Smith and Sayre-McCord are simply for illustrative purposes. The moral of the present paper is quite general. In (implicitly or explicitly) making claims about “logical form” or in providing “analyses”, philosophers need to be more explicit about which of the two sorts of claims discussed herein they are making.

First, then, let us discuss propositions. I shall assume that propositions are structured entities that have individuals, properties and relations as constituents. In saying that propositions are structured, I mean to say that something binds together the constituents of propositions and thereby imposes structure on the propositions. I shall represent this thing that binds together the constituents of a proposition by means of brackets or tree diagrams. Thus the proposition expressed by

1. Jason loves Michelle
might be represented in either of the following two ways:
1a. [Jason*[loves* Michelle*]]
1b. Jason*    loves*   Michelle*

where for any expression e, e* is its propositional contribution—thus Jason* is Jason,
loves* is the relation of loving, etc.. The constituents of a structured proposition, as I use
that term, are the entities inside the embedded brackets/at the terminal nodes of the
proposition. In 1a/1b, they are, of course, Jason*, loves* and Michelle*.

Turning now to the treatment of quantification, I shall assume that determiners
(‘some’, ‘every’, ‘few’ etc.) contribute to propositions relations between properties. Thus
‘some’ contributes the relation that obtains between properties A and B iff they are
coinstantiated; ‘few’ contributes the relation that obtains between properties A and B iff
few things that instantiate A instantiate B; and so on. Thus a quantified sentence like
2. Few men are happy.

expresses the proposition
2a. [[Few*: x [men* x]]happy* x]

where Few* is the relation expressed by ‘few’; men* is the property of being a man; etc..
This proposition is true iff the properties men* and happy* stand in the relation Few*,
(i.e. iff few things that possess men* possess happy*).

Though I have assumed that individuals, properties and relations are constituents
of propositions, nothing I am going to say requires this. For present purposes it suffices
to hold that propositions are structured in the way just described and that they have
constituents of whatever sort that can have some sort of “nature” or “internal structure”.
Thus structured propositions with Fregean senses or “concepts” as constituents would do
just as well. As promised, then, the framework that suffices for distinguishing between our two sorts of claims about logical form is plausible and minimal. I suspect that much more minimal assumptions would suffice to make our distinction (or some analogue of it). But I leave this as an open question.

Against the background of this account of propositions, how are we to understand a claim to the effect that a certain sentence or class of sentences has such and such logical form? Clearly, we will understand such a claim to be a claim about the proposition(s) expressed by the sentence(s) in question. However, there are at least two different things that one might be claiming about the proposition(s) in question. One might be either:

(PSC) making a claim about the structure and constituents of the proposition(s) expressed by the sentence (class of sentences).

or

(NPC) making a claim about the “natures” or “internal structures” of one or more constituents of the proposition(s) expressed by the sentence (class of sentences).

I call the first sort of claim a PSC claim, since it is a claim about a proposition’s structure and constituents. I call the second sort of claim an NPC claim, since it is a claim about the nature of (one or more) propositional constituents. As we shall see, these two sorts of claims are quite different, and very often a given philosophical proposal can be taken as either sort of claim. To see this, let us consider Russell’s [1905] theory of descriptions.

In fact, it is misleading to say that I am discussing Russell’s theory of descriptions. For I am not concerned with the question of how Russell is to be interpreted. Rather, I am supposing that we accept the theory of propositions sketched at the outset and I am imagining a philosopher claiming that the logical form of a sentence like
3. The F is G.

is given by

3a. \([\exists x][y](Fy \leftrightarrow y=x) \land Gx)\]

My concern is with the two sorts of claims such a philosopher might be making about the proposition expressed by 3.

