Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference

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Complex demonstratives (in the singular) are noun phrases (or determiner phrases) that result from combining the determiners 'this' or 'that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases, such as 'woman' or 'woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, 'this woman', and 'that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives.[1] There are also plural complex demonstratives such as 'these skis' and 'those snowboarders smoking by the gondola.'

    In *Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account* (King 2001; henceforth *CD*), I argued against what I called the *direct reference account of complex demonstratives* (henceforth DRCD), and defended a quantificational account of complex demonstratives.[2] Because I share with most DRCD theorists a Russellian view of structured propositions, according to which they have individuals, properties, and relations as constituents,

    1. Note that on this way of using the term 'complex demonstrative,' the criteria for being a complex demonstrative are syntactic. Some do not seem to use the term this way, including Nathan Salmon (2006a, 2006b—discussed below) who seems to claim that some expressions that satisfy the syntactic criteria I provide nonetheless are not "genuine demonstratives." See Salmon 2006a, 272n11 and Salmon 2006b, 446. It is for this reason that I used to use the more overtly syntactical term "complex 'that' phrase" in place of 'complex demonstrative' (see King 1999 and 2001). However, that more perspicuous but unlovely term never caught on, and so I have relented. I think most philosophers and linguists use 'complex demonstrative' the way I do here.

    2. In fact, there are different versions of DRCD that differ on details of the semantics. I don't think these differences matter to the issues I intend to address, so I'll ignore them here.

I made clear that the dispute between me and those who hold DRCD concerns the contributions complex demonstratives make to propositions expressed by sentences (relative to contexts) in which they occur. According to DRCD, complex demonstratives contribute individuals to propositions (relative to contexts). By contrast, on the quantificational semantics for demonstratives I defend, complex demonstratives contribute to propositions (relative to contexts) semantic values of the sort other quantifiers contribute.

In two recent papers, Nathan Salmon has criticized part of my argument against DRCD (Salmon 2006a, notes 11 and 13, and Salmon 2006b, appendix).[3] I shall show that Salmon's criticism fails. I'll also show that the version of DRCD that Salmon ends up endorsing is false.[4]

Before turning to Salmon's objection, it will be helpful to rehearse what I take to be some obvious methodological points. Let's distinguish occurrences of expressions in sentences from the expressions themselves. So, for example, the expression 'that car' has two occurrences in the sentence

1.   That car is nicer than that car.

Now suppose someone proposes a semantic theory of some *expression* (or some sort of expression—for example, complex demonstratives). Surely one way to criticize this semantic theory would be to point out that it gives no account, or no proper account, of the semantics of certain *occurrences* of the (sort of) expression in question.[5] For example, suppose

3. The appendix of Salmon 2006b is virtually identical to the conjunction of notes 11 and 13 in Salmon 2006a. Indeed, Salmon 2006a is virtually identical to a large proper part of Salmon 2006b.

4. As we'll see, I'll just review the arguments given in *CD* that show Salmon's view is incorrect. As I discuss below, Salmon (2006a, 2006b) curiously ignores those arguments.

5. When we talk about the semantic values (extensions, contents, and so forth) of occurrences of contextually sensitive expressions, as I will, we need the notion of an occurrence of an expression *taken relative to a context*. When I suppress contexts and talk of semantic values of occurrences of expressions simpliciter, I do so either because the expressions aren't contextually sensitive or because I am taking the context to be fixed. In *CD* and here, I discuss what I call classic demonstrative, NDNS, and QI *uses* of complex demonstratives (see *CD*, 48–78). A given *occurrence* of a complex demonstrative in a sentence (for example, the occurrence in 'That student who received 100 percent on the exam is a genius.') may exhibit, for example, an NDNS *use* in one context of utterance and a classic demonstrative *use* in another. This will be due to the fact that features of the different contexts (the speaker's intentions) determine that different sorts of properties saturate the second and third argument places of

someone claimed that the word 'true' expressed no property at all, and held that that is why 'It is true that snow is white' just expresses the same claim as 'Snow is white.' Clearly a legitimate objection to such a view would be that it appears to give no account of occurrences of 'true' in sentences like

2.   Nothing Bush said was true.

Or suppose someone claimed that the semantics of English 'and' was such that the truth of a sentence like:

3.   John came in the door and Sue gave him a hug.

requires that the conjuncts are both true and that the event described in the second conjunct occurred after the event described in the first. Again, a legitimate objection would be to point out that this account seems to give the wrong semantics for occurrences of 'and' in sentences such as

4.   First-order logic is undecidable and arithmetic is incomplete.

How does the objection that a semantic proposal regarding an expression doesn't apply to certain occurrences of the expression, call them *problematic occurrences*, affect the proposal?[6] Well, it shows that the proposal in question does not give a complete account of all occurrences

