Putting Together Morality and Well-Being

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It seems an inevitable fact of life that morality sometimes asks us to do something that requires a sacrifice in our own well-being. Should we keep a promise to accompany a friend to the dentist or go off to hear a rare performance of our favorite artist? Go out of our way to help a stranger in distress or hurry on our way to an important business meeting? Give a certain percentage of our income to charity or fund our own nest egg? Conflicts between moral and prudential values are thought to raise concerns about the normativity of morality and the scope of practical reason. If being moral involves making one's life go worse, why should one be moral? And if conflicts between moral and prudential values are genuine, how in such cases can practical reason guide decision about what to do?

Both worries stem in part from an alluring picture of the relationship between morality and prudence. On this picture, moral and prudential values issue from two “fundamentally distinct points of view,” points of view so different that there is no more comprehensive point of view from which values from the one point of view and values from the other can both be given their normative due. For example, from the moral point of view, I should send my year-end bonus to Oxfam, but from the prudential point of view I should invest the money in my own retirement. It seems that there is no more comprehensive point of view from which I can properly consider the reason-giving force of both sorts of consideration. If there is no such comprehensive point of view, then why should I do anything other than what makes my life go best? And, more generally, if the reason-giving force of a value is relative to the point of view from which it issues, then how are values from one point of view normatively related to one another in the context of practical choice — they have what one might call “relative normative weight”: One value outweighs, overrides, trumps, ties with, or is in some other way normatively related to the other. If moral and prudential values have normative weight vis-à-vis one another, then it is in virtue of those relative weights that it is sometimes rational to be moral even though that makes one’s life go worse and, more generally, that conflicts between them are rationally resolved as they are.

The aim of this chapter is to propose for consideration a new approach to putting together morality and well-being, one that, I believe, provides the basis for a unified account of the relative normative weights of any values that might figure in practical conflict. My proposal is that for any given conflict between particular moral and prudential values, there is some more comprehensive value — what I elsewhere call a “covering value” — that includes the conflicting values as “parts” and is in virtue of which the conflict is rationally resolved if it is rationally resolvable. For example, the prudential value of building a financial nest egg gives me a reason to invest the bonus in my pension, while the moral value of aiding starving children around the world gives me a reason to send it to Oxfam instead. On the proposed view, there is some more comprehensive value V with p and m as parts that accounts for the reason-giving force of m in the face of conflict with p and determines the rational resolution of the conflict between them if there is one. This is not to say that there is a single more comprehensive value in virtue of which all conflicts between morality and prudence can be resolved, but only that for each such conflict, there is some or other more comprehensive value in virtue of which there is a rational resolution. And talk of one value being a “part” of another should not be taken to presuppose that values are “out there” or, worse, that they are entities with spatial extension. One value v being “part” of another value w requires no more than that being v contributes constitutively to being w.

Now these more comprehensive values that put together moral and prudential values are unusual in that they are, as present, typically nameless. Because they have no names, it is easy to look right through them, though, as I try to show, they play a crucial role in determining the
rational resolution of conflicts between moral and prudential values. In claiming that nameless values "determine" rational resolution, I do not mean to imply that a rational deliberator must appeal to such values in order to arrive at a rational resolution; a rational agent might correctly arrive at a rational resolution of a conflict by appeal to authority or some form of deliberation that makes no reference to that in virtue of which there is a rational resolution. My suggestion is that however someone might arrive at a rational resolution, its being rational holds partly in virtue of a more comprehensive nameless value.

My case for the "nameless value approach" centers on two arguments. The first provides a prima facie case; there are cases of value conflict whose rational resolution is very plausibly determined by a more comprehensive value that has the conflicting values as parts, and it is not clear how conflicts between moral and prudential values can be relevantly distinguished from them. Without a clear basis for distinction, we have reason to think that just as there is a more comprehensive value that accounts for rational resolution in the one kind of case, so, too, is there in the other. The second maintains that a careful examination of the role of circumstances shows that if circumstances are to play a role in determining the relative normativity of the values at stake, there must be something with content beyond those values and circumstances in virtue of which the values have the relative weights that they do. That thing with further content, I argue, is a nameless value that has the conflicting values as parts.

Whether in the end one believes that there are such nameless values depends on whether more traditional accounts of rational conflict resolution can do the job of putting together values instead. I therefore present the arguments for my approach in the context of examining problems for what I take to be its leading competitor. Even if at the end of the day one remains skeptical of nameless values, the case for them, I believe, raises a serious challenge to the usual way in which the determination of rational conflict resolution is understood.

I have set up the problem and its solution as involving values — very broadly understood to include disvalues, duties, obligations, rights, and so on. But the key idea behind the proposal is that resolution of conflicts between any type of consideration — whether they be values, desires, reasons, ends, and so on — holds in virtue of a more comprehensive consideration that includes the conflicting considerations as parts. Since I believe the right way to understand conflict and its resolution is in terms of "values," broadly understood, I frame the discussion in these terms.
putting together morality and well-being

I am, somewhat dogmatically, going to set aside the first two approaches. The procedural approach has long been attacked by those who claim, essentially, that neutral procedures for sanitizing desires will not yield the "oughtness" of normativity; something substantive must be assumed. It seems to me that the attacks are sufficiently successful to warrant casting about for a different approach. And while the single-point-of-view approach might in the end be correct, in the current stage of debate there are methodological grounds for setting it aside. This approach denies the intuitive understandings of moral and prudential values that seem to underwrite the special difficulty in the first place, namely, that stance but a weaker reason in debate there are.

This leaves the orthodox approach as the main alternative to my own. According to this approach, relative normative weight is in some sense "built into" the values themselves; values give rise to reasons that already are on the same normative page. Some who take this approach think that moral values always override prudential ones; others think that moral values sometimes outweigh prudential ones and that sometimes the reverse is true; still others conclude that a proper understanding of morality and prudence shows that there is little or no genuine conflict in the first place - morality is sufficiently attentive to individual interests to include most prudential values, or well-being is sufficiently capacious to include most moral ones.

The orthodox approach comes in two varieties: the "simple" version, which holds that the values at stake alone account for their own relative normative weights, and the "sophisticated" version, which holds that the values in conjunction with a supplementary factor determine their relative weights. According to the first, the values put themselves together apart from any consideration of the circumstances in which they figure, and according to the second, circumstances, purposes, principles, or a theory of value work as supplementary factors to help values put themselves together. "Circumstances" should be understood throughout this paper to include only nonevaluative or nonnormative considerations, such as the fact that the next train for Trenton leaves in an hour but not the fact that the train conductor is kind.

Proponents of the sophisticated version come in many stripes. "Specificationists," for example, think that circumstances of a choice situation help to specify or to fill out the values at stake in a way that delivers the normative relations among them. "Coherentists" or "interpretivists" argue that by considering the contours and application of related values in a range of other circumstances, a coherent or best theory of a broad range of values emerges in terms of which their relative normative weights are determined. Others think that principles, such as "Family and friends first" or "The greater one's distance from the victim, the less stringent one's duty to save her," help account for why some values, such as the value of human life, may give rise to a stronger reason in one circumstance but a weaker reason in another. And still others maintain that the aim or purpose of a choice, understood in conjunction with the values at stake, determines how those values normatively relate in that case.

Circumstances, purposes, principles, and theory are "supplementary" factors on these views in that it is only because the values are as they are that these factors help to determine the weights of those values in the way that they do. It is in some sense the values themselves that are the primary determinants of rational choice. This idea of being the primary determinant might be likened to being the cause of an event. Striking the match causes the match to light, while the presence of oxygen is a supplementary factor that plays a background role in accounting for the match's being lit. In the same way, it might be thought that values are determinative of their own relative weights, while the circumstances in which they figure, the purpose of choice, the principles that apply in the circumstances, or a theory of value play a background role in helping to account for those weights.

It is worth noting that if either the orthodox or nameless value approach is correct, talk of "points of view" is a red herring. For both approaches grant, for the sake of argument, that moral and prudential values might issue from fundamentally different points of view but insist that this is no block to putting those values together. If this is right, then it might be wondered why it seems that issuing from fundamentally different points of view, that is, from points of view that are not subsumed by some single more comprehensive point of view, raises a problem for putting values together. I believe the appearance of difficulty might be explained by a failure to distinguish between a value "per se" and a value qua instance of a type of value. A point of view is an evaluative stance from which the normative weights of all values of a type can be given. Conflicts of values, however, involve values per se and not essentially values as values of a certain type. Thus, even if there is no more comprehensive point of view that gives the relative weights of every moral and prudential value...
as values of the “moral” type and values of the “prudential” type, a particular moral value — not essentially conceived as a value of the moral type — may normatively relate to a particular prudential value — not essentially conceived as a value of the prudential type. Putting together particular moral and prudential values in this way is putting together morality and well-being in the way that counts.  

A Prima Facie Case

A conflict between values occurs whenever one value favors one of two conflicting options, another value favors the other, and yet both values are “at stake” in the choice. Values are at stake if they are in some intuitive sense what the choice is about, and thus they are not excluded, canceled, or bracketed as irrelevant to the choice. The values at stake can be understood as either the generic values relevant to the choice (e.g., beneficence) or the particular instantiations of those values borne by the alternatives (the particular beneficence of x). In the simplest form of conflicts we take as our focus, certain moral and prudential values are at stake, and the moral values favor one alternative, while the prudential values favor the other.  