Taking the philosopher’s assertion as a PSC claim, we would take 3a to specify the structure and constituents of the proposition expressed by 3. If we represent this proposition in tree form for perspicuity, we get something like:

3b.  

\[
\begin{align*}
(\exists x) & \quad (y) \quad Fy \quad \leftrightarrow \quad y \equiv x \quad \land \quad Gx
\end{align*}
\]

This should make clear how 3a, taken as a PSC claim, specifies the structure and constituents of the proposition expressed by 3. It displays the constituents of the proposition at the terminal nodes of the tree; and it displays the structure of the proposition by means of the branching tree showing exactly how those constituents are bound together in the proposition.² Note that taken as a PSC claim, the claim that 3a gives the logical form of sentences like 3 says nothing about the “natures” or “internal structures” of any of the constituents of the proposition expressed by 3. It simply tells us what the constituents of that proposition are and how they are bound together, and thus structured, in the proposition.

Suppose now that we take the claim that 3a specifies the logical form of 3 as an NPC claim. So understood, this claim must be a claim about the nature or internal
structure of a constituent or constituents of the proposition expressed by 3. And since presumably the primary concern of someone making this claim is the propositional contribution of the word ‘the’ (and not that of ‘F’ or ‘G’), we ought to understand the claim as a claim about the nature or internal structure of the propositional contribution of the word ‘the’. Assuming that in making this claim, our philosopher, like Russell himself, is in part claiming that definite descriptions function semantically like the quantifier phrases ‘Some F’, ‘Every F’ (and not like “genuine singular terms”), we should take our philosopher to be claiming in part that ‘the’ makes the same sort of contribution to propositions as ‘every’, ‘some’ etc. How can we understand the claim that 3a gives the logical form of 3 in this way? Since in the framework we have adopted, ‘every’, ‘some’ and so on contribute relations between properties to propositions, we must understand the claim that 3a gives the logical form of 3 as a claim about the nature of the relation between properties contributed to propositions by ‘the’. And now that we have put it this way, that is easy to do. Simply remove from 3a features that are due to ‘F’ and ‘G’ in 3: namely, the occurrences of ‘F’ and ‘G’ in 3a. Next, let us put variables in their places to hold these places, and bind those variables by prefixing lambda operators so:

3c. \( \lambda H \lambda J([\exists x][[y][Hy \leftrightarrow y=x] & Jx]) \)

Here we have the specification of a relation between arbitrary properties H and J. Thus we may understand the claim that 3a gives the logical form of 3 as claiming that ‘the’ contributes a relation between properties to propositions expressed by sentences like 3, and that 3c tells us what the “nature” or “internal structure” of that relation is. Further, since we are not understanding the claim that 3a gives the logical form of 3 as a PSC claim, we should not take the claim to say anything about the structure of the proposition
expressed by 3. Thus, we should assume as a default position that one making this claim takes the structure of the proposition expressed by 3 to be very much like the syntactic structure of 3, (if he/she didn’t think this, he she would make a PSC claim!). Hence, taken as an NPC claim, the claim that 3a gives the logical form of 3 (given the default assumption about propositional structure), amounts to the claim that the proposition expressed by 3 is something like

![Diagram](image)

3d. The\* F\* G\*

where The\* is the relation expressed by ‘the, ’F\* is the property expressed by ‘F’ and so on. 3c, in turn, specifies the “nature” or “internal structure” of The*.

But precisely what is 3c saying about the “nature” of The*? I think that this question raises an important point. In making an NPC claim, a philosopher needs to be quite explicit about what precisely he/she is claiming about the propositional constituent in question. Simply writing down something like 3c isn’t enough. 3c could be merely a way of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for The* holding. Or it could be a way of saying something far more substantial about The*. For example, some philosophers hold that some properties and relations are complex, and have other properties and relations as component parts. It might be held, for example, that the property of being a bachelor is complex and has the properties of being unmarried, being adult and being male as component parts, so that the property of being a bachelor is literally built out of these other properties. A philosopher who holds such a view might use 3c as a way of specifying the component parts of The* and how they are combined to form it. Taken this way, 3c commits one to the view that the identity relation, the relation between properties ∃x, and so on are components of the complex relation expressed by
‘the’. Clearly, this is a much stronger claim than the claim that 3c simply specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for The* to obtain! To repeat, a philosopher making an NPC claim ought to be explicit as to precisely what she is saying about the nature of the propositional constituent(s) in question. In many cases, this will require addressing substantial questions in metaphysics (e.g. as in the last case, addressing the metaphysical nature of properties and relations). It is worth noting that the philosopher making a PSC claim incurs no such burden. For a fortiori she is making no claim about the nature of the constituents of a proposition, but simply specifying its structure and which its constituents are.