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the relation expressed by 'that' (taken "out of any context"—see *CD*, 42–66). Hence talk of classic demonstrative, NDNS, and QI *uses* of complex demonstratives in *CD* and the present essay should be understood as talk about occurrences of complex demonstratives taken in contexts, where the speakers' intentions in the contexts determine certain sorts of properties. In general, then, a *use* of a complex demonstrative may be understood as an *occurrence in a context* (where contexts include speakers' intentions or the properties they determine). In the present essay, when I equate an occurrence of an expression with a use, or go back and forth between talking of an occurrence of an expression and a use of it, again I do so either because I am talking about occurrences of an expression that aren't contextually sensitive or I am taking the context to be fixed (and hence the use is the occurrence in the fixed context). Having said all this, I will sometimes freely go back and forth between talk of uses of expressions and occurrences of them. In *CD*, I talked primarily about uses of complex demonstratives. I talk about occurrences in the present essay in order to make more direct contact with Salmon (2006a, 2006b), who is concerned with "occurrence-based semantic theories." In his discussion of my QI uses of complex demonstratives, Salmon (2006a, 2006b) too suppresses talk of contexts and speaks of the semantics of occurrences of complex demonstratives simpliciter. See my note 7.

6. Of course, occurrences of expressions are problematic *relative to a semantic proposal for the expression*. I'll leave this tacit, as it should always be clear which semantic theory a given sort of occurrence I discuss will be problematic for.

of the expression in question. Hence *at the very least* it shows that some other explanation is needed for the problematic occurrences. Of course pointing out that a proposed semantics for an expression cannot handle certain occurrences of the expression does not by itself *refute* the semantic proposal under consideration. That is, by itself it does not show that the proposal is not correct for *any* occurrences of the expression, and hence is an incorrect proposal regarding the expression. Showing that a semantic proposal can't handle certain occurrences of the expression in question places a burden on the defenders of the proposal to come up with some explanation of the problematic occurrences. These explanations can, in principle, take various forms. For example, the defender of the proposal could claim that the expression is ambiguous, and that her semantics captures one of its meanings, while the problematic occurrences strongly favor the other reading of the expression in question. Or she could attempt to formulate what could be argued to be an extension of her original semantics that handles the problematic occurrences. Or finally, she could claim that the problematic occurrences are not literal (for example, when some direct reference theorists about names are confronted with occurrences of names that appear to behave as predicates, and hence are not directly referential ['Every Susie I've ever known was funny'], they claim the occurrences aren't literal).

In summary, once one has pointed out that a semantic theory of an expression does not handle certain occurrences of the expression, it is up to the defender of the theory to provide some explanation of the occurrences in question. The opponent of the semantic proposal for the expression in question may then evaluate the conjunction of the original proposal and the explanation of the problematic occurrences. If this conjunction is implausible or bettered by another account, the proposal is refuted. In this way, how damaging it is that a semantic proposal for an expression fails to account for certain occurrences of the expression depends in part on the plausibility of the explanation provided by the defenders of the proposal for the problematic occurrences, how well that explanation coheres with the original proposal, and so on. It should be added that pointing out that a certain semantic proposal for an expression doesn't handle some occurrences of the expression can be legitimately used as a motivation for seeking some alternative semantic proposal for the expression in question that handles the occurrences not handled by the other proposal. Surely, noting that our semantic proposals for 'true' and 'and' don't handle the occurrences discussed above provides reason for scouting new proposals that do handle these

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occurrences. I hope the reader finds what I've said to this point fairly obvious and uncontroversial.

In *CD*, I followed precisely the procedure outlined above. DRCD is a semantic proposal that claims that complex demonstratives, *the expressions*, are directly referential. In *CD* I pointed out that there were *occurrences* of complex demonstratives that the DRCD semantics of such *expressions* gives an improper account of (or perhaps no account of). Among these occurrences are those in which a complex demonstrative occurs in the scope of another quantifier that binds a pronoun occurring in the common noun phrase of the complex demonstrative. I call such occurrences *quantifying in (QI)* uses.[7] In the following example, the quantifier 'Most avid skiers' binds the pronoun 'they' that occurs in the complex demonstrative (I indicate binding by coindexing here):[8]

5.   Most avid skiers$_1$ remember that first black diamond
      run they$_1$ skied.

On its natural reading, 5 (taken in my present context and accompanied by no demonstration) expresses a proposition that is true at a world w if and only if for most avid skiers x in w there is a unique first black diamond run y that x skied in w and x remembers y in w. I noted that the DRCD semantics can't account for occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in 5, since clearly in such a case a complex demonstrative can't be contributing an individual to the proposition expressed by the sentence (relative to context) on pain of getting 5's intuitive truth conditions, which were just mentioned, wrong. More generally, no version of DRCD semantics assigns to 5 these intuitive truth conditions.[9] This suffices to show that DRCD is at least incomplete: its account of the

7. Actually, I pointed out that there were *uses*, occurrences of complex demonstratives taken in contexts, that DRCD gave an improper account of. In identifying QI *uses* with the relevant *occurrences* here, I am assuming a fixed context. See note 5. (I am also assuming that in uttering 5 below, the speaker has what I call *redundant intentions*. See *CD*, 34–35, 52–56.) Further, 5 below, uttered with redundant intentions and with the binding indicated, will express the same proposition in any context. This makes it even more harmless than usual to equate occurrences and uses in the present case, which is the case that Salmon and I are primarily concerned with.

