

Complex demonstratives as quantifiers: objections and replies

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Abstract In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out these objections and respond to them.

Keywords Reference · Referring expressions · Quantifiers · Demonstratives · Complex demonstratives · Indexicals · Singular propositions · Propositions · Semantics · Formal semantics

1 Introduction

In a recent paper,¹ David Braun offers numerous objections to the view of complex demonstratives I defended in my book *Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account* (henceforth CD) according to which, as the book’s title suggests, complex demonstratives are quantifiers.² In the present work, I intend to show that the objections Braun makes to my quantificational account fail. I’ll also formulate and respond to an objection to my view suggested by Jason Stanley in a review he wrote of my book.³ As we’ll see, one of Braun’s objections is in all essential respects the same as the objection suggested by Stanley. Finally, I shall argue that there is data

¹ Braun (2008a).

² King (2001).

³ Stanley (2002).

that I didn't discuss in CD that my quantificational account can handle and that spells even more grief for direct reference accounts of complex demonstratives (henceforth *DRCD*), including Braun's version. The upshot of all this, I claim, is that *DRCD*, including Braun's version, suffers fatal difficulties whereas the objections raised against my view can be countered.

I begin by providing a brief overview of the difference between *DRCD* and my quantificational account. Because I share with most direct reference theorists a Russellian view of structured propositions according to which they have individuals, properties and relations as constituents, I made clear in CD that the dispute between me and those who hold *DRCD* concerns the contribution complex demonstratives make to propositions expressed by sentences (relative to contexts) in which they occur. According to *DRCD*, complex demonstratives contribute individuals to propositions relative contexts. By contrast, on the quantificational semantics for demonstratives I defend, a complex demonstrative contributes to propositions a semantic value of the sort other quantifiers contribute. I'll discuss this further below.

Before sketching my account of complex demonstratives, let me mention three sorts of uses of complex demonstratives that my theory accounts for. The first sort, which I'll call a *classic demonstrative use*, is the sort most discussed in the literature. In this sort of case, I form the intention to talk about something I am perceiving, say Weatherson, and say⁴

1. That red haired man is an Australian.

On the second sort of use, I come to believe that some descriptive material is uniquely satisfied, and not having anything in mind as "the thing satisfying the material and that I intend to talk about", I form a complex demonstrative using this descriptive material with the intention of talking about whatever uniquely satisfies it. So, for example, having learned from an evil TA that exactly one student received 100% on an exam that everyone else did poorly on, Greg, not knowing who scored 100%, says:

2. That student who scored 100% is a genius.

I call these No Demonstration No Speaker Reference, or *NDNS*, uses. Finally, there are uses on which one quantifies into a complex demonstrative with another quantifier, which I call *QI* uses, as in

3. Most avid skiers remember that first black diamond run they skied.

on the reading of 3 on which 'most skiers' binds the pronoun 'they' in the complex demonstrative.

Turning now to my semantics, let's assume that determiners such as 'some', 'every', 'most' and so on express two-place relations between properties. Thus, 'most' expresses the relation that obtains between properties A and B iff most things that instantiate A instantiate B. Assume further that determiners contribute these

⁴ Many of the names used in the paper are the result of choices made for a (much!) shorter version of the paper given at the Cornell Mini-Conference on Complex Demonstratives in April 2007. I thank the audience for their helpful questions, criticisms and suggestions.

two-place relations between properties to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur. Then where Det is a determiner, N_1 is a simple or complex nominal expression ('woman', 'man from Venice', etc.), and N_2 is a predicate nominal or adjective, etc., a sentence such as

4. Det N_1 is/are N_2 .

expresses a proposition of the following sort

4'. [[R N_1^*] N_2^*]

where R is a two-place relation between properties and N_1^* , N_2^* are properties. The proposition is true at a circumstance of evaluation e iff N_1^* bears R to N_2^* in e . On the view that complex demonstratives are quantifiers, they should work in the same way. So, 'that' ought to contribute to a proposition a two-place relation between properties; and the proposition in question should be true at a circumstance of evaluation just in case the relevant properties stand in that relation. The one difference between 'that' and other determiners is that it is contextually sensitive: which two-place relation between properties it contributes to propositions depends on the context in which it is used. In order to understand how this is going to work, we need to consider certain aspects of the use of complex demonstratives.

Even most direct reference theorists hold that demonstrations or the intentions accompanying them are relevant to the semantics of complex demonstratives. With the later Kaplan, I hold that it is the *speaker's intentions* in using a complex demonstrative that are relevant to its semantics. Let's consider two kinds of intentions that speakers have in using complex demonstratives (I don't mean to suggest there aren't other sorts, but we focus on these here). The first sort of intention occurs in cases of the sort that direct reference theorists have primarily concentrated on: classic demonstrative uses. In such a case, the speaker is perceiving something in her physical environment and has an intention to talk about it. I shall say in such a case that the speaker has a *perceptual intention*. In such a case, let us say that the thing one intends to talk about is *the object of the perceptual intention in question*. The intention, I claim, determines two properties. Assuming that b is the object of the intention in question, the intention uniquely determines the property of *being identical to b* (i.e. $=b$) in virtue of its being an intention to talk about b . The other property determined by such an intention will be discussed later. The second sort of intention speakers have in using complex demonstratives is present in NDNS uses and (many) QI uses. Let me focus on NDNS uses here. Suppose a speaker believes that something uniquely possesses certain properties and intends to say something about the thing with those properties. In the case of Greg above in uttering 2, presumably he had the intention to say something about the student who scored 100% on the exam. Let us call such an intention a *descriptive intention*. Given a descriptive intention, there is a property or conjunction of properties C such that the speaker intends to say something about whatever uniquely possesses C , (in Greg's case, C is the property of being a student who scored 100% on the exam). Thus here again, the intention determines a property. Again, these sorts of intentions determine a second property that I'll discuss later.

The question before us now is how to combine two ideas. The first is that ‘that’, like other determiners, contributes a two-place relation between properties to propositions. The second is that speakers’ intentions and the properties they determine are relevant to the semantics of complex demonstratives. The most natural and straightforward way of fitting these two ideas together is to hold that although ‘that’, as used in a given context, will end up contributing a two-place relation between properties to propositions just as other determiners do, ‘that’, taken “outside of any context”, expresses a relation with some number of additional argument places. The idea is that when a speaker uses a complex demonstrative in a particular context, his/her intentions determine properties that saturate these additional argument places in the relation expressed by ‘that’. The result of this saturation is a *two*-place relation between properties. This two-place relation between properties is then contributed to the proposition expressed in that context by the sentence containing the complex demonstrative. I claim that in this way we can capture the various semantic features of complex demonstratives, including their contextual sensitivity.

More specifically, my view is that the lexical meaning of ‘that’ is the following *four*-place relation: *___and___ are uniquely _____ in an object x and x is ___*. The first, second and final argument places here are argument places for properties of individuals. The third argument place is for a property of pairs of properties. The idea is that when a speaker uses a complex demonstrative in a simple sentence such as 1 above, her intentions determine properties that saturate the second and third argument places of this four-place relation. The resulting *two*-place relation is then contributed to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing the complex demonstrative (in that context). The sentence the speaker utters expresses a proposition to the effect that the properties expressed by the predicative material in her sentence, in $4' N_1^*$ and N_2^* , stand in this two-place relation. Let’s quickly run through some examples to illustrate how this works.

Consider again a case in which I intend to talk about Weatherson using a complex demonstrative and say (pointing at him)

1. That red haired man is an Australian.

In this case my perceptual intention determines the property of being identical to Weatherson in virtue of my intending to talk about him. But because I am using the predicative material in my complex demonstrative to pick out Weatherson for my audience in the context of utterance, in usual cases I assume that my audience will already recognize that the thing I am intending to talk about satisfies that predicative material: I assume they already recognize that Weatherson has red hair and I exploit that fact to get them to see who I am talking about. On the other hand, I am trying to inform them that he is Australian. Thus, the predicates ‘red haired man’ and ‘Australian’ have very different roles here. As a result, there is an asymmetry in the roles played by the properties expressed by ‘red haired man’ and ‘Australian’ in the truth conditions of the proposition expressed in a context by a sentence like 1. This occurs as a result of my intentions determining not only the property of being identical to Weatherson in my use of 1, but also the property of pairs of properties of *being jointly instantiated in w, t* , where w and t are the world and time of my

utterance. These two properties saturate the second and third argument places of the following four-place relation expressed by ‘that’: *___ and ___ are uniquely ___in and object x and x is ___*. The result of this saturation is the following two-place relation between properties: *___ and being identical to Weatherson are uniquely jointly instantiated in w,t in an object x and x is ___*. In my context of utterance (w, t), this two-place relation gets contributed to the proposition expressed by 1, with the result that 1 expresses a proposition to the effect that being a red haired man and being identical to Weatherson are uniquely jointly instantiated in w, t, in an object x and x is an Australian. Note that this proposition is true at an arbitrary world w' iff Weatherson is a red haired man *in my original context of utterance* (w, t) and is an Australian *in w'*.

Turning to NDNS uses, recall that Greg, knowing that exactly one student received 100% on the exam but having no one in mind as “the one who did”, says:

2. That student who scored 100% on the exam is a genius.

Here Greg has a descriptive intention: he intends to talk about whoever uniquely possesses the property of being a student who scored 100% on the exam. Thus, his intentions determine this property. Note that in this case, his descriptive intention determines the same property as is expressed by the predicative material in his complex demonstrative. In such cases, I say his intention is *redundant*. I hasten to add that though this often happens in NDNS uses, and for good reason, sometimes it does not.⁵ Now in an NDNS use, we don't have the asymmetry noted in classic demonstrative uses. The speaker here does not assume that the audience will recognize that the object of his intention satisfies the property expressed by the predictive material in his complex demonstrative, because his intention has no object: there is no one he wants to get his audience to recognize as the object of his intention. Thus the predicates here don't play different roles as they did in the classic demonstrative use. Hence, in this case, in addition to determining the property of being a student who scored 100% on the exam, Greg's intentions determine the property of pairs of properties of *being jointly instantiated*. These two properties saturate the second and third places of the four-place relation expressed by ‘that’, with the result being the following two-place relation between properties: *___and being a student who scored one hundred percent on the exam are uniquely jointly instantiated in an object x and x is___*. This relation is contributed to the proposition Greg expresses in uttering 2, with the result that Greg expresses a proposition to the effect that being a student who scored 100% on the exam and being a student who scored 100% on the exam are uniquely jointly instantiated in an object x and x is a genius (note the redundancy here). This proposition is true at a world w iff there is exactly one student who scored 100% on the exam in w and she is a genius in w. Note that NDNS uses will typically be non-rigid, as is this one.