In every conflict situation there is something that “matters” in the choice. I will stipulate that what matters in a choice is to be understood as that in virtue of which a choice is rational. If one is faced with a choice between Ayer and Wittgenstein, for example, which one rationally should choose is a matter of what matters in the choice between them. If what matters is philosophical talent, one should choose Wittgenstein; if what matters is ability to entertain at a cocktail party, one should choose Ayer. Whatever else may matter in the choice, the values at stake will always matter. I also assume that what matters in one choice may be different from what matters in another choice, though we return to this assumption below. According to the orthodox approach, what matters in any given case is given by the values at stake themselves, perhaps supplemented by circumstances, purposes, principles, or a theory of value. According to the nameless value approach, what matters is given by a more comprehensive value with the values at stake as parts.

We — philosophers at least — have ways of indicating what one rationally should choose without explicitly specifying what matters in the choice. We say that one should choose the option that one has “most reason to choose, all things considered” or is “best or good enough with respect to choiceworthiness” or is “what one ought to do” where the ought is the general ought of practical reason. Each of these locutions is a placeholder for different things that matter in different choice situations. Sometimes an alternative will be most choiceworthy because it is the socially just course of action; sometimes an alternative will be what one has most reason to choose, all things considered, because it is best with respect to cost, efficiency, and pleasantness. On the orthodox approach, these placeholders hold the place of a list of the values at stake, perhaps supplemented by some factor; on the nameless value approach, they hold the place of a more comprehensive value with the values at stake as parts.

It is useful, given our focus on conflicts between moral and prudential values, to stipulate a placeholder — call it the somewhat unlovely “prumorality” — as holding the place of whatever matters in particular conflicts between moral and prudential values. Like “all things considered,” prumorality holds the place for different considerations in different choice situations. In some cases, prumorality may stand for something that includes the moral value of saving a human life and the prudential value of achieving a lifetime goal, and in other cases, something that includes different moral and prudential values. It should not be thought that by naming a placeholder as that which matters in a conflict we have stacked the deck in favor of finding that prumorality is a value. As a stipulated name for whatever matters in a choice, prumorality may hold the place of nothing more than a list of the values at stake, supplemented or not.

Thus the issue between the orthodox and nameless value approaches can be put as follows: In any given conflict between moral and prudential values, is prumorality a placeholder for a possibly supplemented list of the moral and prudential values at stake or for a more comprehensive nameless value that has those values as parts?

Now there is an intuitive line of argument that suggests that prumorality is, indeed, a placeholder for more comprehensive values with moral and prudential values as parts. Start with the thought that many value conflicts have a straightforward rational resolution, and, in many of these, it is perfectly clear that the resolution is determined by a more comprehensive value that gives what matters in the choice. Suppose you are a member of a philosophy appointments committee whose task is to fill a vacant chair in your department. There are only two candidates for the post: Aye, who is quite original but a historical troglodyte, and Bea, who is singularly unoriginal but is a bit more historically sensitive than Aye. In all other respects, the two are equally matched. Originality favors choosing Aye; historical sensitivity favors choosing Bea; and both are at stake in the choice. It is perfectly clear that one rationally ought to choose Aye. In
virtue of what does Aye's originality and historical sensitivity have the relative weight it does against Bea's originality and historical sensitivity such that it is rational to choose Aye? The natural, intuitive answer is that these weights are determined by a more comprehensive value, namely, philosophical talent, which gives what matters in the choice and determines the normative relations among its component values. Philosophical talent is that in virtue of which the normative weights of those component values are related as they are in the circumstances. There is more reason to choose Aye than Bea because the particular bundle of originality and historical sensitivity Aye bears makes her more philosophically talented than the particular bundle of originality and historical sensitivity Bea bears.

Next, consider what looks to be a parallel case involving a conflict between moral and prudential considerations. Suppose you are a keen athlete who has entered a major marathon race. The day of the race comes and you are running well. As you approach the last mile, you realize in a wave of excitement that you are in the lead position. Suddenly you spy a stranger who is flailing about in a nearby pond. If you stop to help him, you will lose the race; if you don’t stop, he will drown. Stopping to help has the moral value of saving a human life; carrying on has the prudential value of winning, the race. We can rig the details of the case so that the prudential disvalue of failing to stop is insignificant — perhaps you don’t give a toss about morality, and since no one will know that you failed to save the stranger, failing to stop will have only a slight negative effect on your well-being. Both the moral and prudential values are at stake in the choice. Yet it seems clear that the reason to save the stranger is weightier than the reason to carry on in the race. You rationally ought to stop and save the stranger.

The question for the orthodox approach, then, is: Why should what accounts for the rational resolution of this case be any different from what accounts for the rational resolution of the philosophy case? In both cases we have a conflict of values; in both the conflicting values matter in the choice; in both we have rational resolution of that conflict; and in both that rational resolution plausibly proceeds by one value having greater normative significance than the other. In the philosophy case, it is clear that the greater weight of one value is determined by a more comprehensive value that includes the values in conflict. Why not think that in the drowning case there is similarly a more comprehensive value that accounts for the greater significance of the moral value of saving the stranger over the prudential value of winning the race?

As a first reaction, it might be insisted that the question rides on a false presupposition: easy cases of conflict between morality and prudence are an illusion — it is false that there is more reason to save the drowning stranger than to win the race. But Sidgwick’s skepticism was founded on his own confessed inability to see how moral and prudential values might be put together, not on an a priori argument that they could not be. Indeed, if Sidgwickian skepticism is right and easy cases are an illusion, we should nevertheless be able to explain what it is about such cases that makes them different from the philosophy case, a case whose ease of resolution is not an illusion. The demand for explanation stands.

A more promising line of explanation might appeal to the fact that there is a more comprehensive value in the philosophy case because the values at stake are not all that different, while in the drowning case, the moral and prudential values at stake are so different that there is no more comprehensive value that has them as parts. But what is meant here by “so different”?

One possible view would have it that values are so different if conflicts between them are intractable. But moral and prudential values are not like this; as we have already seen, there is at least the appearance of easily resolved conflicts between them and no explanation of why this appearance is misleading. Another possibility might be that values are so different if they are different in “type.” This move may not seem to advance the issue, since now we need an account of what it is for values to be of different types. But we have an intuitive grasp of value types that may be illuminating. We can contrast two sorts of cases. The literary merit of a novel is a different type of value than the sculptural merit of a statue; however, literary and sculptural values can be put together by the more comprehensive value of artistic excellence. I can meaningfully say something about the relative importance of at least some instantiations of literary and sculptural merit with respect to artistic excellence; I can say that *Bride of the Wind* has less artistic excellence than a Henry Moore sculpture. In contrast, to take a nonevaluative case, color is a different type of consideration than mass; however, literary and sculptural values can be put together by the more comprehensive value of artistic excellence. I cannot meaningfully claim, for example, that a red stick is more ______ than a heavy stick, where the blank is to be filled in by some (nonstipulated, noninstrumental) more comprehensive nonevaluative consideration that
combines color and mass. Now the question is, which type of type do moral and prudential values fall under? It seems that we can meaningfully say that, with respect to prudence, a tiny bit of mundane prudential pleasure is less important than a significant moral value. Indeed, the appearance of such easy cases strongly suggests that moral and prudential values are more like literary and sculptural merit than like color and mass. An appeal to value types will not explain why the drowning case should be different from the philosophy case.

A different tack might be to urge that the difficulty of resolving certain conflicts shows that they cannot be likened to conflicts in which there is clearly a more comprehensive value at work. But the mere difficulty of a conflict does not provide a reason for thinking that the conflicting values cannot be put together by some more comprehensive value. Just as there are easy cases of conflict over philosophy appointments and also over morality and prudence, there are hard cases of conflict over philosophy appointments and also over morality and prudence. Indeed, the fact that some cases are easy and others are hard is very plausibly explained by the nature of the more comprehensive value that has the conflicting values as parts. A choice between Aye, who is quite original but historically insensitive, and Cee, who is less original but a crackjack historian, might be difficult, not because there is no comprehensive value that puts those conflicting values together, but because the comprehensive value that does, namely, philosophical talent, is such that the normative relation between the values of originality and historical sensitivity borne by Aye and by Cee is difficult to ascertain.

Whether there is some convincing way in which the drowning and philosophy cases can be distinguished remains to be seen. In short, the orthodox approach owes us an explanation of why some conflicts are handled by a more comprehensive value while others supposedly are not. In the absence of an explanation, we have a good prima facie case for the nameless value approach. Moreover, even if those who take the orthodox approach could explain why conflicts between morality and prudence are not handled by a more comprehensive value, they would be saddled with a fragmented account of conflict resolution, for on their view, some value conflicts, like the philosophy case, are resolved in virtue of a more comprehensive value, while other conflicts, like the drowning case, are not. The nameless value approach, in contrast, provides the basis for a unitary account of conflict resolution; what matters in choice is given by a more comprehensive value that has the values at stake as parts, and it is in virtue of this value that the conflict can be rationally resolved if at all.

The Orthodox Approach

The Simple Version. According to the simple version of the orthodox approach, the values at stake alone account for their relative weights regardless of the circumstances in which they figure.

On the face of it, this view seems mistaken, for sometimes the very same values have different relative weights in different circumstances. Suppose, for example, that a top philosophy department at a premier research university is faced with the choice of appointing Dee or Eee to a position in the department. The department takes two values to be at stake: philosophical talent and teaching ability. Dee, as it turns out, is a first-rate philosopher but a mediocre teacher, while Eee is merely okay as philosopher yet a first-rate teacher. Whom should the department appoint? Given that philosophical talent and teaching ability are the only values at stake, it seems that philosophical talent has greater normative weight than teaching ability, and the department would therefore be justified in appointing Dee over Eee. Suppose now we change the example so that the department making the appointment is at a teaching college whose focus is on teaching rather than research. Once again, the department takes it that the two values at stake are philosophical talent and teaching ability. In this case, it seems that teaching ability has greater normative weight than in the research university case. If these values alone determined their relative normative weights, then those weights should be the same in both cases. But in the first case, teaching ability counts less than it does in the second.