8. I assume that a quantifier binding a pronoun is implemented in the syntax by something like the indicated coindexing. If that is so, (unlikely) uses of 'Most avid skiers remember that first black diamond run they skied' on which 'they' is used to refer to a salient group of people, involve a different sentence/syntactic structure from 5. The former lacks the relevant coindexing.

9. For example, the formal semantics of Kaplan 1989 actually allows wide scope quantifiers to bind variables in 'dthat' terms. Thus, it might be thought that the

semantics of complex demonstratives, the expressions, gives no account of occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in 5. Thus the DRCD theorist is forced to come up with some other explanation of such occurrences. I used the fact that the DRCD semantics can't handle some occurrences of complex demonstratives to motivate the search for a semantic account that can handle all occurrences.[10] I claim my quantificational account is such an account.

Of course, as I've indicated, examples like 5 *by themselves* don't refute DRCD (that is, they don't show that the DRCD semantics is the incorrect semantics for *all* occurrences [uses] of complex demonstratives), and I didn't take them to in *CD*. As indicated above, we need to see what explanation DRCD theorists offer of problematic occurrences of complex demonstrative like the one in 5. I assumed that the DRCD theorist wouldn't attempt to give an account of QI uses by trying to formulate a semantics that is arguably an extension of DRCD semantics and that assigns the intuitively correct truth conditions mentioned above to 5, since I didn't see how that could be done.[11] As far as I can see, this leaves the DRCD theorist with two options for giving an account of QI uses. The DRCD theorist could claim that complex demonstratives are ambiguous and that her semantics doesn't apply to occurrences like that in 5.[12] Or he or she could claim that such occurrences are nonliteral (or deviant in some sense).[13] For clarity, henceforth let's call (a version of)

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complex demonstrative in 5 could be treated as a 'dthat' term with the quantifier 'Most avid skiers' binding the variable/pronoun in it. However, Kaplan's semantics (extended to include quantifiers like 'Most avid skiers') would assign to 5 uttered in a context whose world is @ the wrong truth conditions. On Kaplan's semantics, 5, taken in a context whose world is @, is true at w (suppressing time and other parameters) if and only if most avid skiers remember in w the first black diamond run they skied *in @*. But this doesn't capture the intuitive truth conditions of 5, taken in the context whose world is @, nor does the sentence taken in such a context even have such a reading at all! As I said earlier, 5, taken in such a context, expresses a proposition that is true at an arbitrary world w if and only if for most avid skiers x in w there is a unique first black diamond run y that x skied *in w* and x remembers y in w (which black diamond run x first skied *in @* being irrelevant). See notes 21 and 24 below.

10. See the last sentence of chapter 1 of *CD*.

11. And indeed, I know of no DRCD theorist who has made such an attempt. See notes 9, 21, and 24.

12. As we'll see, this is the strategy Salmon (2006a, 2006b) pursues.

13. This is the strategy David Braun pursued in a paper he delivered at the Cornell Mini Conference on complex demonstratives on April 28, 2007. On Braun's view, a sentence containing a QI use like 5, uttered with no demonstration, expresses a proposition that is either false or truth-valueless. Braun claims the utterance manages

the direct reference semantics for complex demonstratives DRCD; and let's call DRCD together with an explanation of QI uses a DRCD+.[14] As discussed, exactly how strong the objection to DRCD posed by examples like 5 is depends in part on the plausibility of DRCD+, the conjunction of DRCD, and the explanation the DRCD theorist offers of occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in 5. In particular, refuting DRCD requires arguing against (all) DRCD+(s).

And that is why after I pointed out in chapter 1 of *CD* that the DRCD semantics can't handle occurrences like that in 5, as well as others (and pointed out various other shortcomings of DRCD), I explicitly considered the view in chapter 5 that the DRCD semantics is correct for some occurrences of complex demonstratives and that some other semantic account will take care of occurrences like that in 5.[15] I called such a DRCD+ an *ambiguity approach*. In chapter 5 I argued that my view is superior to such an approach (more on this below). Clearly, I would not have considered and rejected such a view in chapter 5 if I had thought I had already refuted DRCD based on examples like 5 in chapter 1!

Because it will be relevant later, let me briefly summarize the argument of *CD*. First, I showed that DRCD had various difficulties, including (but not limited to) being unable to account for occurrences of complex demonstratives such as that in 5 above, as well as others (which I called *NDNS uses*).[16] I then constructed a quantificational account that can handle all the occurrences of complex demonstratives that DRCD can handle *and* that can handle occurrences, including those like the one in 5 above, that DRCD cannot handle. Finally, I argued that my view was superior to an ambiguity approach DRCD+, on which DRCD is held to account for some occurrences of complex

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to pragmatically convey a proposition that has the intuitive truth conditions I claim are semantically associated with sentences like 5, in part because of the speaker's and hearer's tacitly recognizing that the proposition Braun claims is semantically expressed by the sentence stands no chance of being true and that the speaker is speaking nonliterally. In my presentation for the conference, I argued that Braun's attempt to account for QI uses in this way fails.