Finally, let's consider in broad outline how my account handles QI uses such as the case mentioned earlier:

⁵ See CD pp. 48–49; and 66–74. See also Sects. 6 and 9.

3. Most avid skiers remember that first black diamond run they skied.⁶

Here I'll only consider QI uses in which the speaker's intentions are redundant. As in the case of NDNS uses, though this is often the case in QI uses, sometimes it is not. But as I said, we won't consider such cases here.⁷ In a QI use, in virtue of the complex demonstrative containing a "variable" ('they'), the predicative material in the complex demonstrative expresses a relation: *x is the first black diamond y skied*. Since the speaker's intention are redundant in uttering 3 (we assume), the speaker's intention must determine this same relation. And this relation in this context must occupy the second argument place in the four-place relation expressed by 'that'. Write the relation: F_{xy} . Then we can represent the proposition expressed by 3 as follows:

3'. [Most: x avid skiers: x] [[$THAT_{F_{xy}, j}$: $y F_{xy}$] [x remembered y]]

This proposition is true at a world w iff most avid skiers in w remember in w the unique first black diamond run they skied in w .

According to David Braun's (2008b, "Complex demonstratives and their singular contents," unpublished manuscript) view of complex demonstratives, in favorable and typical cases a speaker in a context is "focused" on an object and utters a complex demonstrative in order to refer to that object relative to that context. If all goes well (see below) she does so and she expresses a proposition with the object as a constituent, a so-called *singular proposition*. Further the contribution of the complex demonstrative to the proposition (relative to the context) is only this object. Hence, if focusing in a context on what is in fact a dog, say Mona, I utter 'That dog is smart', I thereby in that context express the singular proposition that has Mona and the property of being smart as constituents. This proposition can be represented as follows:

5. <Mona, being smart>

This proposition is true at a circumstance of evaluation iff Mona is smart there.

We can express Braun's account more in the style of Kaplan (1989), which it should be viewed as an extension or variant of, as follows. Suppose that contexts are n -tuples of an agent, world, location and time.⁸ In addition, according to Braun, some contexts include a demonstratum as well.⁹ Braun holds that the agent of the context need not be pointing at or otherwise singling out in some obvious way the demonstratum of the context. But she does need to be "(in some sense) focused" on it (Braun, 2008b, "Complex demonstratives and their singular contents," unpublished manuscript, p. 6, 7) so that she can believe singular propositions about it. The

⁶ For a more detailed account of how this works, see CD pp. 51–56. The theory called *T2* there is the theory I hold.

⁷ See CD pp. 74–77 for examples of such cases.

⁸ Following Kaplan, we perhaps should require that the agent of the context be at the location of the context at the time of the context in the world of the context. But such details won't concern us here.

⁹ Following Braun, we will have only a single demonstratum and won't concern ourselves with sentences containing multiple occurrences of complex demonstratives with multiple demonstrata (that may be identical).

referent, and semantic value, of ‘that F’ in a context *c* is the demonstratum d_c of the context if it satisfies the predicate ‘F’ in the world of the context. For example, suppose again Cara is focused on the dog Mona in a context and says:

6. That dog is smart.

Since Mona is the demonstratum of the context and is a dog in the world of the context, Cara in that context by uttering 6 expresses the proposition 5 above. By contrast, according to Braun the sentence 6 taken relative to a context with no demonstratum or a demonstratum that isn’t a dog expresses the gappy proposition that can be represented as follows:

5a. <___, being smart>

Braun holds that speaker’s often assert and believe gappy propositions.

Going back to the uses of complex demonstratives I discussed at the outset, it should be clear how Braun’s account handles what I called classic demonstrative uses such as when I point at Weatherson intending to talk about him and say

1. That red haired man is an Australian.

On Braun’s view, since Weatherson both is red haired and the demonstratum in the context of utterance, I express in the context of utterance the singular proposition to the effect that Weatherson is an Australian:

1’. <Weatherson, being Australian>

As to NDNS and QI uses, I claim that Braun’s account has problems with these. Though he has tried to deal with them,¹⁰ I argue in King (2008a, ‘Reply to Braun on NDNS and QI uses of complex demonstratives’, unpublished manuscript) that he fails to do so. I won’t discuss the fact that DRCD, including Braun’s version, fails to adequately handle NDNS and QI uses further in the present work except to note here and later that failure to handle these uses is a major problem for DRCD.¹¹

2 Some new problems for DRCD

As if that weren’t bad enough, let me add that that there are two other kinds of uses of complex demonstratives that I didn’t discuss in CD and that are also bound to cause problems for DRCD, again including Braun’s version. The first sort of use is one on which complex demonstratives appear to function as bound variables, such as the following:

7. Every student₁ has a professor who thinks that student₁ is smart.

Here again obviously it cannot be claimed that the complex demonstrative contributes an individual to the proposition expressed by 7. On the other hand, it

¹⁰ Braun (2008b, “Complex demonstratives and their singular contents,” unpublished manuscript).

¹¹ Salmon (2006) suggests various ways DRCD might handle NDNS uses, but in King (2008b) I argue that all his suggestions fail.

turns out that a quite straightforward extension of the semantics of CD handles these bound variable uses of complex demonstratives.¹² The second sort of use that my account can handle and that causes problems for DRCD involves anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives, such as the following:

8. A student₁ was sitting in the library. Another student₂ who had an iPod was sitting across from him₁. That student₂ had a logic book.

To see the problem this raises for DRCD, suppose that all the sentences of 8 are true (as uttered in the present context and evaluated with respect to the world of this context) and that Bob is the student who had the iPod and the logic book. Then DRCD presumably claims that the third sentence expresses the singular proposition that Bob had a logic book. But then DRCD predicts that all three propositions expressed by these sentences (in the present context) as they occur in this discourse are true in a world in which a student was sitting in the library, a second student *other than Bob* was sitting across from him and had an iPod, and Bob, who was in a different country, had a logic book. This, of course, is incorrect. Since we can easily imagine that no demonstration accompanied the utterance of the third sentence of 8, Braun's version of DRCD predicts that the third sentence can't be true in such a case. This too is obviously incorrect. Note too that the DRCD theorist cannot claim that the complex demonstrative here is a stylistic variant of a definite description: substituting 'the' for 'that' here results in infelicity! Again, my quantificational account can easily handle these cases.

Finally, things get even worse for DRCD when we consider anaphoric uses mixed with modality. Suppose that we enter an empty library and that for some reason it would have been disastrous for us if there had been more than one student, an iPod and a logic book in the library. (We all know how dangerous logic is—especially when combined with music and students!) You realized this but took no steps to insure that it wouldn't be so. I scold you as follows:

9. This whole thing could have been a disaster! A student₁ could have been sitting in the library. Another student₂ with an iPod could have been sitting across from him₁. And that student₂ could have had a logic book.

Obviously DRCD, including Braun's version, cannot account for this sort of use of a complex demonstrative: there is no one in the library for 'that student' in the third sentence to refer to! Here again the DRCD theorist cannot claim the complex

¹² Though I don't have the time or space to explain in detail how my view handles these "bound variable" uses, it is easy to see how it will go. Recall that in QI uses, speaker intentions determine *relations* (whether the intentions are redundant or not). "Bound variable" uses like 7 are the special case where the relation determined by the speaker's intentions is *identity*: $x = z$. The proposition 7 expresses can be represented as follows (with 'S' for 'student'; 'P' for 'professor'; 'Txy' for 'x thinks y is smart'; and 'Hxy' for 'x has y')

$$(BV) [\text{Every } x: Sx] [[\text{Some } y: (Py \ \& \ [\text{THAT}_{x=z, j} z: Sz] [Tyz])] Hxy]$$

Note that the relation $x = z$ was determined by the intentions of the speaker and occupies the second argument place here in the relation expressed by 'that'. BV is true iff for every student x , there is some y such that y is a professor and y thinks that the thing z that is the unique student identical to x is smart and x has y .

demonstrative is a stylistic variant of a definite description, since again substituting ‘the’ for ‘that’ results in infelicity. And here again my quantificational account can handle the uses in question.¹³

Thus, these bound variable and anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives spell yet more grief for DRCD, including Braun’s version. By contrast, my quantificational account can readily accommodate them.

Having now seen that DRCD, including Braun’s version, has severe difficulties in virtue of failing to handle a large range of data involving complex demonstratives, the remaining sections of the paper are devoted to responding to criticisms Braun, and Stanley, make of my quantificational semantics for complex demonstratives.

3 Braun’s modal existence objection¹⁴

Braun asks us to consider the following sentence uttered by Sally (now) pointing at Matti:

(E) It could have been the case that that man failed to exist.

(E), Braun claims, is true in this context and has, as he puts it, “no whiff of falsehood”.¹⁵ And yet, he claims, my view assigns a reading to (E) on which it is false. Since complex demonstratives are quantifiers on my view, Braun thinks that I am committed to there being a scope ambiguity in (E) since the complex demonstrative qua quantifier can take wide or narrow scope relative to the modal element. The two readings of (E) taken in the context described that Braun thinks my view is committed to can be represented as follows:¹⁶

(KE1) [THAT_{=Matti, J@,t} man:x] [Possibly [*x* fails to exist]]

(KE2) Possibly [[THAT_{=Matti, J@,t} man:x] [*x* fails to exist]]

¹³ As with the “bound variable” uses, I don’t have the space or time to describe in detail how my account works here, but it is even easier here to see how it goes than it was in the case of “bound variable” uses like 7. In NDNS uses, speakers’ intentions determine “descriptive” properties that saturate the second argument place in the relation expressed by ‘that’, whether these intentions are redundant or not. In both 8 and 9, these properties are instead determined by predicative material in the prior discourse. For example, in the case of 8, the property in question is the property of *being a student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library*. Hence the final sentence of 8 (as it occurs in that discourse) is true iff the unique student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library had a logic book. The crucial point is that such anaphoric uses and NDNS uses differ only on whether the property that slots into the third argument place of the relation expressed by ‘that’ is determined by the speaker’s intentions (NDNS use) or predicative material in prior discourse (anaphoric use).