Suppose we take NPC claims in the “substantial” way just discussed. Thus we take them to be claims about the component parts of various complex properties and relations that are constituents of propositions. Then the distinction between NPC and PSC claims is a distinction between: 1) claims about the component parts of a propositional constituent and how they are combined to form that constituent; and 2) claims about what the constituents of a proposition are and how they are bound together to form the proposition. Now someone might object to our distinction, saying that an NPC claim taken in this substantial way is just a claim about propositional structure and so a PSC claim. For a constituent of a proposition is part of that proposition. So a (NPC) claim about the component parts of a propositional constituent and how they are combined to form it is ultimately a claim about the structure and composition of a part of a proposition. But a claim about the structure and composition of a part of a proposition is ultimately a claim about the structure of the proposition. Thus it is a PSC claim, and
our distinction collapses (when, at least, NPC claims are understood in the “substantial” way mentioned).

This objection really amounts to suggesting that we use the term ‘propositional structure’ differently from the way we have been using it, and fails to show that there is no distinction between PSC and NPC claims. Our theory of propositions holds that something binds together the constituents of a proposition, whether those constituents are themselves simple or complex, and imposes structure on those constituents, (we have represented this thing by means of brackets or trees). For purposes of illustration, think of this thing as a relation whose relata are the (simple or complex) constituents of the proposition. It is one thing to make a (PSC) claim about the structure of that relation and what things stand in it. It is quite another thing to make a claim about the component parts (and how they are put together) of one or more relata of that relation. The objector is suggesting that we call both sorts of claims “claims about propositional structure”. But whether we do so are not, there are clearly two different sorts of claims here.

I hope that what has been said so far is sufficient to show both the very great difference between PSC claims and NPC claims, and how a given assertion about logical form could be taken as a claim of either sort. In order to reinforce these points, I shall illustrate how an objection may apply to a given position when taken as an PSC claim, but not apply to that position when taken as an NPC claim. Given the great difference between the two sorts of claims, this is not in itself surprising. Still, illustrating this in a concrete case will prove instructive.

So suppose again that a philosopher tells us that the logical form of 3 is given by 3a (and let us suppress for a moment the question of whether she is making a PSC claim
or an NPC claim). Now consider the following objection to this proposal. Whatever its other virtues, the proposal that 3a gives the logical form of 3 is unacceptable as part of a compositional semantics for English because of the radical mismatch between sentential constituents in 3 and propositional constituents in 3a. The proposition 3a, after all, contains no constituent corresponding to the noun phrase ‘the F’ in 3! Further, and worse yet, the proposition 3a contains propositional constituents corresponding to sentential connectives (\(\leftrightarrow\), \&) and quantifiers ((\(\exists\)x), (y)) that don’t appear in 3 at all. Thus though 3a may serve as an ad hoc specification of the truth conditions of 3, a serious compositional semantics for English will not map 3 to the proposition 3a.

I am not concerned with the merits of this objection. Perhaps it is cogent, perhaps it isn’t. The important point for present purposes is that the objection applies to the proposal in question only if the proposal is taken as a PSC claim. For in claiming that the proposition 3a has no constituent corresponding to the noun phrase ‘The F’ in 3 and that it has constituents corresponding to connectives and quantifiers that don’t occur in 3, the objection clearly presupposes that 3a is intended to specify the structure and constituents of the proposition expressed by 3.