The same phenomenon holds in cases of conflict between moral and prudential values. Suppose I am sitting in my living room wondering what to do with the fifty dollars my mother has just sent me. As I rifle through my mail, I see a postage-paid appeal from the Save the Children Fund. I could send my fifty dollars to save two children from starvation or I could buy myself an exquisite meal of duck confit, sweet corn, and truffle sauce. Suppose that at stake in the choice are the moral value of saving human life and the prudential value of gustatory pleasure. Whatever the normative weights of these values vis-à-vis one another, their weights are different in different circumstances. For suppose that, instead of sitting at home, I am lying in a hospital bed, recovering from a painful illness. Again, I am contemplating what to do with the fifty dollars my mother has just sent me. The envelope for the Save the Children fund lies next to my untouched hospital tray of red Jell-O, mashed peas, and a hockey-puck hamburger. Next to it lies a flyer advertising a service that delivers
exquisite meals prepared by Le Dernier Repas. Again, I could give my fifty dollars to save two children from starvation or I could delight in duck confit, sweet corn, and truffle sauce. In this case, it seems that the relative normative weight of donating the money is different than it is in the case in which I am sitting at home contemplating whether to mail a check or make a reservation.

Note that in these examples, not only do the same generic values figure in each pair of cases but so, too, do the same particular instantiations of them. It would be wholly unsurprising if the same generic values instantiated differently had different normative weights in given cases, for a generic value can be instantiated in a wide variety of ways that will affect its normative weight in the given circumstances. In one case, for instance, the value of saving a human life might be instantiated by an act that saves the life of Hitler, and in another it might be instantiated by an act that saves the life of one's child. The claim that the values at stake are the same, then, should be understood as entailing that the particular instantiations of the generic values as borne by the alternatives are the same. In this way, whatever is relevant about the alternatives to choice is built into the understanding of the particular values at stake.

Our dismissal of the simple view is perhaps too hasty. For circumstances might play a role in determining which values are at stake in the first place, and thus a difference in circumstances may give rise to a value at stake in the one case but not the other. In a choice between saving a dollar and spending it on ice cream, for instance, which values are at stake depends on features of the circumstances, such as whether I am down to my last dollar or whether I am diabetic. If I am neither, then it is plausible to suppose that the values of avoiding destitution or a diabetic coma are not at stake in the choice. In the two above examples, the fact that the appointment is to be made at a research institution may give rise to different values than those in the case of the teaching college, and my being in the hospital recovering from a painful illness may bring with it values not present when I am deciding what to do while sitting in my living room. If the circumstances in two cases are different, then the values at stake in those cases might be different. The simple approach might yet be correct, for once the identities of the values at stake are given, it may seem that circumstances need play no role in determining the relative normative weights of those values.

This move is sometimes made against arguments such as those of Peter Singer and Peter Unger, who insist that if the value of human life trumps the value of some portion of my wealth in one circumstance—for example, if the starving child is at my doorstep—then it should trump the same value in other circumstances—for example, when the starving child is halfway around the world. The argument of the Peters presupposes an “other things being equal” clause, and the objection is that other things are not equal: The difference in circumstances gives rise to a difference in which values are at stake in the two cases. The fact that the child is on my doorstep gives rise to a new value of responding to an immediate moral demand physically present before one, which is at stake in that case but not in the other. And if there are different values at stake in the two cases, we have no grounds for thinking that just because the values common to both cases stand in a given normative relation in the one circumstance, they will stand in the same relation in the other.

It is relatively uncontroversial that circumstances can help frame a choice situation by determining which values are at stake. The debate over whether a particular difference in circumstance gives rise to a particular difference in values at stake in one case but not another is, by contrast, often controversial. However, the correctness of the simple view need not depend on settling such controversial matters, for there are general grounds for thinking that it is mistaken.

Those who take the simple view must maintain that once a list of values at stake is given, the normative relations of those values hold in abstracto, apart from any circumstances in which the values might figure. It makes no sense, however, to ask in the abstract which of two values gives rise to the greater reason. Suppose God is told in a circumstantial vacuum to choose between Eff and Gee with respect to philosophical talent and teaching ability. If there are no specified circumstances, even God cannot know whether Eff's technical prowess gives rise to a greater reason than Gee's easygoing teaching style because there is no fact about how those values normatively relate apart from circumstances. Without some specification of circumstances, the relative normative weights of philosophical talent and teaching ability, taken generically or in their particular instantiations, cannot be determined, and thus there is no truth about which alternative should rationally be chosen. If values can account for their own normative relations, they can do so only with the help of the circumstances in which they figure.

The Sophisticated Version. The sophisticated version of the orthodox approach recognizes that values do not have relative normative weights in
abstracto but that supplemental factors play a role in determining those relative weights. And we have just seen that whatever other supplemental factors may play a role, circumstances most certainly do.

Now if the simple version is mistaken because it fails to acknowledge that circumstances play a role in determining the relative weights of values, one might think that the sophisticated version, which acknowledges such a role, must be correct. But many approaches, including the nameless value one, can allow that circumstances help to determine the normative weights of values. Indeed, if the argument against the simple version is correct, then any plausible approach must give circumstances such a role. The question at issue, then, is whether a more comprehensive value is also needed. As I argue, the values at stake and the circumstances in which they figure underdetermine the way those circumstances affect the normative relations among those values; something with content beyond that given by the values and the circumstances in which they figure is needed to explain why the values at stake are normatively related as they are in those circumstances. And as I suggest, it is hard to see what could provide this content other than a more comprehensive value that gives what matters in the choice.

We start by distinguishing two roles circumstances might play in choice. Circumstances are “internal” when they are the circumstances of the choice situation; otherwise they are “external.” External circumstances help to determine the identity of the choice situation, that is, which choice situation one is in, including which values are at stake and which circumstances are internal to the choice situation. They do not, as such, play a role in determining the relative weights of the values at stake once the choice situation has been identified; their role is to “set up” the choice situation as this one rather than that one. Internal circumstances, in contrast, help to determine the relative weights of the values at stake in a choice situation once it has been set up. For example, the fact that the dean has requested that we fill a position in ethics is an external circumstance: It gives rise to a decision-theoretic situation in which we seek to appoint a person who works in ethics, rather than in logic, or one in which we seek to have ourselves a fine meal. Once the identity of the choice situation has been determined, external circumstances leave the scene, and the internal circumstances, such as the fact that our department is part of a teaching college, may then affect the relative weights of the values at stake: It may give teaching ability greater relative normative weight vis-à-vis philosophical talent than it might have in different internal circumstances.

It will sometimes be difficult in practice to distinguish internal from external circumstances, for some nonevaluative facts that are relevant to determining the relative weights of values at stake might also help determine which choice situation one is in to begin with and vice versa. But this difficulty should not lead us to think that circumstances can play only one role and not two. It seems clear that circumstances that play an external role need not play an internal role, and vice versa. The fact that the dean instructs the philosophy department to hire someone in ethics is an external circumstance; it gives rise to a choice situation in which an ethics position is to be filled. But once that choice situation has been determined, the fact that the dean has instructed the department to hire someone does not play any internal role in affecting the relative normative weights of the values — say, philosophical talent and teaching ability — that are at stake. Similarly, the fact that my pension has been decimated by a downturn in the stock market may not be relevant to determining a choice situation in which I have a duty to give aid — such a choice situation might be determined by the fact that people are starving — but once the choice situation is determined as one in which a duty to give aid is at stake, the fact that I have suffered severe financial losses may be relevant to determining the relative normative weight of that duty against a competing prudential value.

Assuming this distinction in role is sound — an assumption to which we return in due course — the crucial question is, In virtue of what do the internal circumstances affect the relative weights of the values at stake in the way that they do? In virtue of what, for example, does the fact that I am a thousand miles from the victim make the relative weight of my duty to save lesser rather than greater than a competing value in a given choice situation?

Defenders of the sophisticated orthodoxy might appeal to one of two answers. They might claim that the way in which circumstances of a choice situation affect the normative relations among the values at stake is determined by the values at stake themselves or by some function of those values and those circumstances. In the alternative, they might allow that some further content beyond that given by the values at stake and the internal circumstances is needed to account for the way in which those circumstances affect the normative relations but insist that this further content is given by a purpose, principle, or a theory of value, not a more comprehensive value.

The first answer fails, however, because the values at stake and the circumstances in which they figure underdetermine the way in which those
circumstances may affect the relative weights of those values. Imagine a
choice situation in which one must choose between saving another from
harm and avoiding some prudential cost. Now fix the circumstances of
the choice situation, and include among them the fact that one is phy-
ically very distant from the victim. How does this circumstance affect
the normative relations of the moral duty to save and the prudential
cost of doing so? Other things being equal, it seems that the circumstance
of being very far away from the victim diminishes the relative normative
weight of one's duty to save vis-à-vis the competing prudential value.28
But in virtue of what does this claim seem to be true?