¹⁴ Braun (2008a) Section 3 example (19).

¹⁵ Braun (2008a) Section 3 following example (19).

¹⁶ THAT_{=Matti, J@,t} in (KE1) and (KE2) is the relation between properties the word ‘that’ contributes to the proposition expressed by (E) taken in the context described. It is the following relation between properties: *___and being identical to Matti are uniquely jointly instantiated in @, t in an object x and x is ___*.

As Braun correctly points out, (KE2) is false in this context. For (KE2) to be true (at the world of the context @) the proposition that being a man and being identical to Matti are uniquely jointly instantiated in @,t in an object x and x fails to exist has to be true at some world w . But it can't be, because this would require Matti to both exist and fail to exist at w .¹⁷

Hence, Braun claims, my theory predicts that (E) (as uttered by Sally now in the context described) both has a reading on which it is false in the present context and should seem ambiguous. But as Braun points out, neither of these things is correct. Note that the argument here has nothing to do the actual world occurring in (KE2) and other such things. It has only to do with the alleged fact that on my view since complex demonstratives are quantifiers, (E) must exhibit a scope ambiguity and that one of the resulting readings is false.

The problem with this argument is that if it worked, it would show that many quantifiers are not quantifiers (assuming that quantifiers range only over objects that exist at the world of evaluation, as Braun and I both do). Let me demonstrate this by parodying Braun's argument. Bear in mind that everything after boldface 'Begin parody' is part of the parody until boldface 'end parody'.

Begin parody: Suppose that 'Someone who is actually here now' is a quantifier, as my opponent claims. Consider the following sentence uttered by me now in a room in which there are a number of people:

(SE) It could have been the case that someone who is actually here now failed to exist.

I believe, and I suspect that you agree, that, unfortunately, (SE) is true in this context. It has no whiff of falsehood. There is no way to understand it so that it is false in this context. But on my opponent's theory, this sentence has a reading on which it is false in this context. The two readings my opponent's quantificational semantics for 'Someone who is actually here now' assigns to (SE) can be represented as follows:

(SE1) [Someone who is actually here now: x] [Possibly [x fails to exist]]

(SE2) Possibly [[someone who is actually here now: x] [x fails to exist]]

But (SE2) is false in the present context, because the embedded sentence in it (taken in the present context whose world is @) is false at all worlds. Without going through the details, which are essentially the same as for (KE2) above, the embedded sentence (taken in the context whose world is @) in (SE2) is true at w iff someone who is at my current location and time in @ is also in w and fails to exist in w . Obviously, that can't happen at any w . So (SE2) is false. Hence, on my opponent's view according to which 'someone who is actually here now' is a quantifier, (SE) as uttered by me now has a false reading and the sentence should seem ambiguous. Neither of these things seems true to me. **End Parody.**

¹⁷ That is, for the following proposition to be true at w
[[THAT=_{Matti}, $J@,t$ man: x] [x fails to exist]]

there must be an object o in w such that o is a man and identical to Matti at @, t and o fails to exist at w .

Thus, if Braun's argument here works against my quantificational account of complex demonstratives, it also shows that 'someone who is actually here now', which certainly is thought to be a quantifier, is not a quantifier. So either Braun has discovered a powerful argument that shows that DPs that everyone thinks are quantifiers really aren't quantifiers, or his argument fails against my quantificational account of complex demonstratives.¹⁸ I favor the latter disjunct.

Following the modal objection just considered, Braun gives several other modal objections that are very similar.¹⁹ In each case, my response is essentially the same as my response to the objection just considered. Here Braun objects that my quantificational semantics assigns two readings to (E), one of which is false. Yet, he claims, (E) doesn't seem to have a false reading nor does it seem ambiguous. I respond by showing that other sentences exactly similar to (E) except that they contain what we all take to be a quantifier in place of the complex demonstrative in (E) behave in the same way: (SE) lacks the false reading (SE2), which corresponds to the reading (KE2) that (E) lacks. Since presumably no one would take the lack of the missing reading to show that 'Someone who is actually here now' isn't a quantifier, no one should take the fact that (E) seems to lack the reading (KE2) to show that the complex demonstrative isn't a quantifier. With respect to the other modal objections Braun raises, the responses are precisely of the same sort. For each of Braun's examples containing complex demonstratives, there are exactly similar sentences containing things everyone takes to be quantifiers in place of the complex demonstratives that exhibit the same behavior as Braun's sentences.²⁰ Hence, his

¹⁸ Braun's argument would also show that 'someone who is identical to Matti' and 'the man who is identical to Matti' aren't quantifiers. For neither 'It could have been the case that someone who is identical to Matti failed to exist.' nor 'It could have been the case that the man who is identical to Matti failed to exist' seems to have a false reading uttered by me now. (I assume here that definite descriptions are quantifiers, which I am aware some people deny. However Braun assumes it in his paper.)

¹⁹ Braun (2008a) Sections 3 and 4. The objections involve the discourse (25) and its possible continuations (26) and (27); examples (28)–(31); example (32); example (33); example (36); example (37); example (39) and example (39').

²⁰ In the case of Braun's (25) and the possible continuations (26) and (27), (see previous note), relevant sentences would be

(27') It could have been the case that someone who is actually here now failed to exist.

(27'') It could have been the case that the man who is identical to Matti failed to exist.

Like (27) containing a complex demonstrative, (27') sounds fine (and true) as a continuation of Braun's (25). In the case of Braun's (28)–(31), relevant sentences would be (I concentrate on (28) but exactly similar examples work for (29)–(31)):

(28') The proposition that someone who is actually here now fails to exist is contingently false.

(28'') The proposition that the man who is identical to Matti fails to exist is contingently false.

In the case of Braun's (32), relevant sentences would be:

(32') Someone actually here now fails to exist.

(32'') The man who is identical to Matti fails to exist.

In the case of (33), relevant sentences would be

(33') Someone actually here now could have failed to exist.

(33'') The man who is identical to Matti could have failed to exist.

In the case of (36), a relevant sentence would be

(36') Necessarily, the man who is identical to Matti is identical to Matti.

In the case of (37), relevant sentences would be

examples cannot show that complex demonstratives are not quantifiers, on pain of showing that some quantifiers aren't quantifiers. As a result, all of these modal objections to my view fail.²¹

4 Braun's modal reference failure objection

Braun asks us to suppose that Karen believes on general grounds that at exactly 10:00 pm a spy will walk through the door at a party I am attending. Karen is facing away from the door at exactly 10:00 pm, and looking at her watch and seeing the time, she says:

(PS) It could have been the case that that spy behind me wore a blue hat.²²

Suppose that in fact there is no spy behind Karen; indeed, for clarity sake let's suppose no one is behind Karen. Braun assumes that on my view this is an NDNS use (we'll see that there is reason to doubt this). On the reading on which the complex demonstrative is used in an NDNS way and takes narrow scope, this sentence should be true (in the context of utterance) Braun claims. For on this reading it is true iff it is possible that being a spy behind me is uniquely instantiated in an object *x* and *x* wore a blue hat.²³ But, Braun claims, (PS) uttered in the context in question seems at best false and perhaps neither true nor false. Hence, again Braun claims my view makes a false prediction.

There are two points to make in response to this. First, though there is reason to think that the use in question is not an NDNS use (see below), let's assume that it is for the sake of argument. Still, as in previous cases, sentences with other quantifiers in place of the complex demonstrative in (PS) exhibit the same behavior. Suppose again with no one behind me, I utter the following sentences:

Footnote 20 continued

(37') Someone who is actually here now is necessarily identical to Matti. (uttered in Matti's presence)

(37'') The man who is identical to Matti is necessarily identical to Matti.

In the case of (39), a relevant sentence would be

(39a) Possibly, it is not the case that the man who is identical to Matti is identical to Matti.

(39b) Possibly, it is not the case that someone other than me who is actually here now is identical to Matti. (uttered by me with only Matti present)

Finally, in the case of Braun's (39'), relevant sentences are

(39'') The man who is identical with Matti might not have been identical with Matti.

(39''') Someone other than me who is actually here now might not have been identical to Matti. (uttered by me with only Matti present)

As I said in the body of the text, these sentences containing quantifiers exhibit the same behavior exhibited by Braun's examples that contain complex demonstratives, which behavior Braun claims casts doubt on the view that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. In testing my claim, it is important to use informants without views or commitments in philosophy of language.

²¹ That is, all of Braun's modal objections in Sects. 3 and 4 fail.

²² Braun (2008a) Section 5 example (42).

²³ In saying this I assume that the speaker's intentions were redundant in uttering (PS), as did Braun.

(DPS) It could have been the case that the spy behind me now wore a blue hat.²⁴

(UPS) It could have been the case that every spy behind me now wore a blue hat.

These sentences certainly don't seem true in such a context. Like (PS) in the context described, most speakers think they seem strange, and perhaps are neither true nor false. But on the reading where the quantifiers take narrow scope under the modal, the sentences are true in the context in question!²⁵ Despite this, they obviously don't seem true. So here we have other quantifiers exhibiting the same behavior as the complex demonstrative in (PS). Hence even assuming the use of the complex demonstrative in (PS) in the context described is an NDNS use, the behavior of the complex demonstrative in (PS) cannot show that complex demonstratives are not quantifiers.