Indeed, if we understand the proposal as an NPC claim of the sort sketched earlier, the objection loses its force entirely. For understood in that way (and given the default assumption about propositional structure mentioned earlier), the proposition expressed by 3, (3d), does have a constituent corresponding to the noun phrase ‘The F’ in 3, namely:

\[ \text{The*} \quad \text{F*} \]
And the proposition contains no constituents corresponding to sentential connectives or quantifiers that don’t occur in 3. Its only constituents are The*, F* and G*! So here we see quite graphically that an objection to a proposal about “logical form” may apply to the proposal when taken as an PSC claim and have no force at all against that proposal when taken as an NPC claim.

Having considered a hypothetical example, let us now turn to an actual debate in which the distinction between PSC and NPC claims is relevant. One caveat before proceeding. The participants couch their discussion in terms of concepts. Though they talk of propositions too, it is difficult to see what they take the relation between concepts and propositions to be. Much of their discussion suggests that they take concepts to be constituents of propositions, just as I have taken properties to be constituents of propositions. I will assume in what follows that concepts instead of properties are constituents of propositions in the debate between Smith and Sayre-McCord. Even if I am wrong in interpreting them in this way, given present purposes it will be instructive to consider their debate from this perspective.

Michael Smith [1997] (p. 88) provides the following “analysis”, as he calls it, of normative reasons (or desirability):

“…when we say of an agent A that she has a normative reason to, say, keep a promise in certain circumstances C, what we are saying is that, in nearby possible worlds in which A has a set of desires that are completely beyond reproach, from the point of view of reasoned criticism, A desires that, in those possible worlds in which she finds herself in circumstances C, she keeps her promise…”

Smith goes on to say (p. 103-104):

…my belief that it is desirable to φ in C has, as its content, the proposition that φing in C is what I would want myself to do if I had a maximally informed and coherent and unified desire set.
Thus Smith claims that the proposition that A has a normative reason to φ in C is the proposition that φing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires.

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord [1997] objects to Smith’s identifying the proposition that A has reason to φ in C with the proposition that φing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires. Sayre-McCord, as interpreted by Smith, claims that since one can be competent with the concept of a reason without being competent with, or even possessing, the concept of what a fully rational person would want, it can’t be that believing that A has a reason to φ just is believing that if A were fully rational, A would desire to φ. For if I have the concept of having a reason but not the concept of what a fully rational person would want, I could believe that A has reason to φ without believing that if A were fully rational, A would desire to φ. After all, how could I believe a proposition containing concepts I don’t possess?

In responding to Sayre-McCord, Smith must defend the view that all those who believe the proposition that A has reason to φ believe the proposition that φing is what A would do if A had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires, since these are the same proposition according to Smith. However, this proposition will be quite different depending on whether we take Smith’s claim (that the proposition that A has a normative reason to φ in C is the proposition that φing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires) to be a PSC or an NPC claim.

Understood as an NPC claim, Smith is making a claim about the internal structure and components of a propositional constituent: the complex concept of having a reason. He is claiming that this concept has as components the concepts of desire, being fully
rational, etc. Taken this way, Smith would apparently hold that the proposition expressed by ‘A has a reason to φ’ has a structure similar to that of the sentence itself (remember, he is not making a PSC claim!) and has as constituents A (or a concept of A), the (complex) concept of having a reason (whose components he has described), and the concept of φ-ing. Thus the proposition in question looks something like this:

4. A* has-a-reason* to-φ*

where A* is the propositional constituent contributed by ‘A’, has-a-reason* is the propositional contribution of ‘has a reason’, etc. Hence when he says that the proposition that A has a normative reason to φ in C is the proposition that φ-ing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires, Smith is just describing the components and internal structure of the complex concept has-a-reason*, which occurs as a single (but complex) constituent of the proposition that A has a reason to φ. (i.e. 4). So if Smith is making an NPC claim, to respond to Sayre-McCord he must argue that all those who believe that A has a reason to φ believe the proposition 4.