The duty to save, the competing prudential value, and the internal
circumstances, whatever they might be, cannot account for the truth of
the claim, for holding the values at stake and the circumstances in which they fig-
ure constant, the values at stake could nevertheless have different relative
weights in the very same internal circumstances. This is because circum-
cstances external to a choice situation may determine that what matters
in one situation is different from what matters in another, even though in
both situations the same values are at stake in the same internal circum-
cstances. Being physically distant from the victim diminishes the relative
weight of one's duty to save vis-à-vis some competing value only if what
matters in the choice is something that gives great weight to doing one's
moral duty rather than, say, to doing what is supererogatory. If what
matters instead is saintliness or doing the most supererogatory act possible,
the circumstance of being physically distant would cut the other way —
it would make one's duty to save have greater relative normative weight,
not less, for, other things equal, helping a victim who is far away is more
supererogatory than helping one who is nearby.29 The values at stake and
the internal circumstances of the choice situation cannot determine the
normative relations among the values in those circumstances; something
with further content is needed. Put another way, “what matters” in a
choice cannot simply be given by the values at stake and the circumstances
of the choice situation but must have some further content.

So now the question is, what is this further content? According to
the second line of orthodox response, this further content is given by
a purpose, principle, or theory of value, not by a more comprehensive
nameless value.

But this answer, too, fails. To see why, we need to ask what it is about
the content of a purpose, principle, or theory of value that could
determine the normative relations among the values at stake. There are two possibil-
ties. The relevant content might be thought to be given by a particular
weighting of the values at stake. Or it might given by something else. Take
each possibility in turn.

Suppose we must choose between candidates for a philosophy job, and
the values at stake are philosophical talent and teaching ability. Now sup-
pose that what matters in the choice is given by a purpose whose content
is to choose in accordance with a particular weighting of philosophical
talent and teaching ability (or a principle or theory of value with that con-
tent). In this case, once we have agreed on what choice situation we are in
—and therefore on what matters in the choice—we have agreed on what
the correct weighting of the values at stake is. There can be no genuine
disagreement within a given choice situation about how the values at stake
relate; you and I could not have a genuine disagreement about whether
one candidate’s philosophical talent provides more reason to choose her
than another candidate’s teaching ability. Since, however, there can be
such disagreement, what matters in a choice cannot be understood in
terms of a particular weighting of the values at stake. Indeed, genuine
disagreement about how correctly to weight the values at stake presup-
noses a notion of what matters with content beyond a mere weighting of
those values; it is that in virtue of which such disagreement is possible!

If purposes, principles, and a theory of value cannot be understood in
terms of a particular weighting of the values at stake, then if they are to
determine the relative weights of values in a choice situation, they must
have some other content. What could this be? We have several clues that
can be pieced together. We started with the stipulation that whatever else
matters, the values at stake matter. We then saw that the values at stake
cannot themselves account for their own normative relations; the circum-
cstances of the choice situation in which they figure must also play a role.
But it also turned out that the values and the circumstances in which they
figure cannot account for the normative relations; keeping the values and
internal circumstances constant, the relative weights of the values might
differ in different cases since what matters in each case might be differ-
ent. Thus, what matters must have content beyond the values and the
circumstances in which they figure. We then explored a suggestion as to
what this further content might be—a particular weighting of the values at
choice. But we saw that this suggestion precludes the possibility of genuine
disagreement within a choice situation about what the correct weighting
of the values at stake is; indeed, the possibility of such disagreement
presupposes some shared understanding of what matters with content
beyond a particular weighting of the values at stake. In short, what mat-
ters must (1) include the values at stake, (2) have content beyond those
values and the circumstances in which they figure, (3) have content beyond a particular weighting of those values in those circumstances, and (4) be that in virtue of which there can be genuine disagreement about what the correct weighting of the values is.

I cannot see what could fill this role other than a more comprehensive value that has the values at stake as parts. Values are just the sort of consideration that can fill this role; in particular, they have a "unity" in virtue of which their component values hang together in the way that they do. Take, for instance, philosophical talent. It is in virtue of this unity, for example, that, other things equal, a particular originality makes one more philosophically talented than does a particular historical sensitivity, that physical attractiveness is irrelevant to philosophical talent, and that you and I might have a genuine disagreement about whether technical prowess makes someone more or less philosophically talented than someone with a certain understanding of the historical sweep of philosophical ideas. I have a bit more to say about this unity below, but for now, I want to suggest that it is the unity of a more comprehensive value that accounts for the normative relations among its component values as they figure in practical conflict.

Indeed, it seems that a purpose, principle, or theory of value could determine the relative weights of values at stake only by presupposing a more comprehensive value with the values at stake as parts. Consider purposes. My purpose in choosing between two philosophy researchers might be to get the one with the most philosophical talent. Or in choosing between two actions that affect my family, it might be to be a good daughter. Or my purpose might be to lead a certain kind of life or to be efficient. Purposes involve some unified understanding of the competing values at stake in a choice, and it is in virtue of this unified understanding that purposes may determine what it is rational to do. Some purposes involve multiple criteria that do not appear to be part of any unified value. But how could motley criteria determine the normative relations of the values at stake? If a purpose presupposes a more comprehensive value, it would have the content required to provide a normative structure of the values at stake.

Similarly, if principles are to determine the correct weighting of the values at stake, they must presuppose a more comprehensive value. Consider the principle, "Other things equal, one ought to keep one's promises." How can a general slogan determine the relative weights of particular values in a given choice situation? Many principles have exceptions, and the relative weights a principle assigns to competing values may differ from one circumstance to another. In virtue of what does a principle operate in the way that it does? Those who appeal to principles allow that the operation or content of a principle depends on complex background claims as to when different circumstantial features affect the relative normative weights of the values at stake. So, for instance, Scanlon's contractualism holds that it is a background "structure of understanding" that determines when the cost of keeping a promise counts against keeping it, and Kamm's exploration of moral principles governing permissible harming relies on background fine-grained claims about when particular circumstances affect the moral strength of a duty not to harm. If a principle is to be capable of accounting for the way particular circumstances affect the relative weights of the values at stake, it must do so by appeal to these background claims. The question then becomes, In virtue of what are these background claims as they are? Why, for example, do these background claims yield the determination that in a given choice situation in which the cost of keeping a promise is very high, the duty to keep a promise has less relative weight, rather than its opposite? Something is needed to account for the fact that the relative weights fall out in the way that they do. I have suggested that a more comprehensive value that gives structure to the component values at stake can do the required work. It is hard to see what else could. The same line of reasoning holds against appeals to a theory of value.

Why a Value? Suppose it is conceded that purposes, principles, and a theory of value cannot account for the normative relations among values at stake in a choice without presupposing some further content that meets the four conditions already laid out. Why should we think that this further content is given by a value? Part of our answer to this question involves throwing down the gauntlet: What else could it be? What else could fit the bill besides a value that plays the same role that philosophical talent plays in certain conflicts between originality and historical sensitivity?

It might be suggested that a more comprehensive "category" concept, such as "value," "quality of life," "prudential value," "moral value," "political value," "aesthetic value," and so on, not itself a value, could, in conjunction with the values at stake, determine the normative relations among those values. There are two ways this suggestion might be taken. First, it might be understood to claim that a formal category concept can itself determine the normative relations among the values that belong to that category. I do not see how a category concept, by hypothesis not itself a value, could determine the relative weights of values that fall under the
category; a purely formal category concept simply offers a rubric under which values of a kind may be collected in an unstructured way. A value, in contrast, has a unity in virtue of which its components are structured, and thus may provide the normative relations among them. Second, it might be understood to claim that such category concepts help to determine which values are at stake in the first place. Their role, on this interpretation, would be to fix which evaluative features of the alternatives are relevant to the choice— for example, the particular prudential values instantiated by the alternatives or the particular moral ones. Once the values at stake are determined, they put themselves together, in good orthodox fashion. But on this interpretation, we are just led back to the beginning of our argument against the orthodox approach.

Another suggestion might be that nothing determines the normative relations among values; it is simply a “brute fact” that values are related as they are in the given circumstances. But the answer, “It’s just a brute fact that the values are related as they are in circumstances in which they figure” would not do under the assumption that only internal circumstances can affect the normative relations of the values at stake. For, as we have already seen, there can be cases in which the values at stake are the same, the internal circumstances are the same, and yet the normative relations between the values is different. Something must explain this difference; it makes no sense to claim that it is just a brute fact that sometimes the values are related in one way and sometimes they are related in another when the putative resources for accounting for such a difference are identical. At the very least, there must be an appeal to external circumstances to account for this difference. This appeal, however, involves rejecting the claim that only internal circumstances can help to determine the relative weights of the values at stake and, as we see in the next section, leads to a problematic conception of choice.

I suspect that doubts about whether what matters in choice is given by a more comprehensive value have their source in the difficulty in explaining what it is about a value in virtue of which its component values are structured as they are—what is this unity in virtue of which its components hang together in the way that they do? Put another way, what makes a value different from a mere weighting of (component) values? This is a central question in axiology, though little philosophical progress has been made on the matter.

The difference between a mere weighting of values and a more comprehensive value that determines that weighting can, I believe, be illuminated metaphorically by a distinction between two kinds of jigsaw puzzle.