However, and perhaps even more significantly, it isn't clear that the use of the complex demonstrative in (PS) in the situation described *is* an NDNS use. Whether it is or not depends on gritty details of how we think of the speaker's intention in such a case. In CD, when I talked about classic demonstrative uses of complex demonstratives, for the sake of clarity I considered cases in which the speaker was looking at the object she intended to talk about, say *b*, in employing a complex demonstrative. Her intentions then determine the property of *being identical to b* and her use of 'That *F* is *G*' expresses the proposition that being *F* and being identical to *b* are uniquely jointly instantiated in *w, t* in an object *x* and *x* is *G* (where *w, t* are the world and time of the context). I considered such cases because I thought of them as paradigmatic cases of classic demonstrative uses of complex demonstratives. However, I never meant to suggest that these are the only cases in which in using a complex demonstrative one's intention determines a property like *being identical to b*. Indeed, I meant to leave this question open. Let's call intentions used with complex demonstratives that determine properties like being identical to *b* *haecceitistic intentions*. Then what I called *perceptual intentions* in CD, cases in which I am perceiving *b* and intend to talk about it, are haecceitistic intentions.²⁶ However, I would certainly want to allow that other intentions are as well.²⁷ To take one sort of case, suppose that I have many times heard about but never seen a beautiful and valuable painting on the west wall of your living room. I am taken into your living room blindfolded and facing what I know to be the west wall I say (pointing at the wall)

10. That painting is worth lots of money.

²⁴ Again, those who don't think definite descriptions are quantifiers should concentrate on (UPS). Oddly Braun considers a sentence like (DPS), but with a colon after 'that' and seems to think that it intuitively has a true reading. I have found that speakers universally regard (DPS) as "weird" when asked whether it is true, false or weird uttered in the context described.

²⁵ In saying this, I assume, as Braun seems to, that quantifiers don't have presuppositions. But I wish to emphasize that the oddity of all of (PS), (DPS) and (UPS) in the situation described may have to do with presupposition failure.

²⁶ As are what I called in CD *past perceptual intentions*. See pp. 29–30 of CD.

²⁷ Jim Higginbotham convinced me of this at an Author Meets Critics session on my book at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in 2002.

Here I tend to think that my intention is haecceitistic and I express the proposition that being a painting and being identical to *b* are uniquely jointly instantiated in *w*, *t* in an object *x* and *x* is worth lots of money (where *b* is the painting and *w*, *t* are the world and time of my context of utterance). Now slightly alter Braun's example. Suppose that when I utter (PS) there *is* a spy behind me. I think that my intention in this case is probably haecceitistic and I express the proposition that it could have been that being a spy and being identical to *b* are uniquely jointly instantiated in *w*, *t* in an object *x* and *x* wore a blue hat, where *b* is the spy in question and *w*, *t* are the world and time of the context.²⁸ This proposition is true at *w* (the world of the context) iff *b* is a spy at *w*, *t* and there is a possible world *w'* such that *b* wore a blue hat at *w'*. So far so good.

Now if my intention would have been haecceitistic had there been a unique spy behind me when I uttered (PS), then my intention is "trying to be" haecceitistic in Braun's original case in which no one is behind me. It's just that my intention sadly has no object. Hence, in relevant respects this is like the case I described in CD in which I hallucinate that there is a new Porsche Boxster in front of me and say 'That car is beautiful.'²⁹ In effect, I have the sort of intention that would be haecceitistic if my intention had an object *b*, in which case my intention would have determined the property of being identical to *b*. But since there is no object *b*, obviously my intention cannot determine the property of being identical to *b*. It seems plausible in such a case that my intention determines no property. This means that one of the argument places in the relation expressed by 'that' in (PS) relative to the context described has a gap where it should instead have the property determined by my haecceitistic intention. As a result, it is plausible to hold that the "proposition-like" entity expressed in that context by the embedded sentence in (PS) is not truth evaluable and so not a proposition at all. But then talk about it being possible isn't truth evaluable either. Thus, (PS) turns out neither true nor false. This result delivered by my account on the assumption that the intention accompanying the complex demonstrative in (PS) in the situation described is "trying to be" haecceitistic accords even with Braun's intuitions about the case.

I conclude that whether the use of the complex demonstrative in (PS) in the situation described is an NDNS uses or not, Braun's modal reference failure objection fails.

5 Braun's modal NDNS use objection

Suppose, Braun says, that Scott is at work and hears from a colleague that Fred has a single table in his living room and that it is red. Imagine that Scott then utters the following sentence

²⁸ I assume here that the complex demonstrative is read as taking narrow scope under the modal in (PS). Of course, I do not think that it *need* be so read.

²⁹ CD pp. 117–119.

(RP) It could not have been the case that that red table in Fred's living room was completely green.³⁰

Now, Braun claims, this sentence seems intuitively false in Scott's context. However, assuming my view of complex demonstratives and that the use of the complex demonstrative here is an NDNS use, Braun claims that (RP) taken in Scott's context has a reading on which it is true.³¹ This is the reading on which the complex demonstrative is used in an NDNS way and takes narrow scope under the modal. On this reading, the sentence claims that it could not have been the case that being a red table in Fred's living room is uniquely instantiated in an object *x* and *x* is completely green.³² And that presumably could not have been the case. So again, Braun's objection is that my account assigns to (RP) a reading it doesn't have on which it is true in Scott's context.

By this point, the reader can probably anticipate my response. Other quantifiers behave in exactly the same way in similar sentences in similar situations. Hence, that the reading Braun notes appears missing in (RP) can't show that the complex demonstrative in it isn't a quantifier. Suppose again that I have just been told that there is a single table in Fred's living room and that it is red. I utter:

(DRP) It could not have been the case that the red table in Fred's living room was completely green.

I have a hard time hearing a true reading of (DRP) as well. The reason, I think, that it is hard to hear true readings here and in (RP) is that we have a feeling that the speaker is attempting to talk about the modal properties of a particular thing: the red table in Fred's living room. This results in the quantifiers scoping over the modal in both cases.³³ That this is the correct explanation here, and hence that the reading (RP) lacks is no objection to my quantificational semantics, is confirmed by the behavior of other quantifiers in other cases.

In particular, if we use other quantifiers and set the cases up in such a way as to make clear we are "talking about" some particular e.g. chairs, we don't get the true readings that would result from the quantifiers scoping under the modal. So suppose I say:

(IRP) It could not have been the case that a red chair of mine that my Dad bought at a garage sale and painted was completely green.

³⁰ Braun (2008a) Section 6 example (44). I have changed the verb from 'is' to 'was' because I find the sentence a bit odd with 'is' in it. In other cases where Braun considers sentences embedded under 'It could (not) have been the case' they have past tense verbs (see e.g. (E) and (PS)).

³¹ As in the previous objection we considered, depending on how we flesh out the details of Braun's example here, Scott's use of the complex demonstrative in (RP) may not be an NDNS use. I'll ignore that here and assume that Scott has just come to believe on general grounds that there is exactly one red table in Fred's living room and that his use of the demonstrative in (RP) is an NDNS use.

³² Again, following Braun I assume the speaker's intentions were redundant in uttering (RP).

³³ Again, I realize some don't think definite descriptions are quantifiers.

Here the “heavy” descriptive material in the indefinite strongly suggests that I am talking about a particular chair. And here too it is exceptionally hard to get a true reading on which the indefinite scopes under the modal. Similarly, consider

(URP) It could not have been the case that each of my red chairs that my Dad bought at a garage sale and painted was completely green.

Here again the heavy descriptive material suggests particular chairs are being “talked about” and so it is hard to get a true reading.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that complex demonstratives in NDNS uses do sometimes take narrow scope under modals. Suppose Scott is picking numbers at random and Greg and I are betting on the outcome. We take turns choosing odd or even and if the choice is correct whoever made the choice wins and if it is not, the other person wins. I choose even on the last round but it turns out Scott picked an odd number and I lose. Later someone questions my strategy asking why in the world I choose even on the last round. I say one of the following things:

11. It is possible that that last number Scott picked should have been even instead of odd.
- 11'. That last number Scott picked could have been even instead of odd.

These sentences clearly have true readings in the situation described. But that must mean that the complex demonstratives are non-rigid and take narrow scope under the modal here. For otherwise, supposing 5 was the number Scott picked, the sentences are true iff 5 could have been even and so should seem false. So here we have NDNS uses in which the complex demonstratives take narrow scope under modals (and are clearly nonrigid). It is easy to multiply examples, so I won't do so here.³⁴ This makes my explanation of what is going on in (RP) even more plausible.³⁵ For since complex demonstratives in NDNS uses *can* take narrow scope under modals (and are nonrigid), there must be some pragmatic explanation as to why the complex demonstrative tends to take wide scope in (RP).

6 Braun's modal NDNS implicit content objection³⁶

It is a feature of my view that in cases of NDNS uses where speakers have non-redundant intentions, speakers intentions determine properties that intuitively “further restrict” the quantification expressed by the complex demonstrative. Because I think Braun's discussion of such cases is seriously flawed, let me introduce such cases and then note some of their features. Here are two cases I discussed in CD. The first example concerns a case in which a bunch of astronomers are silently making calculations together concerning what was visible in the night sky from Carnelian Bay at various times in the past. They are able to determine that

³⁴ See pp. 90–91 of CD for another example.

³⁵ I would give an exactly similar explanation of Braun's example (46), and so I haven't bothered to discuss it.

³⁶ See Braun (2008a) Section 7.

in the year 100 A.D. the Earth passed through an asteroid belt and that for exactly one night there was an incredible display of shooting stars visible from the shore at Carnelian Bay. Due to the incompleteness of their data, they cannot determine precisely which night it was. Once they see the implications of their calculations, one astronomer says to the others:

12. I would give anything to have been at Carnelian Bay on that night.

Assuming his intentions determine the property of being a night in 100 A.D. when an incredible display of shooting stars was visible from the shores of Carnelian Bay, the astronomer's utterance of 12 expresses (roughly) the proposition that being a night in 100 A.D. when an incredible display of shooting stars was visible from the shores of Carnelian Bay is uniquely instantiated in an object x and the astronomer in question would give anything to have been at Carnelian Bay on x . Note the way in which the property determined by the speaker's intentions intuitively "restricts" the quantification expressed by 'that night' to *nights in 100 A.D. when an incredible display of shooting stars was visible from the shores of Carnelian Bay*. Note as well a crucial feature of this example. The fact that the speaker and her audience are working together has the result that they all see that there was exactly one night in 100 A.D. on which there was a spectacular meteor shower. Thus, when the speaker uses the expression 'that night' intending to talk about the night on which the meteor shower occurred, the speaker knows, and the speaker knows the audience knows, that the audience will be able to determine what she intends to talk about and hence what property her intention determines. This property then is contributed to the proposition expressed by 12 in this context. The important point is this: speakers generally will only engage in NDNS uses of complex demonstratives with *non-redundant* intentions in situations in which they can be confident that their audiences will have access to their intentions and know what properties the intentions determine. After all, only in such cases will the speakers be understood! Thus in considering examples of NDNS uses with *non-redundant* intentions it is important to set up the examples in such a way that it is clear that the audience has access to the speaker's intentions and the property they determine. In the present case, this is done by specifying that the astronomers were working together and all saw that their calculations had the implication that there was exactly one night in 100 A.D. on which there was a spectacular meteor shower visible in Carnelian Bay. Note that if we had just had our astronomer out of the blue utter 12 intending to talk about the night in question, but where there is no indication that her audience had access to her intention and the property it determines, the utterance of 12 will just seem strange. Many of Braun's examples of alleged NDNS uses are flawed in just this way. Often, Braun simply reports what the speaker's intentions are and provides no background story as to how his audience would be aware of them. This dramatically distorts intuitions about the cases he considers. Thus, in responding to his criticisms, we must be more careful than Braun is in describing examples.