By contrast, if Smith is making an PSC claim, it turns out that the proposition expressed by ‘A has reason to φ’ has many more constituents than 4 has and more than it might have appeared to have. For on this way of interpreting Smith, the claim that the proposition that A has a normative reason to φ in C is the proposition that φ-ing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires is an attempt to specify the structure and constituents of the proposition expressed by ‘A has reason to φ’. Thus it turns out to have as constituents the concepts of desiring to φ, of being maximally informed, of being coherent, etc. These are no longer claimed to be
components of the complex concept of having a reason which itself is a propositional constituent. Rather, they are constituents of the proposition taken individually by themselves. Thus, the proposition can no longer be taken to have only three constituents and to have a structure similar to that of the sentence ‘A has reason to φ’. It has many more constituents and has a structure similar to that of the sentence ‘φing in C is what A would desire if she had a maximally informed, coherent, unified set of desires’.

Simplifying for ease of exposition, the proposition would look something like this:

5.

\[
A^* \xrightarrow{\text{maximally-informed}^*} \xrightarrow{\text{coherent}^*} \xrightarrow{\text{unified}^*} \xrightarrow{\text{desire-set}^*} \xrightarrow{\rightarrow} A^* \xrightarrow{\text{desires-to-φ}^*}
\]

where \(A^*\) is the propositional contribution of ‘A’, maximally-informed* is the concept of being maximally informed, coherent* is the concept of being coherent, etc. Thus if Smith is making a PSC claim, in responding to Sayre-McCord he must argue that all those who believe that A has reason to φ believe the proposition 5.

To repeat, if Smith is making an NPC claim, in order to respond to Sayre-McCord’s objection he must defend the view that all those who believe that A has reason to φ believe the proposition 4; whereas if he is making a PSC claim, he must defend the view that all those who believe that A has reason to φ believe the quite different proposition 5. Certainly, these views are quite distinct. And in fact, one of them has an unpalatable consequence that the other lacks.
In our ordinary practice of ascribing beliefs, we do not ascribe to someone belief in a proposition that has as a constituent something that he/she does not have a sufficiently robust cognitive grip on. For example, we would not ascribe to someone who accepts the law of excluded middle but has never heard of radioactivity belief in the proposition that the Hope diamond is either radioactive or it is not. Presumably, this is because the person has an insufficiently robust cognitive connection to the property of being radioactive. In holding that people who believe that A has a reason to φ but have never heard of or thought of being maximally informed, having unified desires etc, nonetheless believe the proposition 5, one must hold that people may believe propositions that have as constituents entities that they have merely the weakest cognitive connection to. Thus, it seems to me that one will end up with a view about the correctness of belief ascriptions that conflicts significantly and in very general ways with our practice of ascribing belief.

On the other hand, claiming that all those who believe that A has reason to φ believe the proposition 4 has no such consequence. Those who believe that A has a reason to φ certainly do have a robust cognitive grip on the constituents of 4, including the complex concept of having a reason. True, we may be forced to say that some who have a cognitive grip on this complex concept, have only the weakest grip on some of the components of this concept. But this doesn’t seem problematic or surprising.

In any case, whether I am right about the unpalatable consequences of the one claim as compared with the other or not, it is clear that Smith’s claim interpreted as an NPC claim is quite different from his claim interpreted as an PSC claim; and that
depending on which of these he intends he must argue different things in response to Sayre-McCord’s objection.

In conclusion, I have tried to show that (implicit or explicit) claims about logical form, or claims to the effect that one is providing an “analysis” or “account” of a certain notion, can often be taken in two different ways. As we have seen, whether a claim is taken in one way or the other can be crucial. Views may be subject to objections when taken one way and not when taken another. An objection to a view taken one way may involve a very different sort of response from what would be required if the view were taken another way. Further, though limitations of space have prevented me from discussing this point here, a view may gain unwarranted plausibility from trading on these two ways of being taken. A given argument may go through if a claim is taken one way; another argument may go through if that claim is taken another way. And even though both arguments are required for some larger philosophical purpose, it is not the case that both arguments would go through on any one way of taking the claim. For these and other reasons, philosophers need to be much more explicit about which sort of claim they are making in making a claim about logical form.