14. Obviously, then, there will be different DRCD+'s corresponding to the different explanations DRCD theorists offer for QI uses (I ignore differences in versions of DRCD here; see note 2). See note 24.

15. It seemed to me that this was the best explanation of these problematic occurrences available to the DRCD theorist (for example, claiming that the occurrences are deviant or nonliteral seemed implausible to me).

16. See note 5.

demonstratives, while some other view accounts for occurrences, including those like that in 5, that DRCD cannot handle. In doing so, I pointed out that all the kinds of occurrences of complex demonstratives that my quantificational account handles, including those like that in 5, exhibit certain important differences in behavior with definite descriptions. This, I claimed, provides evidence that all these occurrences of complex demonstratives have a single semantics. Hence I claimed that the fact that there is similarity of behavior across all kinds of occurrences of complex demonstratives, providing evidence that they are governed by a single semantics, together with the fact that my account could and DRCD could not handle all occurrences of complex demonstratives provide a strong argument for my view over DRCD+ and hence DRCD. And of course all other things being equal, a view that gives a unified semantics for all occurrences of an expression is to be preferred to a view that posits an ambiguity and assigns different semantics to different occurrences of an expression.

   With these preliminaries in place, let's turn to Salmon's objection to my argument based on examples like 5 above. Salmon (2006a, 272–73n11; 2006b, 446–47) reconstructs my argument as follows:[17]

1.   (K1) Any sentence Φ_β containing a directly referential occurrence of a singular term β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator expresses as its semantic content a singular proposition in which the designatum of that same occurrence of β occurs as a component.

2.   (K2) If a singular term β is directly referential, then every occurrence in a sentence of β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator is a directly referential occurrence.

3.   5 does not express a singular proposition in which the designatum of the occurrence of the complex demonstrative in it ('that first black diamond run they skied') occurs as a component.

4.   Hence by premises K1 and 3, the occurrence of 'that first black diamond run they skied' in 5 is not a directly referential occurrence.

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17. In talking about the semantics of occurrences of expressions and QI occurrences of complex demonstratives in the present discussion, I am assuming fixed contexts. See notes 5 and 7.

5.   Hence by 4 and K2, 'that first black diamond run they skied' is not directly referential.

Call this argument that Salmon attributes to me ADR. Since this argument can be reproduced for any complex demonstrative with QI occurrences like the one in 5, we might as well take the conclusion to be that complex demonstratives with such QI occurrences are not directly referential. Indeed, since complex demonstratives that have QI occurrences differ from those that don't only in that the former contain pronouns that can be bound and the latter don't, it would be bizarre to hold that complex demonstratives that have QI occurrences aren't directly referential but those that don't have QI occurrences are directly referential. Hence, we can take the conclusion of ADR to be that complex demonstratives (the expressions) aren't directly referential.

Note that K1 talks about directly referential *occurrences of expressions* in sentences, whereas K2 talks about both directly referential *occurrences* of expressions *and* directly referential *expressions.* In effect, K1 says that a sentence containing a directly referential *occurrence* of an expression (not in the scope of interfering operators) has as its semantic content (relative to a context—Salmon omits this qualification [see my note 7]) a singular proposition containing the referent of the directly referential occurrence ("designatum"—in that context) as a component. K2 says that directly referential *expressions* are such that all their *occurrences* (not in the scope of interfering operators) in sentences are directly referential. Hence, since the *occurrence* of 'that first black diamond run they skied' in 5 isn't directly referential, the *expression* itself isn't, which is what the conclusion claims.

At first, it might seem that ADR *can't* be a correct reconstruction of the argument I gave in *CD* based on examples such as 5. For I've indicated that in chapter 1 of *CD* where I gave the argument, I took occurrences of complex demonstratives such as that in 5 merely to show that DRCD is at least incomplete, and so to place a burden on the DRCD theorist to provide some explanation of them. And then in chapter 5 of *CD* I argued against the DRCD+ that is the conjunction of DRCD and what I took to be the best explanation available to the DRCD theorist of occurrences like that in 5 (at the time I wrote *CD*, DRCD theorists themselves had offered no explanation of QI uses, apparently being unaware of them). Hence, obviously in *CD* I didn't take the existence of occurrences like that in 5 to by itself refute DRCD. But the conclusion of ADR appears to be that DRCD is false (assuming, for the reasons given above,

we take the conclusion of ADR to be that complex demonstratives aren't directly referential).