In the example we just considered, it was the fact that the astronomers were working together that gave the audience access to the speaker's intention and the property it determined, and made clear to everyone that this was so. However, in principle many different sorts of things could have this effect. Here is another case,

which is a variant of a case discussed in CD. Suppose that Scott the scientist is strolling through the Great Moments in Hominid History Fair he sponsors every year. Students produce displays on great moments in hominid history. On Scott's left is a display that obviously concerns the hominid who invented the wheel (e.g. one can imagine a big sign saying 'Hominid Inventor of the Wheel'). Scott thinks the wheel was a fabulous invention. He nods at the display and says:

13. That hominid was brilliant.

Obviously, here it is the display, the fact that the speaker and audience are both aware of it and that the speaker nods at it, that give the audience access to the speaker's intentions and the properties it determines. I claim that in this context, given Scott's intentions and the audience's awareness of them, Scott in uttering 13 expressed the same proposition he could have expressed in a different context by having redundant intentions (that determine the property of being a hominid who invented the wheel) and simply uttering

14. That hominid who invented the wheel was brilliant.

Now before presenting Braun's objection here, let me soften up intuitions a bit. Consider first the following sentence

15a. Necessarily, the hominid who invented the wheel, if he exists, invented the wheel.

I actually find it hard to get the true reading of the sentence on which the definite description takes scope under the modal. I suspect the clause 'if he exists' contributes to the difficulty. But in any case, try to focus on that reading. Now consider a similar sentence involving instead an NDNS use of a complex demonstrative with redundant intentions:

15b. Necessarily, that hominid who invented the wheel, if he exists, invented the wheel.

Again, as with 15a, I think it is somewhat hard to get the true reading of this on which the NDNS use of the complex demonstrative scopes under the modal. However, I have found that informants who focus on the true reading of 15a also find that 15b has an exactly similar true reading. Now, imagine that Scott again nodding at the display saying "Hominid Inventor of Wheel", says

15c. Necessarily, that hominid, if he exists, invented the wheel.

Again, as with 15a and 15b, it is somewhat hard to get the true reading of 15c on which the NDNS use of the complex demonstrative with non-redundant intentions scopes under the modal. But I have found that informants who focus on the true reading of 15b also find that 15c has a true reading.

Now Braun's objection was that one couldn't detect a true reading of 15c, which my theory predicts should be available.³⁷ As I've indicated, though I think the

³⁷ He uses a different example (see his (48) Section 7). I have changed examples because, as indicated in the text, I don't think Braun sets them up properly.

relevant reading is hard to get in each of 15a–15c, I think that if one gets it in 15a and 15b, one gets it in 15c too.

That said, if my view is correct we should *expect* the relevant reading to be harder to get in 15c. This is because in cases in which we have “inexplicit content” in a proposition expressed by a sentence in a context, content that is not the semantic value relative to the context of any overt expression in the sentence used to express the proposition in that context, it seems to interact differently with things like modal operators than content contributed to the proposition in that context by expressions in the sentence. Examples of this in other cases provide strong *independent* evidence that this is so. Consider some such examples. Sometimes we say that someone prefers A’s, where the context makes clear that we are asserting that she prefers A’s to B’s. It is plausible to think that we express a proposition with inexplicit content in such a case.³⁸ Suppose we are buying ice cream and there is a choice between chocolate and vanilla. I say:

16. Shane prefers chocolate ice cream.

It is plausible to suppose that the proposition I express is that Shane prefers chocolate ice cream *to vanilla ice cream*. But then in this context the proposition I expressed has inexplicit content: the property of being vanilla ice cream (or some such thing). But now consider the following uttered in that context:

16N. Necessarily, if Shane prefers chocolate ice cream, vanilla ice cream exists.

This just doesn’t strike people as obviously true, and yet the following does:

16NE. Necessarily, if Shane prefers chocolate ice cream to vanilla ice cream, vanilla ice cream exists.

But we are supposing that the antecedents of the conditionals in 16N and 16NE express the same proposition in the context in question. I think the explanation as to why 16NE seems true to people but not so, or at least not at all so clearly, for 16N has to be that the inexplicit content in the proposition expressed by 16N in the context described makes the true reading of that sentence harder to get in comparison with 16NE. Arguably, then, we should expect the same in the case of 15b and 15c above. One more example. Suppose John is raking leaves. At some point he finishes doing so. I announce this saying ‘John is finished.’ Presumably in doing so in this context I express a proposition to the effect that John is finished *raking leaves*. Hence here again the proposition expressed by my sentence in this context has inexplicit content. Now suppose I say in this context:

17N. Necessarily, if John is finished, leaves exist.

Again, this strikes most people as at least a little odd and not clearly true. But the following strikes people as straightforwardly true

³⁸ Note that propositions don’t have inexplicit content simpliciter. A proposition expressed by a sentence relative to a context does, since one proposition may have constituents all of which are semantic values (relative to context) of overt expressions in a sentence expressing it in one context, and but another sentence might express it in a different context where some constituent of the proposition is not the semantic value of any overt expression in that sentence in the context in question.

17NE. Necessarily, if John is finished raking leaves, leaves exist.

So here again, it is harder to get the true reading of 17N as opposed to 17NE and again it seems overwhelming plausible that the reason is the inexplicit content in the proposition expressed by 17N relative to the context in contrast to 17NE.

This all strongly suggests that the true reading of 15c should be harder to get than the true readings of 15a and 15b. For in the case of 15c the content that makes the proposition true relative to the context is inexplicit (it is determined by the intentions of the speaker and is not the semantic value of an expression in the sentence); and the examples 16 and 17 show that when this is the case, the relevant reading is harder to get.

In summary, then, Braun's objection that 15c doesn't have a true reading is incorrect. It likely does, or at least it does to almost the extent that 15a and 15b do. And in any case, there is *independent* reason to think that the relevant reading will be harder to get in the case of 15c than in 15a and 15b.

7 Stanley's (and Braun's) actuality and attitudes objection

Suppose that the world and time of my context of utterance are @ and t. Pointing at Ladanian Tomlinson, I say 'That football player is talented.' On my account of complex demonstratives I thereby expressed a proposition to the effect that being a football player and being identical to LT are uniquely jointed instantiated in @, t in an object x and x is talented. So on my view, when a complex demonstrative is used with a perceptual intention at a world and time, the world and time get into the proposition.

Because of this feature of my view, in his review of my book in *The Philosophical Review* Jason Stanley claimed that my view 'is subject to a variation of the criticism Scott Soames has leveled against "actualized" definite description theories of names'.³⁹ Stanley did not elaborate, but I think I know what he must have had in mind. Further, as we'll see Braun independently formulates an objection to my view that is in all crucial respects the same objection as Stanley envisaged.⁴⁰ I'll focus on the version of the objection Stanley had in mind, though I will come back to Braun's version after responding to Stanley. Considerations of space and time require prevent me from rehearsing Soames' (2002) argument against the view that names are semantically equivalent to actualized descriptions. But one of the key claims of Soames' argument is that the following is true uttered by me now:

18. It is possible for someone to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without having any beliefs about the actual world.

Similarly, one might claim that the following is true, as uttered by me now pointing at Weatherson:

³⁹ Stanley (2002, p. 606).

⁴⁰ Braun (2008a) Section 9.

18'. It is possible for someone to believe that that Australian is a philosopher without having any beliefs about the actual world.

But, one might continue, if King's view of complex demonstratives is correct, 18' as uttered by me now (at @, t) would have a reading on which the complex demonstrative takes narrow scope relative to the verb of attitude. After all, King takes complex demonstratives to be quantifiers and so in principle 18' should have a reading on which the complex demonstrative qua quantifier takes narrow scope relative to the verb of attitude. On this reading, 18' is true iff it is possible for someone to believe that being an Australian and being identical to Weatherson are jointly instantiated in @, t in an object x and x is a philosopher, without having a belief about @. But that isn't possible; so on this reading 18' is false. Yet 18' does not seem to have a reading on which it is false. Hence, King's theory assigns to 18' a reading it doesn't have.

I think that the crucial considerations in this argument and the Soames' argument are similar enough that it is reasonable to hold that this is a Soames style argument against my view. And I suspect it is the sort of argument Stanley envisaged being used against me.

In responding to this argument, let me begin by agreeing that 18' does not seem to have a false reading. I also agree that in principle on my view, 18' has the reading claimed in the sense that on my view complex demonstratives can take narrow scope under verbs of attitude and if the one in 18' did so, it would be read as claimed.

However, I don't think my view is committed to the claim that 18' has a reading on which it should *seem* false for several reasons. First, quite generally when complex demonstratives are used in attitude ascriptions with perceptual intentions as we are imagining in the case of 18', it is exceedingly difficult to get readings of the relevant sentences on which the complex demonstratives clearly take narrow scope. One can only convince oneself of this by running through many examples, but consider the following (as uttered by me in a room of people pointing at a man in the back):

19. Glenn believes that guy in the back of the room is a spy.

There is little tendency to hear the predicative material in the complex demonstrative as contributing to the content of the ascribed belief. Perhaps it helps to see this if one imagines that Mike is the man I am talking about in uttering 19; and though Glenn believes Mike is a spy, Glenn doesn't believe Mike is in the back of the room (because Glenn falsely believes Mike is now in California). It is hard to hear 19 as false in such a case.