Some jigsaw puzzles are put together in virtue of a unifying picture; the puzzle, when completed, depicts a jungle scene, sleeping kittens, or an Oreo cookie. One piece goes next to another because according to the picture, the monkey is next to the elephant. Values are like this kind of jigsaw puzzle; there is a unifying “picture” that guides placement of its component parts, and it is in virtue of that picture that its parts are normatively related as they are. As we have already seen, a value, such as philosophical talent, has a unity in virtue of which disagreement about the correct weighting of its component values can proceed, and it is in virtue of this unity that, for example, a particular bundle of originality and historical sensitivity manifests more philosophical talent than another bundle. Other jigsaw puzzles are put together in some other way; there is no picture but perhaps only a depiction of something homogeneous like the color red or television static. The pieces then fit together simply by their shapes interlocking in the right way, or perhaps the pieces are all identical in shape and so the puzzle is put together by stipulation. Mere weightings of values are like this second kind of jigsaw puzzle; there is no picture in virtue of which the values are related in the way that they are. As we have argued, values cannot put themselves together simply by shape; something with further content—a picture—is needed. And as we have seen, a stipulated weighting of, for example, beauty, poise in a swimsuit, talent, and so on that gives what matters in a Miss America contest does not allow for the possibility of genuine disagreement over the correct weighting of those values. If someone were to insist that artistic talent was irrelevant or that poise in a swimsuit should count for twice as much, there would be no picture in virtue of which such claims could be correct or incorrect.

For present purposes, we need not attempt to explain just what is this picture that gives the unity of value. Instead, we need only point out that the problem of providing such an account raises no special difficulty for our approach. This problem of the unity of values is a problem even for ordinary values such as beauty and philosophical talent. We have no account of what it is about such values in virtue of which their components are weighted as they are. But this does not block the thought that they are values nonetheless and so should not ground skepticism about whether what we have identified as ‘what matters’ in choice is a value.

A recap of the argument is in order. We began by leaving open the possibility that what matters in a choice—pruimportance in the case of conflicts between morality and prudence— is nothing more than a list of the values at stake. We then saw that there could be cases in which the values
at stake are the same, the circumstances in which they figure are the same, and yet the values have different normative relations. This is possible because what matters in each case can be different. We then asked what the content of what matters could be. It cannot be given simply by the values and internal circumstances, for our question arose from seeing that the content could not be given in this way. We then examined the possibility that what matters is given by purposes, principles, or a theory of value. But each of these suggestions is subject to a dilemma. Either these considerations are understood in terms of a mere weighting of the values at stake or they have further content. If the former, they cannot account for disagreement over the correct relative weights of the values at stake in a given choice situation. If the latter, they very plausibly presuppose more comprehensive values that are at the heart of the nameless value approach. If the argument is right, the relative normative weights of values at stake in a given choice situation are determined by a more comprehensive value that includes those values as parts and gives what matters in the choice.

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF CHOICE

The above argument crucially relies on the assumption that there are two distinctive roles circumstances might play in choice, an “external” role in determining which choice situation one is in and an “internal” role in determining what one should do in a choice situation once one is in it. On this assumption, choice is a two-tier affair; first, there is the question of determining which choice situation to be in, and second, there is the question of determining what to do in that choice situation once one is in it. External circumstances play a role in the first and internal circumstances in the second.

This distinction between internal and external circumstances is crucial because the pivotal claim of the argument is that there can be two choice situations in which the values at stake are the same, the internal circumstances of the choice are the same, and yet the relative weights of the values differ because what matters in each choice is different. If there is no distinction between internal and external circumstances, however, it would be hard to see how it could be possible for two choice situations to be the same in all the circumstances and yet the relative weights of the values at stake be different. To think that it could would be to reject the supervenience of the normative on the nonnormative. It is only because the argument assumed that the external circumstances of

two choice situations could be different that it made sense to suppose that what matters in the choice could be different, and thus that the relative weights of the values at stake could be different even though the internal circumstances of the choice situation were the same.

Proponents of the orthodox approach, however, might reject the distinction between internal and external circumstances and thus jump ship early in the argument. They might insist, for example, that what explains the appearance of there being two choice situations in which the internal circumstances are the same, the values at stake are the same, and yet their relative weights different is simply the fact that the external circumstances are different. There is no need to appeal to different more comprehensive values that give what matters in each choice situation, because the totality of circumstances explains the difference in the two cases. This move resuscitates the “brute fact” view of normative relations: Perhaps it is simply a brute fact that values are normatively related as they are in the totality of circumstances. But why should we, in seeking to answer the question of why values are normatively related as they are, settle with the answer, “That’s just how it is,” when there is in the offing a deeper explanation of why these putatively brute facts are as they are? The appeal to more comprehensive values provides such an explanation. In any case, as I now want to argue, the assumption on which the view is based—that there is no distinction between internal and external circumstances—leads to a fundamentally flawed conception of choice.

If there is no distinction between circumstances that determine a choice situation and circumstances that determine what one should do in a situation, choice is one-tier. On the one-tier conception, at any point in time for a given agent, there is a single choice situation defined by the circumstances that obtain in the universe at that time and all the values there are. What matters in the choice, then, is every value, and the circumstances of the choice situation are all the extant circumstances.53 What one should do in a choice situation, then, is determined by the interaction of all the values there are with all the extant circumstances; values, in good orthodox fashion, put themselves together, with the help of the circumstances in which they figure, that is, every extant circumstance. This view takes its cue from theoretical explanation in science; explanation of the interaction of physical forces is not relativized to something specific that matters when the particular forces are in play; in physical explanation, what matters in principle is everything whatever.54

To take an example. As I finish typing this sentence, I am at a juncture of choice. What should I do next? The identity of the choice situation
I am in is given by the extant circumstances and every value. So, right now, certain circumstances obtain – millions of people are starving, my child wants me to read her a bedtime story, President Bush is gearing up for war with Iraq, I desire a cup of hot chocolate, this chapter is owed to the editors tomorrow, and so on. These circumstances come together with every value so that each value is assigned a relative weight in the circumstances. Perhaps in the circumstances that obtain now, the value of saving human lives has greater normative weight vis-à-vis the value of fulfilling my child’s desire for a bedtime story, but if the circumstances were different, the relative weights might be different – if, for example, my child is on her deathbed and wants to hear The Little Prince one last time. And given the extant circumstances, perhaps many values will be assigned a zero relative weight; that is, they will not make any difference to how the other values relate in the extant circumstances and so in some sense drop away. How extant circumstances and values come together to yield relative normative weights is a complicated matter, but the key point, from the perspective of those who would defend the orthodox approach, is that the explanation of those weights need not appeal to anything beyond the values and the circumstances of the choice situation. What I should do, all things considered, is given by which of all the values there are have the greatest relative weight in the extant circumstances.

One difficulty with this conception is that it cannot recognize the intuitive distinction between cases in which a value does not matter and cases in which it matters but does not make a difference to how the other values at stake normatively relate. Suppose, for instance, that we are choosing between two philosophers to appoint to a chair in logic. The moral worthiness of the candidates does not matter in the choice. (If one finds that controversial, substitute physical attractiveness.) If, in contrast, we are choosing between two priests to appoint to a parish position, moral worthiness does matter. But perhaps with respect to moral worthiness, the priests are a wash; they are equally morally worthy and so their moral worthiness makes no difference as to how their instantiations of other values, such as pastoral ability and holiness, normatively relate. On the one-tier conception, both the philosophy and priest cases would have to be understood in the same way, namely, as cases in which moral worthiness matters but fails to affect the relative weights of the other values at stake. (Indeed, I suspect that the one-tier conception of choice may be partly responsible for the distorted importance that morality is often given in the practical realm. If moral values always matter in choice, and if, as it seems, moral values have special force, then choice situations become all too easily moralized. On the one-tier conception, it is easy to think of moral value as the dominant value, rather than as one value among many.)

This difficulty has its source in what I believe is a fundamental problem with the one-tier conception. Since what matters in every choice situation is the same, namely, every value, which choice situation one is in at any juncture is given by the circumstances that are extant at that juncture. The determination of which choice situation one is in, therefore, is not a normative matter. This means that there is no room for the normative question, Given the extant circumstances, what is an appropriate choice situation to be in? There is only one normative question on the one-tier conception, namely, What should I do in the given choice situation? But it seems clear that the first question makes sense; people can disagree about which choice situation is appropriate in the extant circumstances. As I consider what to write in the next paragraph, I wonder, should I be in a choice situation in which morality matters, in which case perhaps I should stop typing and start writing a check to Oxfam, or is it appropriate for me to be in a choice situation in which prudence is what matters and thus finishing this paper is a priority? The marathon runner who happens on the drowning stranger makes a substantive mistake if she thinks what matters in the choice is simply her own well-being; it is inappropriate for her to be in that choice situation rather than in one that includes the morality of saving human life. Indeed, the complaint that someone is “insensitive” is best understood as pointing to a failure to see which choice situation is appropriate in the extant circumstances, not, as the one-tier conception would have it, as pointing to a failure to discern the correct normative relations between the values in the extant circumstances. Because it precludes normative inquiry into what choice situations are appropriate in given extant circumstances, the one-tier conception fails to carve choice at its joints.

On the two-tier conception, there are two normative questions. First, what is an appropriate choice situation to be in, given the extant circumstances? Second, what should one do in a choice situation once it is given? It is because there are two questions that there must be an “intermediary” between the determination of the choice situation and the determination of rational choice – something that answers the second question without also answering the first. As we have argued, this intermediary is a more comprehensive value. Disagreement over which choice situation is appropriate in the extant circumstances, then, is disagreement over which more comprehensive value should matter in the extant
circumstances. Sometimes what matters in the extant circumstances is doing the moral thing; sometimes what matters is doing what makes one’s life go best; and sometimes what matters is given by a more comprehensive nameless value that includes particular moral and prudential values as parts.