But in fact this is an illusion. Though it isn't the argument I intended to give in *CD*, I am perfectly willing to accept ADR; and we'll see that it is sound, once K2, and hence the conclusion, are understood as I understand them.[18]

As I told Salmon in the correspondence he cites in Salmon 2006a, 273n11, and 2006b, 447, though he seems not to have appreciated what I meant by it, I am inclined to accept K2 as true by stipulation. What I mean by that, as I told Salmon in that same correspondence, is the following. Suppose you have an expression that has some occurrences that are directly referential and some that aren't. I think that variables are such expressions, as does Salmon: free occurrences of variables are directly referential (relative to assignments), and bound occurrences are not.[19] In such a case, should we say that the *expression* is directly

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18. I intended to be arguing in chapter 1 of *CD* as follows:

   1.   DRCD, which is a semantics for complex demonstratives, does not assign the intuitively correct truth conditions to a sentence like 5, containing a QI occurrence of a complex demonstrative.
   2.   If a semantics of an expression does not assign the intuitively correct truth conditions to a sentence containing an occurrence of the expression, the semantics provides no account (or an improper account) of the occurrence of the expression.
   3.   Hence, DRCD provides no account (or an improper account) of QI occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in 5.

The argument of chapter 1 involving QI uses was merely intended to show that DRCD has no account of them. Again, I then later argued against the DRCD+ consisting of the conjunction of DRCD and what I took to be the best explanation of QI uses available to the DRCD theorist.

19. More cautiously, Salmon (2006b, 429) allows that in a Russellian "intensional-semantic theory ... ," "variables are *logically proper names* or *directly referential*. That is, the semantic content ... of a variable, under an assignment of values to variables, is simply the variable's designatum (the assigned value)." This is a claim to the effect that the semantic content of a variable—*the expression*—relative to an assignment of values to variables is just the assigned value. But Salmon (ibid., 430) then says about the semantic content of free *occurrences* of variables "what we have been calling 'the [semantic] content of [the expression] "x"' under a value assignment is ... the [semantic] content of its free occurrences." Salmon here identifies the semantic contents of variables—*the expressions*—under assignments with the semantic contents of free *occurrences* of variables under assignments. So Salmon allows that free *occurrences* of variables are directly referential (that is, have as their semantic contents relative to value assignments their assigned values). Salmon (ibid., 447) then allows that bound occurrences of variables are not directly referential when he says that the claims K (and K2), both

referential or not? This is a question about how to use the term 'directly referential expression'. Nothing of substance *at all* turns on the answer to it. I am inclined to think that in such a case we should not say *anything* about the semantics of the *expression*, but instead should talk only about the *occurrences* of it. In that sense I endorse K2: my preferred terminology is one on which we call an *expression* 'directly referential' only if all of its *occurrences* are. The only thing I object to about K2 is that it entails that if an expression has *occurrences* that aren't directly referential, the *expression* isn't directly referential, even if it has other occurrences that *are* directly referential. Again, my preference in such a case is not to say anything about the *expression* and talk only about which *occurrences* are and are not directly referential.

Once K2 is understood in this stipulative way, given that one accepts the stipulation, the argument is sound. But note how weak the conclusion is (understood as the claim that complex demonstratives—the expressions—are not directly referential). It is consistent with the claim that some *occurrences* of complex demonstratives are directly referential! After all, according to the stipulation K2, we call expressions 'directly referential' only when all their occurrences are. Hence on this usage, an *expression* could fail to be directly referential even if some of its *occurrences* are directly referential. But the conclusion of ADR should be exactly this strong. The conclusion, in effect, is that at least some occurrences of complex demonstratives are not directly referential. And examples like 5 do show this. Hence the conclusion of ADR, coupled with the claim that DRCD does not give any account of occurrences of complex demonstratives (like the one in 5) that aren't directly referential, shows that DRCD is at least incomplete. As I said above, what I take to be the refutation of DRCD has to also include arguing against ambiguity approach DRCD+'s according to which DRCD applies to certain occurrences of complex demonstratives, and some other account applies to occurrences such as that in 5. And as I said, I give that argument in chapter 5 of *CD*. What examples like 5 show by themselves is that

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of which he rejects, have "extremely dubious consequences . . . assuming that a bound variable, since its semantic content is not the variable's customary designatum, is not a 'directly referential occurrence.' (This is how both King and Stanley understand the phrase.)" So Salmon, at any rate, allows that in a Russellian intensional occurrence-based semantic theory, free occurrences of variables are directly referential and bound occurrences are not, given the way I use the term 'directly referential occurrence'. And Salmon nowhere objects to my usage.

at least some occurrences of complex demonstratives are not directly referential. And that is exactly what the conclusion of ADR, properly understood, says. Hence, if we accept the stipulation K2, as I told Salmon I did in the correspondence he cites, ADR is sound.

We can now see that Salmon's objection to ADR is confused. Salmon objects that ADR fails because K2 is false. Variables, Salmon claims, are directly referential expressions though they have occurrences (bound occurrences) that are not directly referential, contrary to K2. Curiously, Salmon writes as though some matter of substance is at stake over K2's truth or falsity. But the only thing at stake here is what terminology to use. K2 represented a suggestion as to how to use the expression 'directly referential expression'. In rejecting K2 and insisting that variables are directly referential expressions, Salmon is merely rejecting one way of using the term 'directly referential expression' and endorsing another. Obviously, nothing of substance hangs on this.