I should add that one bit of indirect evidence that complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions in attitude ascriptions strongly tend to take wide scope in attitude ascriptions is that until my book came out no one ever criticized direct reference accounts of complex demonstratives on the grounds that they didn't capture the narrow scope readings of complex demonstratives in attitude ascriptions. I think the reason it is hard to get complex demonstratives to take narrow scope in such cases is that the purpose of the predicative material in the complex

demonstrative is to allow the speaker's audience to figure out who the speaker is intending to talk about. If the predicative material took narrow scope under the verb of attitude, there would be no reason for thinking that the thing the speaker intends to talk about satisfies the material. After all, it would be being used to specify the content of the attitude the speaker is ascribing to the subject of the ascription and that content might be false. Hence, that the predicative material in a complex demonstrative used with perceptual intentions is used to help the audience figure out who the speaker is talking about produces strong pressure for complex demonstratives to take wide scope in attitude ascriptions.⁴¹ So if complex demonstratives are quantifiers, it still should be exceedingly difficult to get the reading of 18' on which the complex demonstrative takes narrow scope. This point can be bolstered by two closely related points. First, if we use a definite description, which I take to be a quantifier (I know some disagree), in a sentence like 19 instead of a complex demonstrative, still assuming that the speaker is trying to talk about someone in her environment, the description too strongly tends to take wide scope over the attitude ascription

19'. Glenn believes the guy in the back of the room is a spy.

Again, if I utter 19' indicating and trying to talk about Mike, who is in the back of the room, and Glenn believes Mike is a spy, but has no beliefs about Mike's location nor any general beliefs about whether men in this room are spies, it is very hard to hear 19' as false. But it would be if the description in 19' were read with narrow scope.

Second, when other quantifiers are used in attitude ascriptions to talk about things in the environment of the speaker and her audience, they too strongly tend to take wide scope in attitude ascriptions for the same reason. So suppose that there are three men, Mike, Rex and Nathan, on a stage in front of us. Glenn, who is not present, believes each of them is a spy, but has no beliefs about their locations nor any general beliefs about men on the stage in front of us being spies. Gesturing towards Mike, Rex and Nathan, I say:

19''. Glenn believes that every man on the stage is a spy.

Again, it is extremely hard to hear 19'' as false, but again it is false on the reading on which the quantifier takes narrow scope relative to 'believes'. In the case of all of 19–19''' the reason the quantifiers take wide scope over the verb of attitude is the same: the speaker is using the predicative material in the quantifier phrase to help the audience identify who she is trying to talk about.

In summary, then, my first point is that complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions very strongly tend to take wide scope in attitude ascriptions for the reasons given, as do other quantifiers when used in similar ways. That other quantifiers exhibit this behavior is good independent evidence that if complex

⁴¹ This is so even if the attitude verb is factive. For if the demonstrative took narrow scope under such a verb, there would often be a tension between choosing predicative material for the demonstrative that accurately characterizes the content of the attitude of the subject of the ascription *and* choosing predicative material that will allow one's audience to see what object one is trying to talk about in using the demonstrative. By taking wide scope over the verb, such tensions are avoided.

demonstratives are quantifiers, they should behave this way too. At any rate, this is one reason it is hard to detect any false reading of 18'. I hasten to add that complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions *can* take narrow scope under verbs of attitude. But one has to work very hard to make them do so. No such work has been done in the case of 18', however, and so the reading is very strongly suppressed. At the end of this section, I'll give some examples of complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions taking narrow scope under attitude verbs.

There is a second reason that 18' doesn't seem to have a false reading. Even if we could read the complex demonstrative in 18' as taking narrow scope, and so read 18' in a way that it is strictly speaking false, there is reason to think that it still wouldn't *seem* false to us. I believe this has to do with the fact that though when I utter 18', the actual world "gets into" the proposition I express, I am not fully consciously aware of this in an explicit way.⁴² This results in the fact that even if 18' is read with the complex demonstrative taking narrow scope, so that the belief that is said to be possible to have is a belief in part about the actual world, we don't fully recognize this and so don't allow the impossibility of having a belief about the actual world without having a belief about the actual world to affect our intuitions about the truth of 18' (uttered by me now).

To appreciate the phenomenon at work here, let's consider other examples with similar features. As in other cases, I wish to emphasize that in noting that the phenomenon occurs in cases having nothing to do with complex demonstratives, I am providing *independent evidence* that my explanation for why 18' on the reading in question doesn't seem false is the correct one.

Objects only have speeds relative to coordinates or frames of reference. Hence, true propositions about speed arguably must have constituents or parts that specify frames of reference. Thus, when I truly say:

20. Glenn's car was going 80 mph on the way to Mammoth yesterday.

somehow a constituent specifying the relevant frame of reference got into the proposition I expressed. But then to have a belief about the speed of a thing one must have a belief in part about a frame of reference. So

20'. Tracy believes that Glenn's car was going 80 mph on the way to Mammoth yesterday.

attributes to Tracy a belief in part about a frame of reference. And yet the following seems true:

⁴² I have some awareness that the actual world gets in, because that in part explains why speakers have intuitions to the effect that a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a complex demonstrative (not in the scope of anything else) used with perceptual intentions can be true at a world in which the individual being talked about by means of the complex demonstrative doesn't satisfy the predicative material in it. Given my earlier characterization of *inexplicit content*, the actual world counts as inexplicit content of the proposition expressed by 18' in the context described. However, I don't use the term here because it *may* be that there are important differences between the way in which the actual world occurs in the proposition expressed by 18' relative to the context in question and the way in which the entities I earlier gave as examples of inexplicit content occur in the propositions expressed by the sentences discussed relative to the contexts considered.

21. It is possible for someone to have a belief about the speed of a thing without having a belief about any frame of reference.

It seems that children and young adults (and even, sadly, many college students) have beliefs about speeds of things without having beliefs about frames of reference. My own feeling is that 21 is strictly false. But it seems true to people (even to me at least in weaker moments).

A second example. Suppose you think, as I do, when one utters a tensed sentence, one expresses a proposition that has as a constituent the time of utterance (or something that picks that time out in some way). Then when I now utter

22. Aristotle was a philosopher.

I express a proposition that has as a constituent the time of my utterance. That means that to believe a proposition expressed at a time *t* by such a sentence is in part to have a belief about *t*. But now consider the following sentence as uttered by me now

- 22'. It is possible to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without having a belief about the present time.

Strictly this should be false (or at any rate have a false reading) since the proposition that it is said it is possible to believe contains the time of utterance as a constituent. But surely 22' nonetheless seems true. Didn't lots of people in the Middle Ages believe Aristotle was a philosopher without believing anything about the present time?

A final example. Most philosophers and linguists think that sentences like

23. Glenn is tall.

express propositions that have as constituents either comparison classes or height standards understood some other way. This would explain how 23 could be true uttered in one context and false uttered in a different context even though Glenn's height hasn't changed. The idea is that in one context one height standard gets contributed to the proposition expressed by 23 and in another context a different height standard gets contributed so that 23 expresses a different proposition. Despite the fact that sentences like 23 express propositions (relative to contexts) that have height standards as constituents, the following seems true:

- 23'. It is possible for someone to believe Glenn is tall without believing anything about a height standard.

Glenn's 4 year old son seems to do so, as presumably do many non-philosophers who don't seem to even be aware that there are height standards.

I am tempted to multiply examples involving simultaneity, vertical leap and so on, but I'll resist that temptation. The point is that in all these cases, it seems plausible that the propositions which are said to be possibly believed have as constituents things about which it seems true to say that one can believe the propositions without having beliefs about the things in question. One reason, I suspect, is that in these cases speakers are not fully consciously aware of the fact

that the things in question are constituents of the propositions in question. Hence it seems true to say it is possible to believe the relevant propositions without having beliefs about the things in question, though strictly this is probably false. I believe the same thing would occur in the case of 18', even if we managed to read it with the complex demonstrative taking narrow scope relative to 'believe'. The sentence could seem true, even though the proposition it is said it is possible to believe contains the actual world.

So I conclude that for the reason given, the Soames style argument discussed above against my account of complex demonstratives fails. In particular, I can explain why despite the fact that my view predicts that in principle 18' has a false reading, we don't intuitively think it does. Hence the apparent lack of a false reading does not refute my view.

The same considerations I've adduced here can be used to respond to Braun's objection that my account of complex demonstratives incorrectly predicts that the following sentence has a reading on which it is false (consider the sentence uttered by Harold in the actual world pointing at Matti):

(ES) It could have been the case that: Sally asserted that that man is smart though there were a few more electrons than there actually are.⁴³

Indeed, Braun's objection is exactly the same objection I've just responded to in all crucial respects. Both objections hinge on the claim that on my view when the complex demonstrative in 18' or (ES) takes narrow scope under a verb of attitude that is embedded under a modal operator, we get a false reading and yet the sentences don't seem to have readings on which they are false. For the reasons given above, the same reasons in both cases, I can explain why neither (ES) nor 18' seems intuitively to have a reading on which it is false.⁴⁴ Because Braun fails to stress this, let me remind you that my view predicts that (ES), like 18', has a true reading. So it isn't as though my view can't also explain why (ES) and 18' seem true.⁴⁵

⁴³ Though I object to the colon here—ES isn't a sentence of English—I have left it in. The example is from Braun (2008a) Section 9 example (60).

⁴⁴ Instead of 21–23' above, in responding to Braun's claims about (ES) we would consider sentences like 'It is possible to be in a context where the standards of height are different than they are in this context and yet I assert that Glenn is tall' or 'It is possible for someone in the past to assert that Aristotle was a philosopher.' Alternatively, we could change Braun's (ES) to 'It is possible for someone to assert that that man is smart without asserting anything about the actual world' thereby making his objection just like Stanley's.

⁴⁵ Braun (2008a) makes another objection closely related to the one involving (ES) (see Sect. 9 example (62)). He imagines that Sam is reaching for an apple that Braun can see has a large bruise on it. Braun is trying to warn Sam before he bites into it, but Sam interrupts him. When Sam takes a bite and makes a face, Braun says

(C) If you hadn't interrupted me, I would have said that that apple is badly bruised.