The argument for the nameless approach can thus be reframed as a dilemma: Either we must accept the one-tier conception of choice or we must accept the nameless value approach. This may be the deepest level at which the theoretical choice between the orthodoxy and the nameless value approach can be usefully understood. And as I have suggested, it is the one-tier conception that should be given up.

We can now see how the analogy between values and physical forces that was thought to support the orthodox approach breaks down. Indeed, the relation between values and physical forces is not one of analogy but the reverse. Physical explanation is not relativized to something specific that matters when certain physical forces are at work; “everything” matters in explaining physical reality. Sometimes, however, physicists offer “idealized” explanations; when explaining the interaction of the sun, moon, and earth, for instance, physicists may assume as an idealization that there are no other forces, such as those from distant stars, at work. Idealized physical explanation, then, may be relativized to a “closed system.” But it is understood that idealized explanation of this sort gives only an approximation of physical reality; physical reality does not consist of closed systems. However, what physicists take to be an idealization, namely, relativization to a closed system, is the “reality” in the normative case. Values are different from physical forces because the normative relations of values are always relativized to a closed system, namely, something specific that matters in the choice between them. Failure to relativize the normative relations among values in this way will yield at best an idealized explanation that is only an approximate to normative reality.

**Nameless Values**

If the correct conception of choice is two-tier, something with content beyond the values at stake and the circumstances in which they figure is needed to explain the normative relations among the values in those circumstances. It is hard to see what this could be other than a more comprehensive value. By hypothesis, many of these values will be nameless.

The fact that many of these values are nameless might seem to provide evidence against their existence. Being nameless, however, cannot itself be grounds for thinking that there are no such values. Many ordinary named values of today were nameless not long ago. For example, a few decades ago, there was no name for sexual harassment, but there was a definite (dis)value that had as components ordinary named values such as sexual exploitation, condescension, and sexual domination. I believe that we are now in the same position with respect to many nameless values as we once were with respect to values such as sexual harassment.

Indeed, the idea that some values are nameless has a distinguished pedigree; it can be traced back to Aristotle, who thought that there were many nameless virtues and vices. In identifying the virtue and vice concerned with the pursuit of small honors, for example, Aristotle held that the mean between the extremes of ambitiousness and unambitiousness is nameless. Similarly, he thought that the regulation of feelings of anger involved a nameless virtue and vice; at one extreme is an excess of anger, which is nameless, and at the other extreme is a deficiency in anger, which is nameless, and the mean between these two extremes is also nameless.

I believe that Aristotle was right in pointing out that many perfectly ordinary virtues and vices have no names; my proposal takes Aristotle’s insight and extends it to values generally.

A more serious doubt about nameless values might highlight the difficulty of latching onto them. But we must be careful to locate the difficulty. As we have already seen, there is no difficulty in referring to these values; they can be picked out by general descriptions, such as “what there is most reason to do, all things considered,” and they can also be denoted by more specific descriptions, such as “what matters in this situation,” “being the right person for this job,” and “the relevant combination of cost, taste, and healthfulness.”

Perhaps the difficulty in latching onto nameless values lies in our inability to reel off their contents. But the fact that we cannot explicitly articulate the content of a concept does not establish that there is no such concept or even that we do not possess it. Newton, for example, worked with the concept of the limit of series, which remained nameless for some two centuries, without being able explicitly to give its content. And just as Newton possessed the concept of a limit, ordinary thinkers today may possess concepts associated with nameless values. When a philosophy department gets together to make an appointment, there is some or other concept combining into a unity the multiple criteria at stake in virtue of which there can be genuine disagreements about how they are to be correctly related. If members of the department pause to reflect on what this concept is, they may find it difficult to articulate. Nonetheless,
it is in virtue of this concept that their decision of whom to appoint is rational (or not!).

Perhaps problems in latching onto nameless values lie in the fact that such values typically suffer from a high degree of epistemic or semantic indeterminacy, and this in turn raises doubts about whether they can be properly thought to exist as values. But many named values suffer from both kinds of indeterminacy, for example, “justice,” and yet we have no doubt that those values exist. And although nameless values will typically be more indeterminate than named ones, it is not clear how this difference in degree can be parlayed into an argument that nameless values do not exist. After all, the determinateness of nameless values is not of degree zero; just as there are firmly determinate truths about justice—for example, that a tiny amount of efficiency is worse with respect to justice than a very great freedom—there are firmly determinate truths about prumorality—for example, that a small prudential pleasure is worse with respect to prumorality than a great moral duty. There could be some further difference in determinacy that might cast doubt on nameless values, but the challenge for our opponents is to articulate in what such a putative difference consists.

Another kind of doubt about nameless values might lie in the thought that such values are in some way fake—they are Frankenstein values, artificially stitched together to satisfy the mad cravings of those seeking unity where there is none. Or to put the worry somewhat differently, once we allow nameless values, the floodgates are open for values to be put together any old way. But this worry overlooks the fact that values cannot be stipulated weightings of any values whatever. As we have seen, nameless values have content beyond a weighting of its component values, and it is in virtue of this content that its component values are weighted as they are. As we have suggested, this content is given by the unity of the value—the picture in virtue of which its components are put together as they are. Sometimes values come together to form a unity that is a more comprehensive value, and sometimes they do not. Why this is so remains a deep axiological mystery, but the fact that they sometimes do is not subject to doubt. Unlike conflicts between beauty contestants, which are resolved by a stipulated weighting of talent, poise, beauty, and community spirit, conflicts between moral and prudential values are not resolved by stipulating some weighting of those conflicting values. Instead, there is a more comprehensive consideration that gives what matters in the choice and is that in virtue of which it is rational to choose one alternative over the other. Of course, this approach allows that there are many more

values than we might have otherwise thought, but insofar as each has the requisite unity to distinguish itself from a stipulated patchwork of considerations, none can be distinguished as more monstrous than any other.

Although there are many more questions about the nameless values that need to be answered, I’ll mention only one more. If there are more comprehensive nameless values that put together named values, then are there more comprehensive nameless values that put together those nameless values, and so on up until we have a single super nameless value that includes all values as parts? If so, the nameless value approach might naturally dovetail with the one-tier conception of choice. I believe that there is no such supervalue, but a careful consideration of the question would take us too far astray. I doubt that any two values can be put together by some more comprehensive value because it seems that sometimes there is a picture in virtue of which two values hang together to form a unity, and sometimes there is not. A rough-and-ready test for whether two values come together to form a unity is to ask whether it makes sense to attempt to compare their intrinsic merits. Sometimes it makes no sense conceptually, as in the comparison between the abstract beauty of number theory and the utility of a corkscrew—which is better with respect to what? Other times it makes no sense substantively, as in a comparison between the neatness with which someone can drink a glass of milk and the elegance with which she turns pages of a book. In these cases, even “nominal-notable” comparisons seem senseless—someone who drinks milk sloppily is not worse with respect to ______ than someone who flips the pages of a book with unparalleled elegance. This is not to say that a choice situation could not be jiggered so that there is some more comprehensive consideration that fills in the blanks and yields normative relations among the values at stake, but such a consideration would be gerrymandered and thus lack the unity of a genuine value.

CONCLUSION

This chapter presented two arguments for the nameless value approach to putting together morality and well-being. The first was an argument by analogy: Given that there are some practical conflicts that are rationally resolved in virtue of a more comprehensive value that includes the conflicting values as parts, why think that conflicts between moral and prudential considerations are any different? Various attempts to distinguish such conflicts were examined and found to be not up to the job. The
second was an argument from circumstances. Insofar as circumstances can help determine the normative relations among values, what matters in a choice must have content beyond that given by the values at stake and the circumstances in which they figure, content that cannot be provided by a purpose, principle, or theory of value. It was suggested that the only thing that could provide this content is a more comprehensive value. The argument from circumstances, however, crucially relied on a distinction between two roles that circumstances might play in choice. An attack on this distinction was considered and found to lead to a fundamentally misguided conception of choice. Finally, possible sources of skepticism about the existence of more comprehensive nameless values were examined. It was argued that those doubts could be traced either to the mistaken assumption that the existence of a concept presupposes an ability among its would-be possessors to explicitly articulate its content or to a failure to recognize that nameless values have a unity beyond a stipulated weighting of their components.

The existence of nameless values that put together moral and prudential values helps to solve the two puzzles with which we began. If a moral value in conflict with a prudential one is a component of some more comprehensive nameless value, then the normativity of morality in the face of conflict with prudence derives from the normativity of that nameless value in just the way that the normativity of originality in the face of conflict with historical sensitivity derives from the normativity of the value of philosophical talent. It is in virtue of that nameless value that, in a particular case, a moral value has whatever normativity it does in the face of conflict with a prudential one. This, of course, is not to account for the phenomenon of normativity in general, but only to provide a structure for answering the question, Why should I be moral when my life will suffer as a result? The answer is, Because doing so is in accord with value X, which includes both the moral and prudential values at stake and gives what matters in the choice situation. If values in general are reason-giving, then we have the same kind of answer to the “why should I” question as we do when two moral values conflict or two prudential ones do. Even if moral and prudential values issue from fundamentally different points of view, conflicts between them are rationally resolved, if resolvable, just as conflicts between two moral values or two prudential ones are – in virtue of a more comprehensive value that has those conflicting values as parts.

Prumorality, and nameless values generally, also help to block the worry about the scope of practical reason. For if morality and prudence (or beauty and truth, or rights and utility, and so on) can be put together by more comprehensive nameless values, then conflicts between such different values can, like humdrum conflicts within morality or within prudence (or within beauty, truth, rights, and utility), be in principle rationally resolved. What looked like a possible gap in practical reason turns out not to be a gap after all; nameless values rush in to show how there may be a justified choice in every case of value conflict.