Jeffrey C. King
University of California, Davis
jcking@ucdavis.edu

Notes

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1Though I am not claiming Russell ever said this himself, many philosophers have taken Russell’s theory to specify the logical form of sentences containing definite descriptions. E.g. Neale [1990] suggests that he takes Russell’s theory this way, when, in noting that Russell’s theory of descriptions need not be wedded to the formalism of Principia Mathematica, he writes “There is indeed a measure of inelegance involved in spelling out
the logical form of a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ as \((\exists x)((y)(Fy<\rightarrow)y=x) & Gx)\)” (p. 44).

Since the entities at the terminal nodes of 3a are propositional constituents, e.g. \((\exists x)\) and \& must be taken as the usual propositional contributions of ‘some’ and ‘and’ (even though ‘some’ and ‘and’ don’t appear in 3). This is why I have underlined them. If I had not, it would appear that e.g. ‘G’ occurs in both the sentence 3 and the proposition 3b. In 3b ‘G’ represent the propositional contributions of ‘G’ in 3.

I shall use the term ‘constituent’, as already indicated, for entities at the terminal nodes of a proposition, and the term ‘component’ for parts of complex entities like properties (or later concepts).

This hypothetical objection is based loosely on objections Barwise and Cooper [1981] make to the standard representations of sentences such as ‘Every man sneezed’ in the predicate calculus, (see p. 165). But I do not mean to attribute this objection to them.

This is actually a slight departure from the way in which I have used the term ‘constituent’ thus far. When a proposition is represented in tree form, I have called the entities at the terminal nodes ‘constituents’. Obviously, the entity displayed below does not occur at a terminal node in 3d. Thus perhaps I should call the things at terminal nodes ‘minimal constituents’, and call subtrees of a proposition ‘constituents’.

Though, as I have remarked, I want to steer clear of interpretative questions regarding Russell [1905], the fact that Russell asserts that definite descriptions (and “denoting phrases” generally) are not to be regarded as “…standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur.” suggests to me that within our framework Russell ought to be interpreted as making a PSC claim. However, my own view is that Russell’s proposal is more plausible (which is not to say I endorse it) when taken as an NPC claim.

Of course, I did not show that the hypothetical objection does apply to the proposal that 3a gives the logical form of 3 when it is taken as a PSC claim. But the point is that if it does not, it is ruled out on quite different grounds from those that rule it out as an objection to that proposal when taken as an NPC claim.

It is at least possible that Michael Smith and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord accept a framework within which the distinction that I shall be urging them to make cannot be made. In other work I have tried to emphasize the virtues of a particular account of propositions that satisfies the sufficient conditions mentioned earlier in the text for making the distinction I want to make, (see King [1994], [1995], [1996] and [1998]).

For example, Smith [1997] seems to say that in showing that the concepts of being desirable and being something I would desire if I were fully rational are the same, he has thereby shown that the proposition believed when I believe something is desirable is the proposition that that thing is something I would desire if I were fully rational. (see p. 102-
That Smith takes the claim of conceptual identity to show that two propositions are the same suggests to me that Smith takes concepts to be constituents of propositions.

In fact, Smith tries to argue that despite initial appearances, people of the sort just described do possess the concepts of being maximally informed, etc. He claims that their ability to wield the concept of a normative reason correctly shows that they are “sensitive to” things like being maximally informed etc. But this just brings up the point I am making. If we hold that being “sensitive to” concepts in this way is all that is required to believe propositions containing them as constituents (even though one has never heard of or explicitly thought about the concept), we will end up making belief ascriptions that conflict violently with ordinary usage.

This point is closely related to Sayre-McCord’s objection (and thus in this sense I think his objection has more bite against Smith when Smith is taken as making a PSC claim).

References


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