(I changed Braun's example slightly, replacing 'told you' with 'said' in the consequent to avoid irrelevant complications.) Braun claims that (C) seems true in the context of utterance, but objects that my view assigns it a reading on which it is false. That reading again would require the complex demonstrative to take narrow scope under the verb of attitude ('said') in the consequent of the conditional. Hence, the two points made in response to the objection regarding (ES) also suffice to respond here. First, again complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions tend very strongly to take wide scope over attitude verbs. If the complex demonstrative does so in (C), we get a reading on which it is true in the context in question

As part of my response to Braun and Stanley here, I have claimed that complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions very strongly tend to take wide scope over attitude verbs in attitude ascriptions. The reason for this, I claim, is that the role of the predicative material in a complex demonstrative is to get the audience to focus on the thing the speaker intends to talk about in using the complex demonstrative. Having the complex demonstrative scope under an attitude verb, and so having the predicative material in it be used to characterize the content of the attitude, is in tension with having the predicative material play its usual role of helping the audience figure out what the speaker intends to talk about. Thus the strong pressure for complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions to scope over verbs of attitude.⁴⁶

Since this is a pragmatic explanation of why complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions take narrow scope under verbs of attitude, one should be able to find cases in which such uses of complex demonstratives do take narrow scope under verbs of attitude, even if such cases are bound to be somewhat unusual. And I claim that there indeed are such cases. I'll give two cases drawn from CD and a third suggested by Michael McGlone.⁴⁷

For the first example, suppose we are at a party at which evil and vindictive Alan has just been named CEO of the Chanticleer toy company.⁴⁸ Some of the guests are aware of this and some are not. Sherry, a Chanticleer executive, has long believed that Alan despises her. She has just heard the bad news about his being named CEO. Sherry believes that as CEO, Alan will make her life miserable. She is moping around saying she must quit her job. Someone asks me what is wrong with Sherry. Pointing at Alan, I say:

24. Sherry believes that guy who was just named CEO of Chanticleer hates her.

Footnote 45 continued

(note that this doesn't require the complex demonstrative to scope out of the consequent; it simply must take wide scope over the attitude verb *in* the consequent). Further, again as with (ES), even if we were to force the complex demonstrative to take narrow scope under the attitude verb in (C), so that the sentence is strictly false, it wouldn't seem false to us for the same reason I claim (ES) wouldn't on the relevant reading. This is supported by the fact that the following conditionals don't seem false, though for reasons given in the text involving 21, 22' and 23' they likely are:

(C1) If you had asked me about it a year ago, I would have said that Aristotle was a philosopher.

(C2) If we had been discussing basketball players, I would have (still) said that Glenn is tall.

(Imagine (C2) uttered in a context in which the height standard being employed in one for jockeys.) Hence the objection Braun raises involving (C) can be responded to in the same way as the objection involving (ES).

⁴⁶ If this explanation is correct, one would expect uses of complex demonstratives without perceptual intentions to easily take narrow scope under verbs of attitude. This expectation is indeed borne out, which again provides strong confirmation both for the explanation and more generally for my quantificational view of complex demonstratives. See CD pp. 109–110.

⁴⁷ Mike suggested this sort of example during the question session following my talk at the Cornell Mini-Conference on Complex Demonstratives. Thanks to Mike for the example.

⁴⁸ See CD pp. 110–113.

I claim, of course, that in 24 we have a scope ambiguity. The two propositions 24 is capable of expressing as uttered in that context are (where w, t are the world and time of the context, and $=b$ is the property of being identical to Alan):

- 24a. $[[\text{THAT}_{=b, Jwt} \text{ guy who was just named CEO of Chanticleer: } x][\text{Sherry believes}[x \text{ hates her}]]]$
 24b. Sherry believes $[[\text{THAT}_{=b, Jwt} \text{ guy who was just named CEO of Chanticleer: } x][x \text{ hates her}]]$

In the present case, I claim we naturally read 24 as expressing 24b. For I think we have the intuition that my utterance of 24 *explains* Sherry's behavior. But if 24 is read as 24a, it wouldn't explain her behavior. For it only ascribes to Sherry the belief that Alan hates her. But Sherry has believed *that* for some time, and that she has *this* belief does not explain her behavior. Intuitively, I have explained Sherry's behavior because part of the content of the belief I ascribe to her is that Alan was just named CEO. 24a fails to capture this. That 24 does explain Sherry's behavior is supported by the fact that it seems true in the situation as described. For it to seem true, it must be a correct explanation of Sherry's behavior, and not merely be a true belief ascription. As a response to the question as to why Sherry is behaving in a certain way, even a true, but not explanatorily relevant, belief ascription will seem (and be?) false. Thus suppose that when asked what is wrong with Sherry instead of 24 I say:

25. Sherry believes that Chanticleer is exploiting its workers.

If, as we are supposing, this does not explain Sherry's moping about, even if it ascribes to Sherry a belief she really has, it will seem false. Thus the fact that 24 seems true suggests that we do take it to be a proper explanation. And this, as already indicated, would seem to require reading it in such a way that it ascribes to Sherry a belief whose content includes that Alan was named CEO of Chanticleer. But then it seems it must be read as 24b.

Finally, I would add that if instead of 24 I had said

26. Sherry believes that Alan hates her.

or

26'. Sherry believes he [pointing at Alan] hates her.

there certainly is a feeling that I have not fully explained Sherry's behavior. Remember, she came to the party cheery already believing that Alan hates her. Certainly, someone who knew this would be puzzled at 26/26' as an attempt to explain Sherry's moping. What is missing, of course, is the ascription to Sherry of the belief that Alan was just named CEO. In the case of 24, however, we feel that Sherry's behavior is fully explained. This contrast between 24 and 26/26' strongly suggests that 24 does in part ascribe to Sherry the belief that Alan was named Chanticleer CEO and thus is read as 24b in the situation as described. I take it that it is obvious that this case causes severe problems for DRCD, including Braun's version. For according to DRCD, 24, 26 and 26' all express the same proposition in

the contexts in question. Hence 24 should no more explain Sherry's behavior than 26 or 26' on this view. Clearly, that is simply wrong.

Michael McGlone suggested a similar sort of case in which I explain why Rachel, who is a huge fan of great contemporary novelists, isn't talking to a man in the corner at an author's convention. Pointing at the man in the corner, I say:

27. Rachel doesn't know that man in the corner is a great novelist.

Suppose the man in the corner is Philip Roth, who Rachel knows to be a great novelist. It still seems that 27 has a reading on which it is true. But this must be the reading on which the complex demonstrative takes narrow scope under the verb of attitude, since the wide scope reading is false here. Note that I could even follow 27 with

27'. Of course Rachel knows that Philip Roth is a great novelist.

Both 27 and 27' seem true in the described situation. Of course DRCD theorists, including Braun, must deny this. Hence, again this case causes trouble for DRCD theorists.

For a third example, I imagine we are in a bar and there are a number of transvestites there.⁴⁹ This is apparent to all of us except Donnie, who takes them to be women. Donnie points at one of the transvestites and says

28. That woman is beautiful.

Someone asks me what Donnie said, and I reply pointing at the transvestite:

28'. Donnie said that woman is beautiful.

I claim that 28' has a true reading in the situation, and on this reading the complex demonstrative must take narrow scope under the verb of attitude as in 28'a, since the reading on which it takes wide scope is not true in the situation:

28'a. Donnie said [THAT_{=a,Jwt}woman: x [x is beautiful]]

Because some have objected that 28' sounds sort of ironic, as though the speaker is playing along with Donnie's confusion, and so perhaps is not literally true, let me alter the case slightly to eliminate the possibility of making this move.⁵⁰ Imagine that we are all taken in by the transvestites and so all think the men are woman. Let Donnie utter 28 and me utter 28'. Doesn't 28' still seem true to those of us who know the real facts of the situation? It seems clearly so, and that is only explained by our reading 28' as 28'a.

Thus, we have examples of cases in which complex demonstrative used with perceptual intentions do take narrow scope under verbs of attitude and an explanation as to why they strongly tend not to.

⁴⁹ See CD pp. 114–116.

⁵⁰ Lynsey Wolter raised this concern.

8 Braun's objection from attitude ascriptions⁵¹

Braun imagines that Tom's waiter John recommends a wine that Tom enjoys. Tom says to John:

(W) You recommended a good wine.

Susan overhears Tom's comment. Susan and her friends can see that John has a tattoo, but Tom doesn't see this or know that John has a tattoo. Susan says to her friends, nodding at John:

(WB) Tom believes that that waiter with a tattoo on his neck recommended a good wine.

Braun claims that (WB) is true in this context. But he claims that my view predicts that (WB) has a false reading in the context in question. This is the reading on which the complex demonstrative takes narrow scope under the verb of attitude. On this reading, (WB) would entail that Tom believes John has a tattoo, but Tom has no such belief.

From what I've said to this point, my response to this objection should be quite clear. First, my account assigns a reading to (WB) on which it is true: the reading on which the complex demonstrative takes wide scope over the verb of attitude. Second, as discussed earlier, my account explains why it is exceptionally hard to get readings of complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions in attitude ascriptions where the complex demonstratives take scope under the verbs of attitude. Hence, the false reading of (WB) is strongly suppressed and the true reading is highly salient. This explains intuitions about the case. I remind the reader that I have given examples in which complex demonstratives used with perceptual intentions do take narrow scope under verbs of attitude. If this is correct, then we should expect a pragmatic story of the general sort I've given as to why such a reading is not available in (WB) in the situation described.

9 Braun's objection from assertion ascriptions involving NDNS uses

The final series of objections raised by Braun concern cases involving NDNS uses with non-redundant speaker intentions and assertion ascriptions.⁵² As before, Braun often fails to set up the cases with sufficient care and in such a way that it is clear that something in the case provides the audience access to the intentions of the speaker and the property they determine. And as before this drastically distorts intuitions about the cases. Thus, as we did in Sect. 6, again we shall have to re-describe some of the cases in more detail.

Suppose Larry the lobbyist hears that exactly one senator is testifying on campaign finance reform before the Senate Ethics Committee, but doesn't know who it is. Perhaps Larry and his audience are in a bar watching CNN where on the

⁵¹ Braun (2008a) Section 8.

⁵² Braun (2008a) Section 10.

news ticker, it reads ‘Exactly one senator testifying on campaign finance reform before Senate Ethics Committee’. As Larry and his audience view this, Larry says

(M) That senator will get no money from me.