Finally, the appeal to a more comprehensive value that gives what matters in a choice helps us to understand a long-standing puzzle about the demandingsness of morality. Commonsense morality tells us that we are justified in failing to give some sizable portion of our income to help feed starving children halfway around the world. But it is also holds that if those starving children appeared on our doorstep, near death and in need of that same portion of our income, we are not justified – or are less justified – in turning our backs on them. How can commonsense morality account for the difference in these two cases? One way is to argue, as Frances Kamm does, that distance from a victim affects the moral weight of one’s duty to save. But, as do many others, I have trouble believing that physical distance per se can make a moral difference in this way. The nameless value approach offers another way of explaining the difference in the two cases: What matters in each case is different. For even if the circumstances in the two cases are “equalized” and the values at stake are the same, it does not follow that their relative normative weights will be the same: The more comprehensive value that governs the relative normative weights of those values may be different. In the one case, it may make the choice a predominantly prudential one, and in the other a predominantly moral one. This difference in what matters explains why the seemingly same choice of refusing to give may be more or less justified in the one case than in the other.

If moral and prudential values are put together by more comprehensive nameless values, then we have the beginnings of a general model for explaining what determines the rational resolution of conflicts between any values whatever. Conflicts are resolvable, if at all, in virtue of a more comprehensive value that has the conflicting values as parts.

Notes

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1. Thomas Nagel writes: “Conflicts between personal and impersonal claims . . . cannot, in my view, be resolved by subsuming either of the points of the view under the other, or both under a third. Nor can we simply abandon any of them” (Nagel 1979: 134; see also Nagel 1986: 197). For related discussion, see Baier 1958; Thomson 1992; Copp 1997; and Wolf 1987, 1999. See also Sidgwick 1981, who concluded that practical reason is hopelessly fragmented since there is no more comprehensive point of view from which to assess the justifiability of the egoistic and utilitarian points of view. It is perhaps worth pointing out that my understanding of “fundamentally different points of view,” namely, as points of view that are not themselves subsumed under some common point of view, does not, unlike other understandings of the phrase, preclude by definition rational resolution of conflicts between considerations issuing from such points of view.

2. By “rational choice” I primarily have in mind what one has most reason to choose “full stop,” although the argument applies also to what one has most reason to choose relative to one’s own, perhaps faulty, mental states.

3. By “normative relations” I mean broadly “aggregative” relations – trumping, outweighing, overriding, being more stringent than, and so on – but not “canceling” relations – excluding, silencing, or bracketing as irrelevant. The relative weight of a value is greater or stronger than or outweighs another if it contributes more to the basis for rational choice in a given choice situation. See Raz 1975: 37–9 for a discussion of exclusionary relations and Scanlon 1998: 50–4 for a discussion of the “bracketing as irrelevant” relation.

4. I say “typically” because it might be argued that some named values, such as “supererogation,” put together particular moral and prudential values. I say “at present” because their being nameless is a contingent matter.

5. As we see below, however, not any more comprehensive consideration will do. The consideration – whether or not a value – must have a “unity,” that is, something in virtue of which its components hang together in the way that they do. Any deflationary or reductive account of values consistent with this requirement will be consistent with the favored approach. But see Scanlon 1998: ch. 1 for a powerful case, which generalized would show that an account in terms of desires will not work.

6. It might be objected that since some practical conflicts are resolved by something like the Pareto rule, the nameless value approach cannot have universal application. The Pareto rule holds that one alternative is rationally preferred to another if it is at least as good with respect to every value at stake and better with respect to at least one. But it is far from clear that in cases in which the Pareto rule applies, the values are all at stake; perhaps the correct way to understand the application of the Pareto rule in such cases is that it is indeterminate which of the various values is at stake. The Pareto rule would then tell us that whichever value is at stake, the Pareto superior alternative can be rationally chosen. Indeed, although my focus is on conflicts, the problem and, I believe, its solution extends to choice situations that do not involve conflict.

7. There are possible approaches that do not fit these categories. For instance, an “agent-based” approach might be worked up from what Amartya Sen has argued is a way of putting together consequentialist and deontological values, namely, by building into the badness of an outcome its badness as viewed by the agent who is responsible for it. See Sen 1982, 1985; cf. Regan 1983. Since my target is the third category of views, I do not discuss other possible approaches.

8. For the view that individual well-being or happiness is the basic notion from which all moral considerations are derived, see Aristotle 1985, Plato 1968, and Sumner 1996; for the view that moral considerations reduce to rational constraints on the pursuit of one’s well-being, see Hobbes 1988 and Gauthier 1986; for the view that well-being is simply one aspect of morality, see Gewirth 1978. No one, as far as I am aware, has defended the idea that there is a third more comprehensive point of view that includes the moral and prudential points of view, though for a thoughtful rejection of this possibility, see Copp 1997. For discussion of the view from nowhere, see the locus classicus, Nagel 1986.


10. Thanks to Shelly Kagan for suggesting this analogy (to which I take exception later in the paper). For examples of the orthodox approach, see Griffin 1986, 1991, 1996; Kamm 1996; Nagel 1970: ch. 13; Parfit 1984; Parfit 1985; Raz 1975, 1999; Korsgaard 1996; and Scanlon 1998. The approach is implicitly endorsed in a wide range of writings in ethics. (Neo-Kantian constructivists account falls within the orthodoxy as described because “the values themselves” can be understood as constructions of practical reason.)

11. There is, in addition, the problem of showing how purely conative states can be normative states. See Quinn 1993: ch. 12; Raz 1999: ch. 5; Scanlon 1998: ch. 1.

12. It is perhaps worth noting that some proponents of the orthodoxy deny that moral and prudential values issue from fundamentally different points of view; the categories of “the moral” and “the prudential” do not mark any significant distinction but are just convenient ways of talking about values that share some feature such as impartiality or self-regardfulness. See Griffin 1986: 161; Scanlon 1998, chs. 2–3; and Raz 1999: chs. 12–13. An extreme version of this denial – that there is no distinction whatever between moral
and prudential considerations—might be traced back to the Greeks. My discussion of the problem does not depend on insisting that moral and prudential values are significantly different in some way.

13. See Nagel 1986: 195-200, who thinks that when morality conflicts with prudence, morality "provides sufficient reason to sacrifice our own good." Compare Scheffler 1995, who argues that morality gives special weight to considerations having to do with individual well-being and that individual interests are already responsive to moral considerations, so that, in the end, morality and prudence are "potentially congruent." Thomas Scanlon employs a similar strategy in arguing that "contractualist morality makes room for projects and commitments" and that "other values have a built-in sensitivity to moral requirements," but concludes that moral considerations are "overriding." See Scanlon 1998, 2002: 514. For doubts about whether the Scheffler-Scanlon strategy will eradicate genuine conflicts between moral and prudential considerations, see Wallace 2002: 451-9. Of course, those who take this approach might hold that sometimes the values at stake give rise to reasons that are not on the same normative page, and in these cases, there is no rational resolution of the conflict.

14. Specificationism is usually presented as a view about correct deliberation, not as a theory of the determination of rational choice, but I co-opt it for my own purposes. For versions of specificationism, see, e.g., Kohl 2001; Wiggins 1975; Nussbaum 1990; and Richardson 1994.

15. For an example of coherism, see Hurley 1989; for interpretivism, see Dworkin, forthcoming, and, in law, Dworkin 1986. It is not altogether clear how coherists, interpretivists, specificationists, and their ilk should be interpreted. On the one hand, they might hold that circumstances play only an "external" role (see text below), that is, they help determine which values are at stake, but that once the values at stake are given, their relative normative weights can be determined in the abstract apart from the circumstances in which they might figure—in which case they would be proponents of the simple version. On the other hand, they might think that filling out the values is a matter of determining their relative normative weights. This would make them proponents of the sophisticated version. I believe the latter is the more sympathetic interpretation and treat them accordingly.

16. See Kamm 1996 for a deontological, Hurka 2001 for a virtue-theoretic, and Scanlon 1998 for a contractualist version of this view within the moral domain.

17. I set aside "particularism," the view that the identity of the values at stake is indexed to the particular circumstances in which they figure and that those very finely individuated values, perhaps in conjunction with Aristotelian practical wisdom, determine how those values normatively relate. Such a view, although orthodox in spirit, is not sufficiently general to be a challenge to my own approach. Note, too, that views about how one ought to go about choosing between alternatives when reasons run out are not relevant to our inquiry; we are searching for an account of how relative normative weights are determined within practical reason. Cf. Nagel 1979: 134-5.

18. This distinction between being the "primary determinant" and being a "supplementary factor" is not critical to my argument. While I assume that the determinative of normative relations is the primary determinant, one could instead take it to include everything that plays any role, even a background role, in determining the relative weights of values. In this case, the difference between the nameless value approach and the sophisticated version of the orthodoxy would appear less stark, for both would allow that something beyond the values themselves is required to put the values together; the difference would be that the nameless value approach insists, contra existing views of the orthodoxy, that this "something beyond" includes a more comprehensive nameless value.

19. Cf. Copp 1997, who assumes that if there is no more comprehensive point of view that includes the moral and prudential points of view, it follows that it makes no sense to ask in any particular conflict what we ought to do, taking into account both the moral and prudential values at stake. See also Foot 1978: 169-70.