In order to show that nothing is at stake here and that nothing in Salmon's criticism of ADR undermines any part of the argument of *CD*, let's just grant Salmon his terminology, and so his claim that variables are directly referential *expressions* despite having *occurrences* that are not directly referential. Better, let's simply not talk of *expressions* being directly referential or failing to be at all, and confine such claims to *occurrences* of expressions. In this way, with Salmon, we now reject K2 (again, it only amounted to a suggestion as to how to use the term 'directly referential expression'; we now refuse to use the term at all). Does the rejection of K2 affect any part of the argument of *CD*? No! The argument of chapter 1 of *CD* still goes through as before (see note 18): there are *occurrences* of complex demonstratives that are not directly referential (including, but not limited to, occurrences such as those in 5), and hence DRCD gives no account of certain occurrences of complex demonstratives. Obviously, Salmon's rejection of K2 cannot magically provide DRCD with a semantic account of occurrences of complex demonstratives such as the one in 5 that captures the intuitive truth conditions of 5.[20] Further, as was claimed in *CD*, since my quantificational

20. We'll see below that Salmon does offer an account of the semantics of (what I would call) the complex demonstrative in 5, and I'll criticize that account. My point here is that the rejection of K2 in criticizing the argument ADR does nothing to provide DRCD with an account of QI uses. Again, all I intended to establish in chapter 1 of *CD*, in considering QI uses, is that DRCD has no account of them. Hence, rejecting K2 doesn't affect the argument of chapter 1 involving QI uses at all. See note 18 and also note 5.

account handles the occurrences of complex demonstratives that DRCD can handle as well as those that it can't, my theory has the advantage over DRCD in coverage of data. In addition, the argument of (chapter 2 and) chapter 5 that all occurrences of complex demonstratives share a common semantic feature as a result of which they exhibit the same differences in behavior with definite descriptions is unaffected. Hence, the evidence that all occurrences of complex demonstratives share a unified semantics (contrary to the DRCD+ that is the conjunction of DRCD and the claim that occurrences of complex demonstratives such as the one in 5 have some other semantics) is intact. And finally, the following methodological point is surely not affected by anything Salmon says: all things being equal, an account that assigns a single semantics to all occurrences of an expression, as my quantificational account of complex demonstratives does, is to be preferred to an account that posits an ambiguity, such as the DRCD+ that is DRCD applied to some occurrences of complex demonstratives and some other account applied to occurrences such as that in 5.

Thus, rejecting the stipulative K2 and adopting a different stipulation does not affect any part of the argument of *CD*. Of course given the stipulative nature of K2, this is precisely what one ought to expect. But rejecting K2 is the only criticism Salmon makes of anything in *CD*. Hence, despite Salmon's claims to the contrary, nothing in Salmon 2006a, 2006b weakens any part of the argument of *CD* against DRCD+ and DRCD and for my quantificational account.

There are two final points to address. The first concerns Salmon's account of QI uses. Salmon, of course, is a DRCD theorist. But as we've seen, DRCD doesn't account for occurrences of complex demonstratives such as that in 5 on its natural reading. So what is *Salmon's* account of such occurrences?[21] What DRCD+ does he endorse?

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21. A large part of the burden of Salmon 2006a and particularly Salmon 2006b is to sketch a semantics for *occurrences* of variables and variable-containing expressions on which such expressions are arguably univocal and that assigns semantic values (relative to assignments of variables) *both* to occurrences of, for example, 'the first woman he kissed,' when the pronoun/variable is free ('The first woman he kissed was Yvonne' with Carl assigned to 'he') *and* to occurrences of 'the first woman he kissed,' on which the pronoun/variable is bound by a higher quantifier ('Every man$_1$ remembers the first woman he$_1$ kissed'). I find the semantics Salmon provides interesting and have no objections to it. (The semantics Salmon provides assigns as semantic values ["bondage"] *extensions* to expressions relative to m-tuples of variables under assignments of values to variables [see Salmon 2006b, 427]. But Salmon at least sketches how an assignment of ["bondage"] *contents* to expressions relative to the same parameters

Salmon (2006a, note 11; 2006b, 446) claims that my examples of QI uses (such as 5 above) involve "stylistically altered definite descriptions" rather than "genuine demonstratives." Oddly, he overlooks the fact that in *CD* I explicitly argued against the view that QI uses are "stylistically altered definite descriptions" (see chapter 2, 74–76 and note 34). I noted that there are cases of QI uses, where substituting the relevant definite description for the complex demonstrative results in infelicity. These are among what I call *QI uses with nonredundant intentions*.[22] So, for example, suppose that when a race car driver wins a certain (large) number of races, he is inducted into the prestigious Checkered Flag Club. We are watching the end of a race on TV in which the winning driver has, in virtue of this very win, achieved that mark. The announcer screams "And by winning this race, Mario qualifies for induction in the Checkered Flag Club." Intending to convey how important the Checkered Flag Club is to race car drivers, I say nodding at the TV:

6. Every race car driver in the Checkered Flag Club$_1$
   still remembers that race he$_1$ won.

———

would go [see ibid., 430–31].) One might expect that Salmon, having done this, would try to give an account of QI uses by claiming that similarly there is an arguably univocal semantics that is an extension of DRCD and that assigns semantic values (relative to parameters) *both* to occurrences of complex demonstratives that don't contain pronouns bound by higher quantifiers (that is, non-QI uses) *and* to occurrences of complex demonstratives that do contain pronouns bound by higher quantifiers (that is, QI uses like the complex demonstrative in 5 above). However, Salmon does *not* do this, presumably because he recognizes that such a semantics would fail to capture the intuitive truth conditions of 5 and would assign the sentence a reading it doesn't have. Though Salmon does not formulate a semantics that assigns to complex demonstratives contents relative to m-tuples of variables, contexts, and value assignments, it is easy to see that such a semantics, which is an extension of the semantics Salmon does formulate, would assign to 5, taken relative to a context whose world is @, truth conditions on which that sentence in that context would be true at an arbitrary world w if and only if for most avid skiers x in w, there is a unique first black diamond run y that x skied *in* @ and x remembers y in w. But this doesn't capture the intuitive truth conditions of 5, taken in the context whose world is @, nor does the sentence taken in such a context even have such a reading! As I said earlier, 5, taken in such a context, expresses a proposition that is true at an arbitrary world w if and only if for most avid skiers x in w there is a unique first black diamond run y that x skied *in w* and x remembers y in w (which black diamond run x first skied *in* @ being irrelevant). As I noted earlier in note 9, exactly similar problems afflict the attempt to account for QI uses by claiming they are the result of quantifying into Kaplan's 'dthat' terms.

22. See *CD*, 74–77.

Obviously, this is perfectly fine. But replacing the complex demonstrative with the comparable definite description results in infelicity:

> 6′.   *Every race car driver in the Checkered Flag Club$_1$
>   still remembers the race he$_1$ won.

In 6, of course, we have a QI use of a complex demonstrative.[23] My account in *CD* predicts the contrast between 6 and 6'. However, if the complex demonstrative in 6 is really a "stylistically altered definite description," as Salmon claims, it is utterly mysterious why substituting the appropriate description for the complex demonstrative would lead to infelicity. After all, Salmon's claim is that the complex demonstrative *is* the definite description in such a case. Further, that Salmon makes this claim means that Salmon himself endorses a DRCD+ that is an ambiguity theory of precisely the sort I refute in chapter 5 of *CD*. For he holds that some occurrences of complex demonstratives have the semantics that DRCD claims they do, and other occurrences, such as that in 5 above, have the semantics of definite descriptions. Since I give the argument just mentioned against Salmon's particular version of an ambiguity approach and other arguments against ambiguity approaches in general, it is surprising to me that Salmon doesn't mention any of these arguments in discussing these issues. In any case, these arguments show Salmon's version of DRCD+ to be false.

There is a second and final point that I'll close with. I can't resist making this point because of the following casual remark of Salmon's (2006b, 434n21):

> In particular, that demonstratives are singular terms is common sense, and no persuasive evidence has been adduced that they are quantifiers.

Salmon is incorrect. DRCD+, including Salmon's version, fails to properly explain QI uses of complex demonstratives, whereas my quantificational account easily handles them.[24] There are also other uses discussed

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23. Again, in such QI uses speakers' intentions are nonredundant. In such cases, for the use to be felicitous, something must give the audience access to the speaker's intentions and the property (relation) they determine. Here it is the mutual experience of watching the TV and hearing the announcer. See *CD*, 66–78 for discussion.

24. I know of three strategies available to the DRCD theorist to attempt to give an account of QI uses and hence three versions of DRCD+. The first is Salmon's, which I showed to be incorrect in *CD* in the way just described. The second strategy, suggested to me by Salmon in correspondence, is to treat QI uses as the result of quantifying into Kaplanian 'dthat' terms. As mentioned in notes 9 and 21, this account does not capture the intuitive truth conditions of sentences like 5 containing QI uses and assigns

in *CD* that DRCD cannot handle, that DRCD theorists have not given plausible accounts of, and that my quantificational account handles.[25] Contrary to what Salmon claims here, surely this *is* persuasive evidence that complex demonstratives are not "singular terms" and are quantifiers.

As if that weren't bad enough, let me add that there are several other kinds of uses of complex demonstratives that I didn't discuss in *CD* that are also bound to cause problems for DRCD, again including Salmon's version, and that my quantificational account handles. The first sort of use is one on which complex demonstratives appear to function as bound variables, such as the following:

> 7. Every student$_1$ has a professor who thinks that student$_1$ is smart.

Here again obviously it cannot be claimed that the complex demonstrative contributes an individual to the proposition expressed by 7. Thus, again, here DRCD has no account. On the other hand, it turns out that a quite straightforward extension of the semantics of *CD* handles these "bound variable" uses of complex demonstratives.[26]

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to such sentences truth conditions they just don't have. Hence it too fails. The third strategy is Braun's mentioned in note 13, which I have argued fails as well. Hence the only three strategies known to me available to DRCD theorists for explaining QI uses fail, and so the corresponding versions of DRCD+ are all false.