Given his intentions here and the property they determine (*being a senator who is testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics committee*), I claim that (M) in this context expresses a general proposition that is true at a world w iff there is a unique object x that is both a senator and is testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics Committee in w and x will get no money from Larry in w . Thus, Larry expresses a general claim and we can imagine that he has only general beliefs. Imagine now that Smith is the testifying senator and that John heard and understood Larry’s utterance of (M). Braun points out that if John runs into Smith, now knowing he is the one who testified, John can truly say (addressing Smith):

(S1) Larry said that you will get no money from him.

But, Braun objects, on my view Larry only asserted and believed general propositions in uttering (M). Hence (S1), which attributes belief in a singular proposition to Larry, should be false in this situation if my view is correct. But intuitively it seems true.

The weakness in this argument is that we often ascribe the saying of singular propositions to people who have only general beliefs, and yet the ascriptions seem intuitively true nonetheless. Here are some examples. First assume definite descriptions are quantifiers. Suppose that not knowing who the mayor of Los Angeles is, but believing on general grounds that any mayor of Los Angeles is a crook, I say:

(M1) The mayor of Los Angeles is a crook.

We can suppose that I have only general beliefs in uttering (M1) and that (M1) itself expresses a general claim. If you overhear me and run into the mayor the next day and say

(S1’) Jeff said you are a crook.

this will seem intuitively true to people aware of the facts of the case. But as in the above case, this is so even though (S1’) attributes to me the saying of a singular proposition, and I believe and assert only general propositions in the case described. And indeed, there are even more radical cases of this that don’t depend on the assumption that definite descriptions are quantifiers. Suppose that Glenn says to me

(UM1) Every one of my siblings is an architect.

and that I have never met any of Glenn’s three siblings. That night I am introduced to Glenn’s sister and I say:

(S1’’) Glenn told me that you are an architect.

Again, ordinary people find this ascription straightforwardly true, though Glenn told me only general claims. So the moral is that even if Braun is right that (S1) seems true in the situation described, this is perfectly consistent with the claim Larry has

no singular beliefs about Smith nor has he asserted any singular propositions about him. Hence Braun's objection here fails.

Braun's next objection concerns a case in which Larry again utters (M). We can again suppose that he does so looking at CNN where, as before, his audience sees that the screen reads 'Exactly one senator testifying on campaign finance reform before Senate Ethics Committee':

(M) That senator will get no money from me.

As a result of their mutually recognized experience of seeing the television screen, Larry's audience has access to his intentions in using the complex demonstrative here and the property they determine: the property of being a senator testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics Committee.⁵³ Larry's intentions are again non-redundant and by uttering (M) as before I claim that Larry expresses a proposition that is true in *w* iff there is a unique thing *x* that is a senator testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics Committee in *w* and *x* will get no money from Larry in *w*. Again, suppose Senator Smith is the Senator testifying, unbeknownst to Larry.

Braun now objects that if my view were correct, it would be possible for Tom to utter the following sentence using the complex demonstrative in an NDNS way, with his intentions determining a property that Smith uniquely possesses and have the sentence be false in his context.

(MD) Larry said that that Senator will get no money from him.

This should be possible on my view, because Tom's NDNS use of the complex demonstrative in (MD) could be accompanied by non-redundant intentions that determine a *different* property possessed by Senator Smith, say the property of cursing at the Vice president, than was determined by Larry's intentions in uttering (M). If that were to occur and the complex demonstrative in (MD) took narrow scope under the verb 'said', (MD) might well express a proposition that is false in Tom's context because it's truth would require Larry to have said something he didn't say, (namely a proposition that is true iff the unique senator who cursed at the Vice President will get no money from Larry). But Braun claims that in this sort of case, Tom's utterance of (MD) will seem true. After sketching such a case, Braun complains, "...Tom seems to speak truly when he utters [(MD)]..."; and later "King's theory incorrectly entails that Tom's ascription is false in Tom's context, on its narrow scope reading".⁵⁴

Despite his protestations to the contrary, Braun is simply wrong here. As before, his objection here relies on the fact that he hasn't sketched the examples in sufficient detail so that we and Tom and Larry's audiences can see that Larry in uttering (M)

⁵³ Again, Braun ignores the fact that in felicitous NDNS uses of complex demonstratives with non-redundant intentions, the situation must be one in which something gives the hearers access to the speaker's intentions in using the complex demonstrative and the property they determine. When one leaves this out, it is easy to see that intuitions will be dramatically distorted. All the objections in Braun's Section 10 hinge on misdescribing cases in which NDNS uses of complex demonstratives are felicitous except the first.

⁵⁴ Braun (2008a) Section 10 examples (69) and (72) and surrounding discussion.

and Tom in uttering (MD) can indeed have non-redundant intentions determining different properties in such a way that (MD) can be false in its context. Let's fill out the example to make this clear. Suppose as before Larry and his audience are in a bar looking at the television on which CNN is displaying the sentence 'Exactly one senator testifying on campaign finance reform before Senate Ethics Committee'. Neither Larry nor his audience has any senator in mind as the one testifying. Again, Larry utters (M) clearly intending to "talk about" the unique senator who is testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics Committee, and so his intentions non-redundantly determine the property of being a senator testifying on campaign reform before the Senate Ethics Committee. In uttering (M) in this context, I claim he expresses a proposition that is true in w iff there is a unique x that is a senator testifying on campaign finance reform before the Senate Ethics Committee in w and x will get no money from Larry in w . Suppose there is another television set on the other wall of the bar. Tom and his friends are watching that television. It is tuned to CSPAN and displayed on the screen is the sentence 'Exactly one senator cursed at the Vice President.' Suppose that neither Tom nor his audience has any senator in mind as the one who cursed; suppose Larry knows nothing, and so has said nothing, about this cursing; and suppose Tom and his audience know nothing about any senator testifying before the Senate Ethics Committee. Tom utters (MD) nodding at that screen while he and his friends are all viewing CSPAN:

(MD) Larry said that that senator will get no money from him.

Surely (MD) does seem to misreport what Larry said and hence seems false in Tom's context. In uttering (MD) Tom represents Larry saying as something about a senator who cursed at the Vice President. Note that (MD) will seem false even if, *unbeknownst to all parties*, Senator Smith is the senator who both testified and cursed at the Vice President. I claim that the reading of (MD) on which it seems false in Tom's context is precisely the reading on which the NDNS uses of the complex demonstrative takes narrow scope under the verb 'said', and hence requires for its truth that Larry said something that entails that a unique thing x is a senator who cursed at the Vice President and x will get no money from Larry. Since Larry said no such thing, (MD) is false in Tom's context as it intuitively seems to be. So Braun's objection fails: he is just wrong in claiming that Tom cannot speak falsely by uttering (MD) with non-redundant intentions in a case of the sort described. Again I wish to emphasize that any initial appearance there may have been to the contrary resulted from Braun not sketching in sufficient detail a case in which Larry and Tom have different non-redundant intentions and in which it is clear to their audiences what their intentions are and what properties they determine. Once we sketch a case in which this is clearly true, as we just did, it is clear (MD) could be used to misreport what Larry asserted in uttering (M). That this can occur should constitute strong evidence *in favor* of my view, since it precisely predicts that this can occur.

It is worth noting that changing the example to one using 'believes' instead of 'said' makes my case even stronger (I suspect that this is because we are much looser about 'said' ascriptions than we are about 'believes' ascriptions). Imagine the

last case as described (Larry and his audience have heard nothing about any senator cursing; Tom and his audience have heard nothing about any senator testifying; and none of the relevant parties has anyone in mind as the cursing or testifying senator). Suppose now that Larry, looking at the CNN screen saying ‘Exactly one senator testifying on campaign finance reform before Senate Ethics Committee’, had said ‘That senator is a hero.’ Tom, knowing nothing about this and Larry knowing nothing about any cursing, is looking at the CSPAN screen saying ‘Exactly one senator cursed at the Vice President.’ Nodding at the screen, Tom says ‘Larry believes that senator is a hero.’ Surely this seems false even if, unbeknownst to all, Smith both cursed and testified.

10 Review and conclusion

Though Braun raises many objections to the quantificational account of complex demonstratives I articulated and defended in CD, we have now seen that there are responses to all of his objections. In the case of almost all of my responses, a significant part of the response has been that since other quantifiers exhibit the behavior Braun cites as evidence against the view that complex demonstratives are quantifiers, exhibition of that behavior couldn’t possibly be evidence that an expression isn’t a quantifier. When additional claims were invoked to explain behavior of complex demonstratives that Braun claims undermines my quantificational theory, independent evidence was cited to support the claims in question, (e.g. see the discussion of “inexplicit content” in Sect. 6 and examples 16N and 17N; the discussion in Sect. 7 of quantifiers scoping over attitude verbs when they are being used to “talk about” something in the environment of the speaker and examples 19’ and 19’’; and the discussion of the apparent possibility of believing propositions that have things as constituents without having beliefs about those things and examples 20–23’).⁵⁵ As a result, my responses to Braun’s objections are about as principled and well motivated as they can be.

In contrast, in King (2008a, “Reply to Braun on NDNS and QI uses of complex demonstratives,” unpublished manuscript) I argue that Braun’s responses to my objections to DRCD in CD cannot be sustained. I show there that Braun has no response to the main problem NDNS uses pose for DRCD and that his attempt to explain away QI uses is riddled with difficulties. I conclude that the arguments from NDNS and QI uses are effective against Braun’s account.

Finally, we have seen that there are many uses of complex demonstratives that DRCD, including Braun’s version, utterly fail to account for. In addition to the NDNS uses and QI uses just discussed, there are “bound variable” uses, anaphoric uses and anaphoric uses combined with modals. Surely the failure to account for such a broad range of data is a severe defect of a proposed semantic theory. By contrast, my quantificational account can handle *all* this data. These considerations,

⁵⁵ In at least one case, Braun is simply wrong about the behavior he claimed undermined my quantificational account. See Sect. 9 where I show that contrary to what Braun claims, (MD) *can* be used to misreport what Larry said.

it seems to me, provide overwhelming reason to think that my quantificational semantics for complex demonstratives is superior to DRCD, including David Braun's version.

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