20. I sometimes slide between generic and specific values for ease of presentation, but the slide is harmless.

21. Therefore, rational resolution of conflict is not a matter of doing what "one feels like" or "satisfying one's brute desires," since what matters must include all the conflicting desires. I believe that in some conflicts (e.g., choosing between desserts) what matters might be given simply by a brute preference, but such cases are rarer than one might think. In any case, I set aside such cases since they do not involve putting together conflicting considerations in the way of interest.

22. For simplicity, I ignore the possibility of organic interactions among originality, historical sensitivity, and the other respects in which they are equally matched. The examples used throughout the paper are purposefully schematic in form, and the reader should feel free to fill in or amend the details in a way that makes them seem as plausible as possible.

23. The details of the case can be jiggered to accommodate intuitions about when the prudential value is itself significant enough to be "at stake" in the choice. Note, too, that the case can be changed to involve someone whose well-being is affected by doing the moral thing, but such a case would have to be more complicated; for example, it might involve a strong supererogatory consideration against a weak prudential one.

24. Two other suggestions can be quickly dismissed. One is that easy cases involving morality and prudence follow as a conceptual matter from a proper understanding of the moral and prudential values at stake, and thus there is no more comprehensive value in virtue of which that resolution holds. But this thought quickly runs into the difficulty of explaining how grasp of a concept can yield substantive truths. Another is that the difference between the drowning and philosophy cases just is that in the former there is no more comprehensive value and in the latter there is. This suggestion, while perhaps in the end correct, amounts to begging the question at the present juncture of argument: The challenge raised by the apparent parallel...
between the two cases is to explain why there is a more comprehensive value in the one case but not, supposedly, in the other.

25. See Singer 1972 and Unger 1998. Cf. Kamm 1999b. More typically, attacks on Singer-Unger type arguments involve a related objection, namely, that a circumstantial feature that affects the relative weights of two values in one case may not affect the relative weights of the same two values in the same way, if at all, in another case. See Kamm's discussion of "the principle of contextual interaction" in Kamm 1996 and in Kamm 1983 and Shelly Kagan's (1988) discussion of "the additive falacy." See also Temkin 1987. The argument of this paper can be seen as complementary to the Kamm-Kagan-Temkin argument that "transporting" normative weights from one case to another is illegitimate; the paper attempts to explain why it is illegitimate by appeal to the difference in the more comprehensive value that gives what matters in each choice.

26. Cf. Kamm 1996: 83, who thinks that ethical values have some kind of intrinsic "merit weight" independent of circumstances, but allows that those weights may be affected by different factors that obtain in different circumstances. The "weight" she has in mind seems distinctively moral, but her view about moral weight might be generalized to overall relative normative weight as a hybrid of the "simple" and "sophisticated" views.

27. Seeming counterexamples to this claim can be explained either by uncovering a surreptitious assumption that the circumstances are "ordinary" or by showing that as a substantive matter the one value has a certain normative weight vis-à-vis another in every circumstance. The possibility that two values have exactly the same relative normative weight in every circumstance seems unlikely: Even if, for example, the value of human life is always intrinsically weightier than the value of mild amusement in every circumstance, how much weightier it is will plausibly vary from circumstance to circumstance.

28. This claim should not be confused with Frances Kamm's claim that distance from the victim affects the moral strength of one's duty to save. Kamm is concerned with how circumstantial features can affect the moral weight of a consideration, not with how circumstantial features can affect the overall relative normative weight of a moral consideration—given its moral weight—and a prudential one—given its prudential weight. See Kamm 1999a and 1996: 233.

29. This is so under either an "objective" conception of what matters (what God would say determine my rational choice) or a "subjective" one (what in fact determines my rational choice). Under an objective conception, saintliness could be what matters if, for instance, there has never been a supererogatory act previously performed and this will be the last act in the universe. Under a subjective conception, saintliness may in fact determine my rational choice without my having, paradoxically, to aim at it.


31. For example, the background structure of understanding that fills out the content of Scanlon's contractualist principles appeals to "reasonableness." Scanlon allows that what counts as reasonable depends on values held by those party to the contract. If my argument is correct, some of those values held will be more comprehensive nameless ones. My disagreement with Scanlon can be put in the terms of his framework as follows. Scanlon thinks that (as a description of how practical reasoning usually proceeds) an agent makes a normatively guided "decision" as to what is relevant to the choice. This decision amounts to take certain considerations as relevant to the choice, and these considerations, in conjunction with contractualist principles, determine their own relative weights (see Scanlon 1998: 47, 50–4). My suggestion is that an (ideal) agent makes a normatively guided decision as to what more comprehensive value is relevant to choice, and this more comprehensive value then determines the specific considerations relevant to the choice (i.e., its component values) and their normative relations. I believe that what the agent decides to take as relevant must be a more comprehensive value and not a list of considerations (or a particular weighting of them) because I cannot see how the considerations themselves, even in conjunction with principles supported by a complex and rich background structure of understanding, can put themselves together unless those principles presuppose a more comprehensive value.

32. In a forthcoming book on human rights, Griffin suggests that the rational resolution of conflicts between rights and the social good is determined by appeal to the more comprehensive concept of "quality of life." Griffin wants this notion to be a formal "category" concept rather than a value, because he is concerned to present a workable picture of how conflict is actually to be resolved, and he thinks the prospects for actually resolving such conflicts by appeal to a value would be dim. See Griffin, forthcoming. I do not see, however, how a category concept could do the normative work Griffin envisions. Thanks to Griffin for discussion on this point. Cf. Scanlon 1998: ch. 3 and Raz 1999: ch. 13, who argue that "prudence" and "individual well-being" are not more comprehensive concepts from which all prudential considerations derive their relative normative weights.

33. The one-tier conception discussed here is stripped of all bells and whistles. For instance, the extant circumstances that "obtain in the universe" might be restricted to include only those that are in some sense "agent-involving"; they are circumstances that could conceivably be relevant to what the agent might now do. And once the extant circumstances are restricted, only some values and not all will be relevant to the choice, and the relevance of certain values might make other values irrelevant, further narrowing the values and circumstances of the choice situation. Insofar as this "narrowing down" of the choice situation derives from a nonnormative restriction on circumstances, it does not affect my complaint against it. Once it is allowed that something normative, such as a commitment, plan, or intention, is what matters in the choice, the conception of choice is no longer one-tier. My claim is that any normative consideration that narrows down a choice situation must include a more comprehensive value if there is to be a rational choice in it.

34. Of course, "everything" is itself restricted to a domain—the domain of our natural world—and those who think that "every value" matters in every normative explanation would presumably restrict their domains to the normative world (or to the nonnormative world that subvenes it).
35. The only kind of normativity that the one-tier conception can make sense of in this question is epistemic; the agent may, for example, have overlooked an extant circumstance.

36. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IV, 1125b. Indeed, Aristotle repeatedly underscores the point that many virtues and vices have no names (1107b, 1108a, 1115b). Some examples: excessive fearlessness (1107b, 1115b), the mean between excessive fearlessness and rashness (1107b), excessive desire for pleasure (1107b), deficient desire for pleasure (1107b, 1119a), the virtue associated with pursuing honor and its corresponding state or condition (1107b), the condition corresponding to a deficiency in desire for honor (1107b), the vice of overstating the truth (1108a), the mean between overstating and understating the truth (1108a, 1127a), the virtue associated with seeking pleasure in everyday life (1125b, 1127a), the virtue associated with seeking pleasure in amusements (1108a), and, arguably, excessive and deficient desire for pleasure in daily life and in amusements (1108a).

The question of why certain values are named and others are not admits of a variety of possible answers. I suspect that value-naming conventions depend on our evaluative practices, and that if we began to recognize that nameless values played a crucial role in determining rational resolution of conflict, we would begin to focus attention on their content and application in a way that would eventually result in our adopting shorthand expressions for them. Elijah Millgram suggested to me that Aristotle's explanation for why certain virtues and vices are nameless is that they rarely occur. (This reading of Aristotle is arguably implicit in Hardie 1968: 140.) I doubt that this is a correct interpretation; although Aristotle explicitly says that the particular vices of deficiency in desire for pleasure and of excessive fearlessness are unnamed "because [they] are not found much" (1119a, see also 1107b, 1115b), he does not seem to intend this to be more than a sufficient condition for namelessness. After all, he says that all the virtues and vices associated with feelings of anger are nameless (1125b), and surely the vice of excessive anger could hardly be thought to be rare, even in Aristotle's day. Moreover, he thinks the rare virtues and vices are rare because they go against human nature - the person who shuns pleasure or is unafraid of earthquakes is "a sort of madman" (115b, see also 1119b) - but many of the nameless virtues and vices he identifies are not rare in this way.

I take this example from Peacocke 1984, 1998b, who argues that an inability to articulate explicitly the content of a concept does not show that one lacks the concept.

37. Thanks to Stephen Robert Grimm for pressing me to say more about this objection.

38. Although it is natural to think of the unity of values as something "out there," independent of us, the mystery of this unity may be a matter of the complexity of the social construction of value. After all, certain ordinary values are clearly the products of social invention, for example, goodness as a marriage. The line between socially constructed value and stipulated evaluative considerations is not an easy one to draw, but I believe there is such a line.

40. One particularly nettlesome problem I leave untouched is to explain how values, nameless or otherwise, are individuated, which has ramifications for how promiscuous our evaluative ontology is to be. Another is how these more comprehensive values work with the internal circumstances to determine the relative weights of the values at stake. Neither of these problems, however, is peculiar to the nameless value approach.