25. Such uses include NDNS uses and certain Bach Peters sentences. See *CD*, 2–10, 12–15, and 89–92. I have reverted to talk of uses of complex demonstratives here instead of occurrences because a given occurrence of a complex demonstrative may be used in an NDNS way or some other way. Something similar is true for the other uses I am about to discuss. See my note 5.

26. The coindexing in 7 indicates anaphoric relations. Though I don't have the time or space here to explain in detail how my view handles these "bound variable" uses, it is easy to see how it will go. In QI uses, speaker intentions determine *relations* (whether the intentions are redundant or not—see *CD*, 51–56 and 74–76). "Bound variable" uses like the one in 7 are the special case where the relation determined by the speaker's intentions is *identity*: $x = z$. The proposition that 7 expresses, relative to a context whose world is @ and in which the speaker intends 7 with the indicated coindexing, can be represented as follows using the notation of *CD*—see *CD*, 93 and Appendix (with 'S' for 'student'; 'P' for 'professor'; 'Txy' for 'x thinks y is smart'; and 'Hxy' for 'x has y')

> (BV) [Every x: Sx] [[Some y: (Py & [THAT$_{x=z,J}$ z: Sz] [Tyz])] Hxy]

Note that the relation $x = z$ was determined by the intentions of the speaker and occupies the second argument place here in the relation expressed by 'that'. The proposition BV is true in w if and only if for every student x in w, there is some y such that y is

The second sort of use that my account can handle and that causes problems for DRCD involves anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives, such as the following:[27]

8. A student$_1$ was sitting in the library. Another student who had an iPod$_2$ was sitting across from him$_1$. That student$_2$ had a logic book.

To see the problem this raises for DRCD, including Salmon's version, suppose that all the sentences of 8 are true (as uttered in the present context and evaluated with respect to the world of this context) and that Bob is the student who had the iPod and the logic book. Then DRCD presumably claims that the third sentence expresses the singular proposition that Bob had a logic book. But then DRCD predicts that all three propositions expressed by these sentences (in the present context) as they occur in this discourse are true in a world in which a student was sitting in the library, a second student *other than Bob* was sitting across from him and had an iPod (and no logic book), and Bob, who was in a different country, had a logic book. This, of course, is incorrect. Note too that the DRCD theorist cannot claim that the complex demonstrative here is a "stylistically altered definite description": substituting 'the' for 'that' here results in infelicity! Again, my quantificational account can easily handle these cases.

Finally, things get even worse for DRCD when we consider anaphoric uses mixed with modality. Suppose that we enter an empty library and that for some reason it would have been disastrous for us if there had been more than one student, an iPod, and a logic book in the library. (We all know how dangerous logic is—especially when combined with music and students!) You realized this but took no steps to ensure that it wouldn't be so. I scold you as follows:

9. This whole thing could have been a disaster! A student$_1$ could have been sitting in the library. Another student with an iPod$_2$ could have been sitting across from him$_1$. And that student$_2$ could have had a logic book.

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a professor in w and y thinks in w that the thing z that is the unique student identical to x in w is smart in w and x has y in w (note again the irrelevance of the world of the context @ to the truth of BV in w). These *are* the intuitive truth conditions of 7 in such a context.

27. Here coindexing indicates anaphoric relations and not binding, as it did in 5. Assume no demonstrations were employed in uttering the sentences of 8.

Obviously DRCD, including Salmon's version, cannot account for this sort of use of a complex demonstrative: there is no one in the library for 'that student' in the third sentence to refer to! Here again the DRCD theorist cannot claim that the complex demonstrative is a "stylistically altered definite description" since again substituting 'the' for 'that' results in infelicity. And here, again, my quantificational account can handle the uses in question.[28]

Thus, these bound variable and anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives spell yet more grief for DRCD, including Salmon's version. By contrast, my quantificational account can readily accommodate them. Again, contrary to what Salmon claims, surely that my account handles QI uses, NDNS uses, certain Bach Peters sentences (see note 25), these bound variable uses and anaphoric uses lately noted, and that DRCD/DRCD+ cannot handle *any* of them *is* persuasive evidence that my view is correct and that complex demonstratives are quantifiers and not singular terms. As in many areas of inquiry, so in semantics: sometimes what initially appears to be the commonsense view is just wrong.

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28. As with the "bound variable" uses, I don't have the space or time here to describe in detail how my account works in the present case, but it is even easier here to see how it goes than it was in the case of "bound variable" uses like 7. In NDNS uses, speakers' intentions determine "descriptive" properties that saturate the second argument place in the relation expressed by 'that', whether these intentions are redundant or not (see *CD*, 48–50 and 66–74). For the occurrences of the complex demonstratives in the final sentences of both 8 and 9, these properties are instead determined by predicative material in the prior discourse. For example, in the case of 8, the property in question is the property of *being a student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library*. Hence the final sentence of 8 (as it occurs in that discourse) is true if and only if the unique student who had an iPod and was sitting across from another student who was sitting in the library had a logic book. The crucial point is that such anaphoric uses and NDNS uses differ only on whether the property that slots into the second argument place of the relation expressed by 'that' is determined by the speaker's intentions (NDNS use) or predicative material in prior discourse (anaphoric use).

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